740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–846: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State
secret
urgent
urgent
Seoul, 8 May 1946.
[Received May 9—1:45 p.m.]
[Received May 9—1:45 p.m.]
Tfurc 42 [to Tokyo]. [From Langdon and Thayer.]
- 1.
- Current thoughts here on the form of future aid and assistance to Korea after the formation of the provisional Govt visage progressive reduction of Allied occupation and control over Korean affairs and complete withdrawal occupation forces as soon as practical.
- 2.
- It is generally agreed that the most essential factor in this plan is the early reduction of occupation troops to a minimum consonant with security. Any real reduction of Soviet troops will take considerable time to accomplish both in negotiations and in actual operation.
- 3.
- Consequently, it is suggested that Washington may desire to consider instructing the American Delegation at the Joint Commission at an early date to propose to the Soviet Delegation an agreement that the number of troops of each ally be reduced to no more than one division or a total of 15,000 troops, the bulk of which to be concentrated at central points in North and South Korea, this operation to be accomplished by the time the provisional government is inaugurated which we estimate will be during July or August.
- 4.
- Such a proposal would not only be good for the record at this time but would also give the Russians ample advance notice of a step which we regard as urgent if a provisional Korean Govt is to function normally and the undesirable features of multipower occupation, such as that of Austria and Germany, are to be eliminated.
[
Langdon
and Thayer
]