894.30/5–1446
The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
No. 419
[Received May 23.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s telegrams 201, May 6, 1946,34 and 214, May 9,35 in regard to a protest by the Soviet Member of the Allied Council in connection with a recent SCAP directive to the Japanese Government concerning the destruction of Japanese naval vessels and to the Department’s telegraphic instruction 299, May 10 [9], on this subject.
There are enclosed,36 as listed below, copies of correspondence on this subject which has passed between Lieutenant General K. Derevyanko, Soviet Member of the Council; Major General Paul J. Mueller, Chief of Staff on behalf of the Supreme Commander; and myself, as Chairman and Member for the United States to the Council. A copy of the directive of April 30, 1946 to the Japanese Government, subject, “Destruction of Former Japanese Naval Vessels”, is also enclosed.
The principal points raised in General Derevyanko’s letter of May 3, 1946 are as follows:
- 1.
- The time allowed for consideration of the draft directive was too short, especially as the Soviet Government was not consulted concerning the basic problem and the directive appears to be the result of an American unilateral action.
- 2.
- Representatives of the Members of the Council should be allowed to witness the destruction of former Japanese naval vessels. A collateral question involves the disposition of Japanese transport submarines.
- 3.
- Vessels for experimental target use should also be allocated to the Soviet Government.
- 4.
- An executive committee should be formed to compile a list of allocable Japanese naval vessels.
- 5.
- The executive committee should also have cognizance over auxiliary vessels of the Japanese navy.
- 6.
- Allocable Japanese naval vessels should not be utilized for repatriation purposes.
- 7.
- The destruction of special facilities and ammunition is an integral factor in the disarmament of the Japanese navy.
In reply to General Derevyanko’s letter of May 3, the Chief of Staff, Major General Paul J. Mueller, explained the chain of command through which policy decisions are transmitted to the Supreme Commander and stressed that, in general, the questions raised by General Derevyanko were beyond the scope of the Supreme Commander’s authority. General Derevyanko was also advised that the suggested establishment of an executive committee is not in accordance with the Moscow Communiqué, and that the temporary use of Japanese vessels for repatriation purposes and the destruction of Japanese submarines are both in accordance with instructions received from the United States Government.
In his letter of May 7, 1946 to General MacArthur, General Derevyanko reverted to the question of the time permitted for consideration of the directive and contended that his recommendations had not been given consideration. He suggested that the Council as a whole should consult and advise in the name of the Council.
In reply to this letter, I reiterated that the basic principles for the disposition of Japanese combatant naval vessels were agreed upon by the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain and China, and mentioned the impracticality of calling a meeting of the Council for discussion of each individual directive as well as the desirability of continuing the present procedure of informal consultation and presentation of views.
It would appear that the subject directive is being utilized by General Derevyanko in an endeavor to increase the time for consideration by Council Members of proposed SCAP directives, to expand the functions of the Council, and to circumscribe actions of the Supreme Commander by seeking to establish his dependence upon prior advice by the Council acting as a unit. There is also involved a Soviet desire to preserve vessels to be allocated to the Soviet Government and to throw the entire burden of repatriation upon United States vessels.
Respectfully yours,