740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2446: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State6
[Received May 24—5:09 p.m.]
Tfurc 48 [to Tokyo]. [From Langdon and Thayer.] In view of Izvestiya’s clarification on 15 May of Soviet reaction to commission’s adjournment the following observations on our present position and future course would appear appropriate.
It is now all too clear that despite US occupation of Southern Korea the Russians have intended to impose a united front policy throughout the country differing only slightly from those in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania. Such a policy if we could be forced to accept it would doubtless hasten and simplify Soviet control over [Page 686] the entire Peninsula. It is therefore entirely possible that the Kremlin will delay a resumption of negotiations and wait for our natural impatience, our demobilization problems, declining American interests in Korean affairs and local dissatisfaction with the division of the country to oblige us to supply speedy solution of these terms, i.e., a united front which excluding [excludes] all but elements controllable by the Communist Party. On the other hand, if we stand firm, it is not unlikely that Russia will find her long range interests best served by reaching a compromise solution on a government acceptable to us, thereby accelerating our departure from Korea and thus, in her estimate, leaving the Soviets a free hand to pursue their political aims here.
Whether she persists in pushing a united front or decides to compromise, it is clear that we should (a) indicate to Russia our firm determination to resist Soviet domination of Korea and our readiness to stick it out as long as may be necessary to ensure Korea from such domination and (b) take advantage of the Korean Communists’ unpopularity among moderate patriotic elements to consolidate the position of the latter in the south and encourage their resistance in the north.
While these objectives cannot of course be achieved overnight, patient and tactful guidance of the Korean leaders and firmness both in Washington and here as to our conditions for resuming the implementation of the Moscow decision should eventually produce desired results.
On the international front, it is recommended that aside from the reiteration of our position whenever appropriate, no effort to initiate high level discussions with Moscow be undertaken for the time being. Similarly we should avoid indications of impatience. Another important element in such a program is to avoid as far as possible any impression that there is a division in our camp, that Washington is pressing General Hodge to revise his position, or that high officials at home suspect him of favoring certain unpopular elements at the expense of others. In this connection the UP story by Hensley on 18th May caused considerable harm by enabling the Communists to demonstrate to their now unenthusiastic bedfellows that American support of democratic elements is divided and unreliable.
Consolidation of democratic elements can in our view be best accomplished by increasing the participation in Military Government and preparing them to take over more responsibility as our occupation and Military Government forces are perforce reduced. A prerequisite to this is the formation of a true coalition of all democratic parties, which can probably be brought about by convincing them that the quickest way to achieve lasting independence is first to unify in the [Page 687] south; second, to participate in the administration as a coalition of independent parties; and possibly, thereafter to use their unified prestige to press for unification with the north.
As predicated in Tfurc 456a local reaction of Koreans to our press release on Commission’s adjournment has been favorable though despondency and depression have mingled with satisfaction at our unexpectedly firm stand vis-à-vis the Russians.
All groups support Hodge with the exception of the Communist controlled Democratic People’s Front consisting of a number of youths, women, labor unions, and farmers’ alliances of indeterminate strength and two small splinter parties in addition to the People’s Party and the Communists. This front is so controlled by a small group of Communistic infiltrators that neither the parties themselves nor their individual members have any opportunity of expressing themselves. Thus while even the head of the People’s Party and chairman of the People’s Front, Lyuh Woon Hyung, has admitted that he would prefer immediate independence to trusteeship, he has half-heartedly supported the latter under Communist pressure. He further admits that at least two members of his party’s Executive Committee have Communist Party cards and is said to have confessed to being no longer able to control the party. These familiar tactics have rendered the front a formidable stalking horse for the Communists who have little or no real support among the population. It cannot be denied that the front is supported by a large number of genuinely patriotic Koreans with progressive leanings whose participation in Korean politics would be most desirable if they could speak for themselves. It has, therefore, been General Hodge’s policy to encourage these elements to throw off Communist domination and reach a working agreement with other parties which would justify granting them more participation in government affairs. This policy culminated in the formation of the Representative Democratic Council to which all major parties were invited. All except the Communists accepted but at last moment Lyuh of the People’s Party deserted. The council cannot, therefore, be called completely representative of all patriotic elements and has consequently not been given much opportunity to participate in Government.
This has until recently been the general situation through [though] a growing restlessness at the domination of the Communists, disgust with the illegal and terroristic tactics of Communists’ organized labor and farm groups and bitterness at Russian pillage in the north have tended to decrease the front’s popular support. On the other hand some members of the front, distrustful of America’s reliability in [Page 688] preventing eventual Russian domination here found it personally expedient to play along with the Kremlin’s supporters.
In the past 2 weeks three events have shaken the so-called left considerably. First, a group led by Lyuh’s younger brother bolted the People’s Party denouncing it for its subservience to the Communist and setting up a Socialist Party which calls itself the Party of the Patriotic left. Second, a widespread counterfeiting ring implicating several officials of the Communist Party was found in the building which houses the Party’s HQs. Third, the Commission adjourned on an issue in which the great mass of Koreans believe the Russians were wrong. These three events have so shaken the front that prominent members of the front have begun to waver and Lyuh the elder has personally made overtures to Kim Kiu Sic, Acting Head of Representative Democratic Council. To [We?] have encouraged this tendency as much as discretion permitted and have pressed the right to accept such overtures with good grace.
Tenable temporary setback has, however, interrupted this development, inasmuch as a UP story from Hensley in Washington blaming Hodge for the Commission’s breakup gave encouragement to those who believe that a split in the American camp will give eventual success to the Russians. It is hoped that we shall soon be able to squelch its effect sufficiently to permit a resumption of negotiations between right and left. In the meantime we are biding our time and not pushing the matter.
However, provided a satisfactory coalition of patriotic parties can be achieved, without Communist collaboration, General Hodge proposes to increase their participation in affairs considerably by creating a Korean Nonadministrative Cabinet and Legislative Body which, subject to his supreme authority, will enact regulations and laws for the period prior to the establishment of a Unified Provisional Government under the Moscow decision. It will be made clear by adequate publicity that this step is not designed to postpone unification but, on the contrary, by giving the initiative to Koreans in the South to hasten its realization. In this connection there are indications that Korean puppets in the north are finding their position more and more difficult and might possibly be induced to enter into private negotiations with a southern coalition to form a government slate which an American delegation might eventually put forward for consideration by the Commission should it reconvene.
It will be noted from the above that public opinion from home that the American authorities are backing exclusively such conservative elements as Rhee and Kim Koo are unfounded. We have largely ignored [Page 689] the latter who as a result of his own political ineptitude has almost dropped out of political scene. Rhee, on the other hand, has been cooperative in rallying all shades of opinion toward unification and has been helpful in preventing his following from excessive anti-Allied demonstrations. At the same time he has made conciliatory gestures to the Russians and has urged his many followers to do likewise. General Hodge does not necessarily feel that Rhee is essential or even desirable in a future provisional government, but so long as he is one of the few nationally known leaders among democratic elements, his cooperation now can hardly be dispensed with.
The Department’s reactions to the above would be appreciated as soon as possible especially with respect to the establishment of an interim non-administrative cabinet and legislature.
It is not the intention of General Hodge to take any step that might prejudice the resumption of Joint Commission negotiations or that would give the Koreans grounds for fearing that we are rendering the division of the country permanent. On the contrary we would stress to the Koreans the temporary and practical nature of the new setup; however, some positive action is essential to encourage the Korean people and indicate progress toward self rule.