The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward for the
information of the Department single copies of: (1) directive of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Imperial Japanese
Government, dated January 20, 1946, concerning the custody, control and
protective maintenance of Japanese aircraft plants, arsenals and
laboratories;75 and
(2) press release of the United States Army Forces, Pacific, January 20,
1946, commenting on that directive.
It is stated in the press release that the purpose of taking these war
plants, numbering nearly 400, into American custody is to ensure their
availability and preservation in good condition for reparations.
[Enclosure]
Press Release Issued by the General
Headquarters, United States Armed Forces, Pacific, at Tokyo,
January 20, 1946
400
Jap War Plants to
SCAP
Custody for Reparations
A sweeping directive of General MacArthur today took nearly 400
Japanese aircraft plants, army and navy arsenals, and war material
laboratories into SCAP custody to
insure their availability, intact and in good operating condition,
for reparations.
SCAP officials said that much of
their equipment had been deteriorating, due to lack of proper
maintenance, and that there had been a number of cases in which
machinery had been removed from some of the installations.
The Japanese government was ordered to halt such removals from the
installations, which were listed by name, and to assure the
necessary personnel and supplies for proper maintenance.
SCAP also decreed cancellation at
once of any permits that have been previously granted to any of the
installations for conversion to peacetime production, unless an
installation is “immediately and absolutely essential to the civil
economy”.
The commander of the Fifth United States Fleet is charged with
custody of three installations at the Yokosuka Naval Base, and all
others covered in today’s order are in custody of the commanding
general of the Eighth Army.
SCAP ordered the two responsible
American commanders to have the Japanese place each installation
under guard to carry out SCAP
orders for prevention of theft, sabotage and unauthorized removal of
equipment and machinery.
The Japanese government was directed to have its representatives
report, within 72 hours after receipt of today’s directive, to the
two American commanders to receive their orders for carrying out the
directive’s provisions.
The targets of today’s action were concerned primarily with Japan’s
former war activities and are considered “first priority material”
for reparations in the opinion of SCAP and the Pauley reparations mission.76
The list included 265 aircraft and parts plants in 34 of Japan’s 47
prefectures with 133, or half of them, concentrated in five
prefectures—36 in Aichi (Nagoya), 35 in Tokyo, 25 in Osaka, 24 in
Hyogo (Kobe), and 13 in Kanegawa (Yokohama).
Also listed were 33 naval arsenals with 10 branches, 36 military
arsenals, and 30 laboratories associated with research for war
production, [Page 476] for a total of
394 plants and installations scattered throughout Japan.
Maj. J. A. O’Hearn of Boston, chief of the industrial division of the
Economic and Scientific Section, said the directive was intended not
only to stop machinery removals but also to accomplish the return of
whatever has already been removed.
“They’ve been taking machinery also to warehouses and just piling it
up,” he said.
Deterioration of other machinery and equipment in the installations
“is pretty widespread and we want to stop it,” Major O’Hearn
added.
“It is naturally essential to the interests of both the Japanese and
the Allied Powers that any equipment taken for reparations have the
highest possible value,” he said. “It would be valueless unless it
were in good condition.”
The Eighth Army and Fifth Fleet commanders also were ordered to
review all cases in which conversion to peacetime production, of any
of the plants or installations named in today’s list, had been
previously licensed.
(An earlier SCAP directive had
ordered that applications for conversion be submitted by the
Japanese to the commanding generals of the Sixth and Eighth Armies
for approval. Licenses previously issued to plants named today
therefore will be reviewed.)
The commanders were told to consider “the probability that these
plants will be taken as reparations, and consequently should not be
allowed to acquire importance in the Japanese economy, with other
industrial plants becoming dependent on their production.”
“If in your opinion,” they were told, “any converted plant is not
immediately and absolutely essential to the civil economy, you will
cancel authorization for its conversion.
“Otherwise, it may continue to operate, under custody and control as
specified herein, and you will make clear to the Japanese that
conversion in no way prejudices final disposition of any
installation for reparations or other purposes.”
The commanders likewise were directed to report any other plants or
installations in their areas that they considered within the intent
of today’s directive, but which were not listed by SCAP.
Five company names accounted for 109, or about two-fifths, of all the
aircraft plants. Nakajima had 47, Mitsubishi and Aichi 19 each,
Kawasaki 15, and Hitachi 9.
[Here follow other details of installations affected.]
