Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

740.00119 PW/7–346

Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley to President Truman²³

Tokyo, June 22, 1946.

Dear Mr. President: Following are some observations, conclusions, and recommendations on the Korean situation based upon a firsthand inspection by myself and my staff in Korea. I have also given consideration to interviews with people in our Occupation Forces in Korea as well as Koreans and members of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Northern Korea.

Frankly, I am greatly concerned with our position in Korea and believe it is not receiving the attention and consideration it should. While Korea is a small country, and in terms of our total military strength is a small responsibility, it is an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend. It is here where a test will be made of whether a democratic competitive system can be adapted to meet the challenge of defeated feudalism, or whether some other system i.e., Communism will become stronger.

It is clear from the actions of the Soviets that they have no immediate intention of withdrawing from Korea for the following reasons:

1. They apparently are stalling on taking any joint action with the United States toward setting up a Trusteeship, toward forming anything resembling a provisional government, or doing anything that might in any way hamper their entrenching themselves more firmly in Northern Korea.

2. They are propagandizing and promoting a Communist Party and a Soviet type of program which would establish loyalty to Moscow as the highest form of loyalty to Korea. To this end they are riding rough-shod over all political factions which might oppose or even question such a philosophy. For example, the streets of Northern Korea are decorated with Soviet propaganda posters. Most of these posters publicize the Soviet Government, and include large pictures of Stalin and Lenin.

Many of the posters read as follows:

“Long live the friendship of the Soviet Union and Korea”

“The Soviet Government is the highest form of Democracy”

“We will raise the honor of the Red Army still higher”

“For the Fatherland, for the party, for Stalin”

“Long live Stalin, the creator of our victories”

“In a strange land a fighter must be more observant and on guard”

“The first teacher of a Red Army soldier is his Sergeant”

From the above, it is clear that the Soviet Government does not intend to allow the United States exclusive use of the word “democracy”. “Democracy” means one thing to the Soviets, and quite another to the United States. To us it means, among other things, freedom of speech, assembly, and press. The Soviet interpretation of “democracy” is expressed in terms of the welfare of the masses.

In considering the effect of Soviet propaganda on the Koreans, it must be remembered that about 70% of the present 27,000,000 people in Korea are small farmers and fishermen. Only a few have ever voted or even have the right to vote. They have little knowledge of national or international economic affairs, and are easily swayed by golden tongues and promises.

3. Communism in Korea could get off to a better start than practically anywhere else in the world. The Japanese owned the railroads, all of the public utilities including power and light, as well as all of the major industries and natural resources. Therefore, if these are suddenly found to be owned by “The People’s Committee” (The Communist Party), they will have acquired them without any struggle of any kind or any work in developing them. This is one of the reasons why the United States should not waive its title or claim to Japanese external assets located in Korea until a democratic (capitalistic) form of government is assured.

4. The Soviets are taking no substantial amount of capital equipment from Korea, although they may be taking certain stocks and products of current production.

5. They are devoting considerable effort to rejuvenate economic activity in Northern Korea probably directed toward replacing the broken economic ties to Japan with new economic ties to the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Army is obviously ensconcing itself for a long stay. Officers’ families are already with them. The Army is virtually operating the railroads. Statements by high ranking Officers show no indication of any plan of leaving or even a hope of leaving.

The possible Soviet objectives in Korea are as follows:

1. To provide Korea as a ‘puppet state’ which would make possible a defense in depth in the event that the Soviet Union were attacked from the Southeast. I would anticipate the present Soviet thinking would be to deal with Korea as they did with Poland and Yugoslavia, namely, with a ‘puppet’ government they will make a Sovietized trade treaty which will only exploit the Koreans.

2. To provide an encirclement, or one jaw of a pincer against North China and Manchuria (the industrial heart of a strong new China). The other jaw of the pincer would be Outer Mongolia (newly Sovietized) and Siberia.

3. To provide a similar encirclement or jaw of a pincer against Japan in the event that Japan were built up by some foreign power to use as a base against the U.S.S.R. The other jaw of the pincer would be the Vladivostok peninsula, Karafuto, and the Kurile Islands.

4. To secure favorable port concessions in the warm water ports of Ch’ongjin (Seishin) and Hungnam (Konan) and Wonsan; similar to the concessions in the ports of Port Arthur and Dairen.

Note: If civil war continues in Manchuria, the U.S.S.R. might occupy Manchuria on the theory that they must protect their interest in the railroads and be able to communicate between Siberia, Port Arthur, and Dairen.

Recommendations:

1. The Soviet Union should be compelled to comply with the Moscow Declaration on Korea. Specifically she should be called to task for failure to participate in the formation of a representative provisional government, and for maintaining the split at the 38th Parallel.

Acting may be secured in several ways including:

a. Raising the issue with the United Nations or the Big Four.

b. By the United States taking action to withhold concessions which otherwise might be made to the U.S.S.R.

c. By aggressively pursuing a campaign of propaganda in favor of a United Korea which would make the Soviet obstructionism obvious to the Koreans and to the world.

2. The United States should carry on a propaganda and educational campaign within Korea in order to sell democracy and the four freedoms. It should teach the responsibilities as well as the advantages of democracy.

In the absence of such a campaign, the Koreans will hear pretty largely only of Communism which the Soviets preach as the highest form of democracy. Sending American teachers to Korea and Korean students to the United States would aid such a campaign and should be encouraged from a long range viewpoint. However, no immediate benefits can accrue in time to meet the present crisis.

3. Korea should receive certain needed industrial equipment from Japan as part of reparations removals. Her industrial economy presently is developed for the production of raw and semi-finished materials which were required by Japan. She now requires equipment such as machine tools in order to devote the products of her present industry to the needs of her internal economy. This can be provided in one or more ways including:

a. Substantiating a claim for damage and cost of Japanese occupation and aggression.

b. The United States subordinating a portion of its (and possibly other countries also) claim to Korea with or without receiving compensation from the Koreans in the form of future deliveries of raw materials. Since this may have to take the form of disposing of United States property, an act of Congress similar to the Tydings Act²⁴ on the Philippines may be required.

c. A more practical manner of bringing this about would be for the United States Representative at the Japanese Reparations Meetings to pick the psychological time to reduce its demands sufficiently to give Korea what it needs. (Note: The United States would not actually be giving up anything it expects to get or even wants).

4. The United States should give greater technical assistance to Korea in the reconstruction of her industrial economy. This can be done by:

a. Sending engineers to Korea to aid in starting operations and training Korean supervisory personnel.

b. Encouraging Korea to invite participation of American capital which would bring with it managerial knowhow.

c. Encourage training of Korean engineers in American industries and engineering schools, and send American teachers to Korean engineering schools.

You will note that the observations, recommendations, and conclusions contained herein depart from strictly reparations or even economic aspects of the Korean situation. However, the economy of which the reparations question is an integral part is so interwoven with the political and international phases that I took the liberty of extending my remarks into these fields. I do not do so with any intent of usurping anyone elses prerogatives.

I am addressing an identical original of this letter to the Honorable James F. Byrnes, The Secretary of State.

Respectfully,

Edwin W. Pauley

23. Mr. Pauley, President Truman’s personal representative on reparations, was on a special mission to the Far East; for announcement of his visit, see Department of State Bulletin, May 12, 1946, p. 821. For other documentation, see ante, pp. 471–604 passim. Copy of this letter was sent to the Department on July 3 by the White House for preparation of a reply; for President Truman’s reply, as sent July 16, see p. 713.
24. Philippine Independence Act, approved March 24, 1934; 48 Stat. 456.