Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–746

The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State

secret
No. 31

Seoul, June 7, 1946.
[Received June 17.]

Sir: As of possible interest to the Department, there are enclosed herewith¹⁹ translations of the following printed documents of political action issued by local branches of the Communist Party in Korea for party members:

• Document A—March 30, 1946. Instructions (general) No. 12 of Pusan City Committee;
• Document B—April 2, 1946. Instructions by Pusan City Committee in regard to propaganda policy concerning the U.S.–Soviet Joint Commission;
• Document C—April 3, 1946. Instructions by In’chon City Committee re policy “as to the Joint Conference between the U.S. representatives and those of the Soviet Union in Seoul.”

Document C was seized in a raid by the Military Government Counter Intelligence Corps officers on the Communist daily, Inchon Shinmun, on May 7, 1946, in the course of law enforcement. The other two documents were brought to C.I.C.’s attention.

Mr. Eugene Prostov, of the Department’s Economic Mission to Korea (under Dr. Arthur C. Bunce, JK) who served as interpreter of the American delegation on the U.S.–Soviet Joint Commission, has made the following analysis of the documents:

“These documents indicate (1) that the party line of the Korean Communist Party published on 3 April 1946 is identical with the line followed by the Soviet Delegation in the meetings of the Joint Commission through 8 May 1946; (2) that, judging by identical phraseology, both lines derived from the same or closely related instructions; (3) that the leftist propaganda and demonstrations were controlled by the Communist Party in a centralized and well-organized manner so as to assist the Soviet Delegation; (4) that the Communist Party has confidence in being able to collaborate with, and utilize for its own ends, the Democratic People’s Front, of which it is one of the four component parties; (5) that as early as 3 April 1946, the Communist Party (and, by implication, the Soviet Delegation) intended to discredit and bar from both consultation and provisional government not only the Democratic Council, but also all or most of the other than Communist-controlled leaders, by using the criterion of non-support of the Moscow Decision; (6) that it was a firm intention of both the Communist Party and the Soviet Delegation to defer the discussion of the 38th parallel and economic problems of unification until the establishment of an adequately controlled ‘United Front’ government; (7) since the Communist Party instructions spell out the objectives of the Soviet Delegation, and are completely consistent with them, they not only explain the Soviet tactics at the conference, but also throw some light on the Soviet intentions vis-à-vis the formation of a future Korean government, its structure and personnel, which were to have been pursued had the Commission continued its work.

The following are the highlights of the documents, with parenthetical references to the proceedings of the Joint Commission: ‘Principal object of our …²⁰ propaganda campaign should be … influencing the Joint Conference,’ (C); ‘the result must be brought to bear on the Joint Commission,’ (B):

(1) ‘We should insist firmly upon the Soviet representatives’ demands … saying that these demands are expressive of democracy and what the people want.’ (C)

(2) ‘We should separate the anti-democratic parties from the people and expose their … actions … and falsehoods.’ (C)

(3) ‘Let the people know that the Conference is to establish real democratic government.’ (B, C; Joint Commission, 24 April).

(4) ‘Inform that … our political parties and organizations only (viz., the Democratic Front) will have the right to participate in the Joint Commission.’ (B, C; Joint Commission Shtikov, 11 April; Tsarapkin in SubCommission #1, May 6, 1946, etc.)

(5) ‘If the above shall be carried out, all problems, rice … inflation, the 38th parallel, will be fundamentally solved.’ (B, C; Joint Commission: Shtikov: inflation, 20 April; 38th boundary, 6 April, 1946).

(6) ‘Any ones who will wipe out their previous mistakes and return to our democratic form, we will welcome them.’ (B, C; Joint Commission—provision for renouncing errors as laid down in Soviet Document, 6 April; also Shtikov, 5 April.)

(7) ‘To oppose the party registration law which is worse than those of a totalitarian state.’ (A, B, C; Joint Commission: Tsarapkin in Sub-Commission #1, 1 May, 1946, page 5)

Part II of Documents B and C lays down ‘concrete regulations’ in connection with the above. These are of particular interest, since they relate to parties and leaders which were to be excluded.

A. Parties that can participate in the Joint Commission:

(1) Those who act for the welfare of the people and are supported by the people (B, C: Tsarapkin, March 22).

(2) Parties and organizations which appeared independently and naturally, and are working reasonably.

(3) Those supporting the Moscow Decision (Shtikov, March 22).

(4) All those of Democratic People’s Front have the right to join the Joint Commission. (B, C; Tsarapkin, 5 May; Shtikov, 6 May, 1946)

B. Parties and organizations that cannot participate in the Joint Commission: (B and C)

(1) Representative Democratic Council (Shtikov, 4, 6 May; Tsarapkin, 5 May) and other parties that have opposed Moscow Decision (Shtikov, 22 March).

(2) Reactionary parties and groups inimical to the U.S.S.R. (Shtikov, 5 April 1946)

(3) Those opposed to the welfare of the people; those opposed to the People’s Front, and those advocating terrorism; anti-democratic, pro-Japanese and treasonable groups (allusions throughout the work of the 1st Sub-Commission beginning 30 March 1946)

C. Acceptable leaders: Pak, Heun Yung; Lyuh, Woon Hung, Hu, Hun; Kim, Doo Bong; Kim, Il Sawng; Iee, Choo Ha; Tshei, Moo Chawng; Kim, Won Bong (NB: the list consists of the names of leaders of the People’s Front parties as well as those of the Communist Party.)

D. Reactionary leaders who must be positively rejected: Rhee, Syngman; Kim, Koo; An, Chai Hong; Kim, Seung Soo; Cho, Wan Koo; Cho, Man Sik; Chang, Duk Soo; Cho, So Ang (NB: these are doubtless the names of those with whom the Soviet Delegation would have refused to consult. In 7 cases the reason for rejection is stated to be opposition to trusteeship; other reasons given include instigation of student soldiers, fascism, terrorism, capitalism, treason, being anti-Russian, being pro-Japanese, opportunism, feudalism, conservatism, and even nationalism, having no definite opinion, etc. The list includes every prominent conservative leader in the south and also Cho, Man Sik, who is not conservative in the north.

E. Lists, without further explanations ‘those who are neither against nor for trusteeship’: Kim, Kyu Sik; Kim, Pyung Rho; Hong, Meing Hui. (These are probably individuals who would be acceptable to the Communists as a last resort. Kim, Kyu Sik is a strong liberal leader of wide popularity; others are relatively minor figures.[)]

F. Form of Government (note: the shape of things to come is most clearly stated in Document A: ‘To insist that the Provisional Government … will be the People’s Republic in regard to its national constitution and the people’s system in regard to its form of government.’ Document B enjoins caution, but states that ‘when the government is established, and the governmental form is decided, insist on the following: The People’s Republic and the People’s Committee have been developed independently and naturally, so support them absolutely.’ People’s Committees were included as the recommended type of local authorities in the Soviet proposal of 14 April, 2nd Sub-Commission.)

(Note: In Soviet political tradition, People’s Republics are democracies assisted into being wherever feudalistic survivals make impracticable the outright adoption of socialism; they progress from coalitions of democratic parties to the rule of a single party featuring ‘liquidation of feudalistic survivals and progress to socialism while bypassing capitalistic development.’ During the latter stages the power is shared with a strongly articulated youth organization patterned after Komsomol. The Khorezmian, Bukharan, and Tuvan People’s Republics were absorbed into the Soviet Union on application. Outer Mongolian and Yugoslav republics are independent.

People’s Republics are based on local People’s Committees, as in Tuva or Mongolia. Like the local Soviets in the U.S.S.R., they are administered by a periodic congress and an interim executive body.)

In conclusion, documents B and C specify the techniques to be employed in the propaganda campaign. These range from the creation of shock brigades, emphasis on the lectures and discussions, including the use of posters, theaters, press and radio, bombardment of the Joint Commission by a ‘continuous stream of decisions and petitions,’ and utilizing leaders who ‘know how to organize a group of those who get excited after listening to sensational speeches.’ All three documents include, as additional propaganda objectives, opposition to certain ordinances of the Military Government, by passing resolutions which are to be reported to the Joint Commission. The ordinances objected to concern Party Registration, New Korea Company, closing of Private Schools, Disposal of Japanese Property, and the Restriction of Assembly Rights.”

Respectfully yours,

William R. Langdon

19. Enclosures not printed.
20. This and subsequent omissions indicated in the original.