740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–846
The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State
No. 20
[Received May 17.]
Sir: Reference is made to the Department’s telegram No. 45 of March 29, 1946, requesting that suggestions be made from time to time, combining the views of the other members of the American delegation on the Soviet-American Joint Commission for Korea, which [Page 668] might guide the Department in revising paragraph 4B of SWNCC 176/18 of January 28, 1946, relating to plans for a permanent Korean government.
The Department’s wish will be borne in mind and, as the Joint Commission’s work progresses and the general scheme of government desired by the Korean people becomes known as a result of consultation with Korean political parties and social organizations, recommendations and suggestions for the permanent government of Korea will be submitted to the Department. In the meantime, in order to orient and prepare the American delegation in pre-planning for its tasks under paragraph 3 of the Moscow Communiqué, Section III, Korea, of December 29, 1945, it would be helpful if the Department outlined for the delegation specific measures under the following headings which presumably will have to be worked out by the Commission:
Measures for helping and assisting the
- Political Progress,
- Economic Progress, and
- Social Progress of the Korean people;
- Development of Democratic Self-Government of the Korean people;
- Establishment of National Independence of Korea.
The development of the industry, transport, agriculture, and national culture of Korea is the function of the Korean Democratic Provisional Government under Paragraph 1 of the Moscow Communiqué, but the Soviet delegation on the Commission has taken the position that such development should also be assisted by the Commission.*
For the Department’s possible guidance, a statement roughly indicating the American delegation’s concepts of what is involved in the [Page 669] task of the Joint Commission under paragraph 3 of the Moscow Communiqué is enclosed.86
Trusteeship
It might be appropriate at this time to make some observations on the question of a trusteeship for Korea as envisaged in paragraph 3 of the Moscow Communiqué.
Judging from the attitude of the Soviet delegation up to now, the Soviet Government will probably take the position that the measures worked out by the Joint Commission, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Government and Korean parties, for “helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea” will be supervised if not partially administered by the authority in Korea, in whatever form it may take, representing the four interested powers or United Nations Organization. For example, the Soviet chairman of the Sub-commission on organization (of the Provisional Government) has formally proposed to his American colleague that, in the preamble of the Provisional Government’s “charter,” there be acknowledged the derivation of that government’s authority from the Moscow Communiqué and a statement of “the principles of the (Provisional Government’s) relations with the bodies effecting the trusteeship.” Again, throughout the discussions so far in the Joint Commission, the Soviet delegation has stressed the need of recognition by all Korean parties and social organizations that Korea is to be subjected to four-power trusteeship during the life of the Provisional Government. Unlike the American authorities in south Korea, who have played the trusteeship theme pianissimo and placed much stock in Mr. Byrnes’ remark in his radio address of December 30, 1945, that the Joint Commission, working with the Provisional Government “may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship,” the Soviet authorities in north Korea have made it plain to the Koreans that trusteeship is the meat of the Moscow Communiqué, that there is no alternative to it and that opposition to it is subversive.
Whatever Moscow’s reasons for its seemingly wholehearted support of a trusteeship may be, individual members of the Soviet delegation have privately put forward sound arguments for trusteeship: the unpreparedness of Koreans for immediate independence, the present quarrelsomeness of Korean factions and need of Allied umpires; the advantages of Korea starting toward nationhood on a well-organized and better trained basis, the need for technical and material assistance, [Page 670] et cetera. Thus, the delegation approaches the problem realistically and has no sympathy with Korean sensibilities over trusteeship. Rather, it loses patience with Korean boasts that no Allied help is needed. The delegation also takes the view that Koreans contributed little, if anything, to their liberation and, therefore, have no moral right to question the plans which their liberators have for their independence. As a matter of interest, it might be mentioned that the Soviet delegation has stated that Koreans are not ready for the Soviet form of democracy, which suggests that the Soviets perhaps desire trusteeship so that they might utilize it for cultivating their doctrines in Korea.
For the following reasons, it is now thought advisable that the United States Government decide firmly on a trusteeship for Korea for the whole or part of the probationary period and direct the American delegation on the Joint Commission to approach on that premise its assignment under paragraph 3 of the Moscow Communiqué.
- (a)
- Two or three years of stable, centralized administration are essential for the Korean people to become reintegrated, to cool off from their excitements since the Japanese surrender, to learn discipline and team-work and to develop some elementary sense of individual responsibility for their national well-being;
- (b)
- The Koreans will need initial help, guidance, training in organization and orderly procedures, and supervision backed by authority if they are to get a good start for independence;
- (c)
- The Soviet Government is treating a trusteeship as something absolute and almost sacred;
- (d)
- The United States has from the beginning been the chief proponent of a trusteeship for Korea;
- (e)
- The Korean people will most likely become reconciled to a trusteeship when they see the extent of authority enjoyed by the Provisional Government under it and, presumably, the unobtrusiveness of the trusteeship agency;
- (f)
- It will be easier for the American delegation to formulate concrete, definitive proposals if it postulates the existence of an authoritative organ to give effect to its proposals; also such postulation will make for greater harmony in working out proposals with the Russian delegation, which at times has misinterpreted the American delegation’s defense of freedom of expression (by Koreans voicing dislike of trusteeship) as evasiveness with respect to the trusteeship feature of the Moscow agreement.
- (g)
- An absolutist, repressive regime of Korean Communists is getting ensconced behind the Soviet Command in North Korea, which may conceivably, with Soviet Army connivance if Soviet troops prolong their occupation unduly, interfere with, defy, or nullify the authority and measures of the Provisional Government for the whole of Korea—the advantages of four-power responsibility for, and support of, the Provisional Government’s authority in such a situation are obvious.
Agency of Trusteeship
If the United States Government should revise its present position that it may be possible to dispense with a trusteeship and decide that a trusteeship up to five years from the time of issuance of the Moscow Communiqué is mandatory, a major premise in approaching its tasks under paragraph 3, as far as the American delegation is concerned, would be a clear idea of the nature of the initial advisory, supervisory or control agency in Korea of the four interested powers or United Nations Organization which the United States envisages at this time. In this connection the following thoughts are projected:
The agency might be an organization of qualified advisors, instructors and experts from the four interested powers. Because of their intimate current experience with Korean affairs, the United States and the Soviet Union would, from a practical standpoint, be called upon to supply the majority of the personnel for the organization. For instance, if the organization required 500 persons (including military, constabulary, police and Coast Guard instructors), the United States and the Soviet Union would provide respectively say, 225 and 175, and Great Britain and China the remainder. Each of the four powers would be represented by a High Commissioner, who would also be administrative head of his nationals in the organization. The four High Commissioners might also form the executive body of the trusteeship organization, and the several national commissioners might be chairmen, in rotation, of this executive body. Or the four powers might prefer to select a permanent chairman. The rules for the organization’s administration, proceedings, chairmanship, discipline, etc., would be drawn up by the four commissioners. The members of the organization would work in the several departments of the Provisional Government in an advisory capacity, and an instrument would be drawn up with the Provisional Government to the effect that in the event of dispute between advisors and Provisional Government authorities, the dispute would be referred to the executive body of the trusteeship agency for decision. The salaries of the organization’s personnel might be outside the Provisional Government’s budget and be paid directly by the Government concerned.
Name of Agency of Trusteeship
Although the relationship to the Provisional Government of the four-power organization would be that of a substantive trusteeship, a concession might be made to Korean susceptibilities by calling the organization say, “Allied Commission for Korea,” or “Allied Cooperating Commission in Korea,” or by some other name, and by regulating it by a four-power agreement independent of, and unrelated to, the United Nations Organization. The Koreans feel, and [Page 672] with some justice, that their cultural level and history entitle them to different treatment at the hands of the United Nations from that applicable to peoples of mandated territories in Africa and backward races in southeast Asia which have not yet made any contributions to mankind or history.
Foreign National Representation and Korean Representation Abroad.
After the Provisional Government is installed and until the end of the trusteeship, foreign national interests in Korea might be represented by a Diplomatic Agent and Consul General, as formerly in Tangier. Korean interests abroad might be represented by diplomatic agencies at the capitals and by branches thereof at important places, controlled to some extent by personnel of the trusteeship organization in the Foreign Affairs Department in Seoul. This is suggested as a means of developing a Korean foreign service. With the establishment of foreign national representation as above indicated, the Soviet and United States Commanders, while still being vested with supreme authority, should perhaps have tactical jurisdiction only until the withdrawal of their forces.
Disposal of Zonal Governments.
The American delegation has proposed that the administrative system for southern Korea that has been set up and developed by American Military Government be adopted and enlarged as the administrative and executive machinery of the Provisional Government. There is no comparable Soviet military government or centralized Korean regime in northern Korea and the absorption by the southern Korean administrative system of the central and local “committees” governing north Korea ought to present no great mechanical difficulty. When or if the Soviet delegation accepts this proposal, American Military Government as such will automatically go out of existence and American personnel, which would assume advisory status, will progressively be withdrawn in favor of Korean personnel, as favored by the United States Government. The Soviet delegation has a plan for merging the two zonal governments not radically different from that of the American plan (see enclosure 2).87
Schedule of Transition From Present to Final State of Korean Control.
The following is a very tentative schedule of the successive stages in Allied control of Korea as envisaged by the American delegation, beginning with the present proceedings in the Joint Commission and ending with the liquidation of the trusteeship organization.
[Page 673]1946, June 30—Final selection of ministerial and other high personnel and determination of “charter” and platform of Korean Provisional Democratic Government. Submission of proposals regarding same to United States and Soviet Governments.
1946, July—Provisional Government being familiarized with existing administrative system in south Korea and central committee system in north Korea. Joint Commission studying on behalf of Provisional Government extension of south Korea administrative system to, or merger with, north Korean system. (The Soviet delegation in this period proposes to recruit the staff for the Provisional Government from Military Government in south Korea and People’s Committee in north Korea.)
1946, July 30—Acceptance by four governments of proposals of Joint Commission for personnel, charter and platform of Provisional Government.
1946, August 1—Inauguration of Provisional Government. First substantial mutual troop withdrawal begins.
1946, August to November—Installation of Provisional Government and assumption by it of nominal authority over zonal administrative systems, which nominally cease to exist and actually begin to unite. Progressive actual authority and administration of affairs are assumed by Provisional Government. (The Soviet scheme envisages assumption and exercise of complete administrative authority as soon as feasible after inauguration.) Consultation with Provisional Government and parties on measures of assistance (trusteeship) begins and proposals for four governments are drafted. American personnel of trusteeship organization is enlisted (chiefly from Military Government), also possibly Soviet personnel, according to needs therefor of trusteeship as determined by Joint Commission in consultation with Provisional Government. Proposals of Joint Commission submitted to four governments, including need of additional personnel for trusteeship organization to be supplied, if so desired, by Great Britain and China. Second substantial reciprocal troop withdrawal begins.
1946, December—1947, January—Joint Commission’s proposals studied by four governments. Additional (British and Chinese) personnel for trusteeship organization selected. Four-power agreement concluded. The several national High Commissioners appointed. Trusteeship organization installed in Korea. Joint Commission liquidated.
1947, February—Last troops withdrawn. (Note: Up to this point, supreme authority will have resided in the two Commanders. Following the final withdrawal of troops, supreme authority for the predetermined trusteeship period will be vested in the trusteeship organization, [Page 674] and an instrument suspending the complete independence of Korea and recognizing the supreme authority of the trusteeship organization during the period will be concluded with the Provisional Government before the final withdrawal of troops).
Troop Withdrawal
It was gathered from private conversation with a member of the Soviet delegation that the Soviet Government has no plan of withdrawing its troops from north Korea during the probationary period. The foregoing schedule provides for three stages of withdrawal, with all troops to be gone by February, 1947, and is in line with the Government’s policy that military occupation should end as early as practicable.† In view of the probable absence of any plan of troop withdrawal on the part of the Soviets, the Government might wish to consider immediate conversations with Moscow looking to withdrawal along the lines just indicated, so that the record will be in order for three-power pressure for an agreement on early total withdrawal when the time comes for the Joint Commission’s proposals for “helping and assisting (trusteeship)” to be studied by the four powers. It is very clear to us here in Korea that there will never be any normal political or economic life in Korea or unhampered operation of a trusteeship so long as Soviet troops remain in the country.
The foregoing observations and enclosures have been submitted for review and comment to the Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces in Korea and to my associates on the Joint Commission. They embody many suggestions made by these authorities and have their general concurrence. For the Government’s study, there is also enclosed copy of a memorandum on the first draft of this despatch prepared by Major General Archer L. Lerch, Military Governor, as well as a translation of an informal statement by Colonel General Shtikov, Chief Soviet Commissioner, of the Soviet Delegation’s ideas on the order of the Joint Commission’s work.88
Respectfully yours,
-
The Soviet delegation, in an informal memorandum of May 2, 1946, proposes that the measures of assistance to be elaborated under paragraph 3 of the Moscow Communiqué should be along the following lines:
- A.
- Economical
- Industry
- Transportation
- Agriculture
- B.
- Internal and External Trade
- C.
- Financial
- D.
- Training Korean Personnel
- E.
- National Culture
- Economics
- Culture
- Health
- F.
- Political
- Constitution
- Government Structure
- G.
- Justice
- Court System, Legal Codes, etc.
Simultaneously, a code on the elections of local organs of authority shall be worked out. The structure of the local government will have been determined during the first stage of work. [Footnote in the original.]
↩ - Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- SWNCC 101/4, 24 October 1945. [Footnote in the original; for text of SWNCC 101/4, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, p. 1096.]↩
- Latter not printed.↩
- Submitted to General Hodge.↩