Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

740.00116 PW/11–2746

Summary of Testimony Before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo of Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, From November 19 to 25, 1946

Tokyo, November 19-25, 1946

In response to the request of Mr. Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, went to Tokyo during November 1946 to give evidence on behalf of the prosecution before that Tribunal at the trial in progress of major Japanese war criminals. His presence as a witness was desired in connection especially with the subject matter of Section 9 (“Japan, the United States of America, the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the British Commonwealth of Nations”) of the “Summarized Particulars Showing the Principal Matters and Events upon Which the Prosecution Will Reply in Support of the Several Counts of the Indictment in Group One” (see Appendix A, Trial of Japanese War Criminals, Department of State Publication 2613, Far Eastern Series.) Mr. Ballantine appeared before the Tribunal to give his testimony from November 19 to November 25, 1946, inclusive.²⁰

Mr. Keenan, in introducing Mr. Ballantine to the Court, set forth the contention of the prosecution that “the evidence adduced will show him to be eminently qualified as an expert on the subject of international relations in the Far East.” He explained that for that reason Mr. Ballantine’s testimony, which was in the form of a prepared affidavit, would include statements of conclusions.

Mr. Ballantine’s affidavit (attached),²¹ which he read before the Court, and which began with a brief statement of his diplomatic career, contained a résumé of American-Japanese relations in the years preceding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, with special emphasis on matters pertaining to the diplomatic conversations between representatives of the Japanese and the American Governments in 1941. Most of the material included in the affidavit was taken from already published documents, either Foreign Relations of the United States—Japan, 1931–1941, or the testimony of former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. The affidavit was supported by fourteen exhibits, all consisting of documents which had previously been published in Foreign Relations of the United States.

The defense entered objection that [to?] the admission in evidence of the affidavit on the grounds, first, that the witness was fully conversant with the Japanese and the English languages, wherefor there did not exist the language difficulties which had been a reason for permitting testimony by affidavit in other cases; second, that it contained many immaterial, irrelevant and repetitious matters and conclusions within the province of the court for determination; and, thirds that the defense was seriously prejudiced by evidence in the form of a carefully prepared affidavit rather than in the form of answers to questions. The Court ruled that the procedure had already been decided in chambers, that it would disregard anything not properly in evidence, and pointed out that “far from being prejudiced, the accused, having had advance copies of the evidence, have been enabled to check each statement and to test the truth in cross-examination They have been advantaged.”

Mr. Ballantine was then cross-examined in turn by counsel for the defense, Messrs. Blakeney, Blewett, Cunningham, Warren, Smithy Brannon, Brooks, Logan and Okamoto.

With regard to the general attitude of the Government of the United States toward an agreement with Japan, Mr. Ballantine stated in reply to questions by Mr. Blewett that our attitude was governed by the fixed principles of the United States which were traditional in our Far Eastern policy and the most complete embodiment of which was found in the Nine Power Treaty of 1922.²² He said that we wanted to see those principles carried out in any new agreement; and when the Japanese came to us and asked for a new agreement, we told them it must conform to our fixed principles.

Mr. Ballantine, in reply to a question by Mr. Blewett regarding the State Department’s conception of American objectives in the conversations, said:

“It was our desire and our hope to meet the expectations of the American people who desired peace. We wanted to keep alive the spark of peace to the last split second. We wanted to clutch at every straw that might make possible the continuance of peace. Surely there was nothing inconsistent between that objective and giving our armed forces and those of our friends time to prepare adequately for self-defense.”

Asked whether the Department believed that under such circumstances an agreement could be reached, Mr. Ballantine said, “Under those circumstances we were all the more anxious to take anything that was possible, but surely we weren’t going to sacrifice our principles.”

Asked by Mr. Cunningham what the State Department had in mind as a plan or program in the event the negotiations failed, Mr. Ballantine replied:

“I don’t know that any conclusion had been reached on that. The Japanese had said that in the event of failure of the negotiations that the consequences would be most unfortunate. We felt that we could go so far, and if we could not go any further, we would just stand and take the consequences.”

Thereupon the following colloquy took place:

Q. In your answer to Mr. Blewett you suggested that unless the arrangements or the fixed policy of the United States as settled by the 1922 Conference were carried out, that you could not make an agreement. Now this fixed policy, as you have expressed it, was it the opinion of the State Department that this fixed policy was to be carried out, even if it meant war? Is that correct?

A. It meant that we were unwilling to surrender our principles no matter what were the consequences.

Q. Did it not also mean that even in the light of the changed circumstances between the time the fixed policy was settled until the time the negotiations were going on, you would not go beyond a certain limit even if it meant war?

A. The changed circumstances were Japan’s breaking away from the Nine Power Treaty of which she was a party. Our position on that is abundantly set clear in a note which we addressed to the Japanese Government on December 30, 1938,²³ which I believe is in evidence before this Tribunal.

In cross-examination by Mr. Blakeney, Mr. Ballantine after having been questioned first in regard to the circumstances relating to the initiation of the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area which took place between representatives of the American and Japanese Governments in 1941, was then questioned in some detail in regard to the differences between the two parties as they developed during the conversations. In regard to differences arising out of the question of Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Ballantine, in response to a question, said:

“We wanted clarification from the Japanese as to what their attitude was, what they would do in case we became involved (in the European war) through acts of self-defense, and we explained clearly what we meant by self-defense.”

Thereupon questions were asked by Mr. Blakeney and answered by Mr. Ballantine, as follows:

Q. Then I ask you again whether the Japanese response was not in effect this: That they agreed unconditionally to the existence of the right of self-defense, but could not accept your explanation of its scope?

A. The Japanese came to us and asked for an agreement covering peace in the whole Pacific area. There was one factor which might be likely to cause a disruption of that peace. Japan was a member of the Tripartite Pact. There was a possibility that we might become involved in the war in the Atlantic. We wanted to ascertain from them their attitude, their obligations under the Pact as it affected that possibility.

Thereupon questions were asked by Mr. Blakeney and answered by Mr. Ballantine, as follows:

Q. And your position was, the position of the United States was, was it not, that certain acts were being taken which in the view of the United States were self-defense?

A. Certain acts were being taken or might be taken in the future.

Q. And the United States was requesting Japan to agree that if such acts of self-defense were taken in the future and did lead to involvement in the European war, that Japan would not be committed to action under the Tripartite Pact; is that a correct statement?

A. That is only part of the story. The rest of the story is that we didn’t ask for a new agreement. Japan came to us and asked for an agreement; so when they advanced this proposal of May 12,²⁴ we wanted clarification on that point.

Q. And the Japanese wanted clarification on the point of how far you contended that your right of self-defense extended; did they not?

A. We volunteered that information to them at the outset.

Later in the course of the cross-examination defense counsel reverted to the subject of the Tripartite Pact. Mr. Ballantine in response to questions denied that positions of the two parties came any closer as the conversations progressed. Mr. Blakeney then asked whether it was on the basis of the American redrafts of the proposed agreement that on August 28 Ambassador Nomura said to Secretary Hull that he did not feel there would be any difficulties about the Tripartite Pact question at the proposed Roosevelt–Konoye meeting.²⁵ Mr. Ballantine replied that he did not know the basis of Nomura’s contention. Asked whether it was the position of the Department of State that Japan should be required to abrogate the Pact, Mr. Ballantine said that so far as he knew “we never took a position on that point, only we didn’t want any interpretation of that Pact which was inconsistent with the peace agreement which the Japanese sought for the Pacific.” For an exposition of that position he referred to point nine in the Ten Point program which was suggested in the American communication to the Japanese representatives of November 26²⁶ as a basis for future discussions. That point reads as follows: “Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers will be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific.”

In reply to a question whether the Japanese representatives did not give a series of different suggested phraseologies for dealing with the question of their alliance in an effort to meet the American position, Mr. Ballantine said that the furthest they got was to say they would interpret the Pact independently, probably meaning that they would reach their own decision without reference to Germany. In reply to a further question he said we had no basis for reaching the conclusion that their statement of intention to interpret their obligations under the Pact independently was sufficient evidence of Japan’s effort to escape from the Tripartite Pact without formally denouncing it. Some further questions were then asked by Mr. Blakeney, which he said was for the purpose of trying to find out why no agreement was reached on this subject. Mr. Keenan objected to cross-questioning on the Tripartite Pact on grounds of its immateriality in the light of the final position of the Japanese Government on this matter as expressed in its note of December 7,²⁷ which reads as follows:

“The American proposal contained a stipulation which states both governments will agree that any agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall not be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. This version, with the above provision, has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe and as such it would not be accepted by the Japanese Government.”

The objection of the Chief of Counsel was sustained by the Court.

In regard to the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China, Mr. Ballantine stated, when asked what the objections of the American Government to this were, that:

“The objection was that ever since 1936 Japan had made this demand, and it is one of the causes that brought on the extended hostilities. If we were going to have a stabilizing peace in the Far East, it was necessary to have such arrangements as Japan made entered into by amicable negotiations with China.”

Asked whether the Department of State objected to the Japanese making an amicable arrangement for the stationing of troops to protect their legitimate interests in China, Mr. Ballantine replied:

“There are two points there. One was the very great vagueness of the Japanese as to what they wanted. The areas were indeterminate; the number of troops was indeterminate; the length of time was indeterminate; there was no clear-cut expression of what they wanted. It was a blank check.…²⁸

“The second point was the well known fact that the Chinese Government had shown itself opposed to accepting any such provision.”

In further regard to the Department of State’s attitude toward this matter, questions were asked and answers given, as follows:

Q. Now, did the Department of State recognize from the outset of these conversations that, owing to internal conditions in Japan, it was to be expected that the reaching of any agreement on this point would be very difficult?

A. The Secretary of State explained time and again that he was prepared to be patient.

Q. Therefore, I suppose it is fair to state that the Department would not have entered upon these conversations at all had it been determined to insist on immediate unconditional withdrawal of all troops.

A. We entered upon the conversations because the Japanese Government had informed us that they wanted a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area.

Q. Yes, But I mean practically speaking—not discussing the rights and wrongs, but practically speaking—the Department of State surely must have recognized from the very beginning that it would be impossible to get any agreement for immediate unconditional withdrawal of all troops. That you knew, did you not?

A. The Japanese had told us at the outset of these difficulties, and you will note in our proposal of June 21²⁹ we had the terms under there, “Subject to further discussion”. We were prepared to explore the subject with them thoroughly and reasonably.

In reply to further questions, Mr. Ballantine contended that little progress was made on this matter as conversations went on. Mr. Blakeney then tendered in evidence a communication from Ambassador Nomura to the Secretary of State, dated November 7, 1941, entitled “Disposition of Japanese Forces” (appearing in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II, pages 709–710). He asked why Mr. Ballantine had not referred to that document in his affidavit. Mr. Ballantine’s reply was:

“For two reasons. One. Because while we were giving consideration to this document, this intercept of the Japanese Government of November 5—about November 5, I don’t remember the exact date—came in.^* That intercept made it clear that the representations being made to us on the troop question were not being made in good faith. The second reason is that you will note in this proposal they injected the island of Hainan, which was entirely a new question which left us just where we were.”

With reference to the attitude of the Department of State to the question of the sincerity of the Japanese approaches following the receipt by it of the intercepted message above referred to, questions were asked and answered, as follows:

Q. Would I then be correct if I said that from that time on as far as the Department of State was concerned you [were] not really negotiating because you had no confidence that any agreement obtained would be of any value?

A. I don’t think that is correct. We were on our guard. We naturally wanted to have things, commitments provided, and we were unwilling to accept vague expressions, and we wanted dependable commitments.

The President: It was still possible for the Japanese to give you evidence of good faith?

The Witness: I think it would have been still possible.

The President: By withdrawing troops or any other practical evidence of an intention to follow peaceful courses.

Mr. Blewett also asked questions about the subject of the retention of Japanese troops in China. In reply to questions, Mr. Ballantine stated that at no time had agreement been reached between the United States and Japan in regard to the retention of Japanese troops in China against communistic activities; that our attitude on the question had been the same from beginning to end, uninfluenced by the fact of Germany’s attack on Russia or by the prospect of German landings in England.

With reference to the attitude of the American Government toward the question of the independence of “Manchukuo,” Mr. Ballantine stated:

“Our position right along was that this was a question between China and Japan. If China were voluntarily, through amicable negotiations, willing to agree to it we had nothing to say. Our position was clearly stated in the June 21 draft:³⁰ Amicable negotiations in regard to Manchukuo.”

In regard to the stationing of Japanese troops in French Indochina, Mr. Blakeney asked Mr. Ballantine whether the formulas in successive Japanese proposals did not represent concessions from their original position. Mr. Ballantine maintained that the new formulas represented no recession in substance from the first proposal. Mr. Blakeney then asked whether the Japanese offer in its proposal of November 20³¹ to withdraw their troops from Southern Indochina was not a totally new concession. Mr. Ballantine asserted that the offer was perfectly meaningless because there was no limit placed upon the total number of troops they could bring into Indochina and they could bring their troops from Northern Indochina to Southern Indochina within a few days to threaten us.

With regard to the question of military encirclement of Japan, questions were asked by Mr. Blakeney and answered by Mr. Ballantine, as follows:

Q. Well, mention of the Indochina question brings up another point. You knew, of course, the Japanese contention and complaint that Japan was being encircled?

A. We had heard a great deal about that.

Q. Now was there not in truth an A, B, C, D, American-British-Chinese-Dutch cooperation on the subject of Japan and Pacific relations?

A. Naturally, in the situation then prevailing, it was necessary or desirable that the countries affected would consult with each other about means of self-defense.

Q. Then you of the Department of State did know that from, say January, 1941, there had been military cooperation among these nations plus Australia with respect to possible action against Japan?

A. I would say military consultations.

Q. And did you of the Department of State know during the year 1941 that the joint defense plans of those nations were the only plans in existence for military defense of American Pacific territories.

A. I do not know that any particular plans of consultation were the only plans for defense.

Q. Now, of course, the United States never accepted the implication of the term “encirclement”, did it?

A. The Acting Secretary of State told the Japanese Ambassador that the American policy was the opposite of encirclement policy.

With reference to the freezing measures, adopted by this Government on July 26, 1941,³² questions were asked by Mr. Blakeney and answered by Mr. Ballantine as follows:

Q. Did the State Department know in taking the steps toward the freezing of Japanese assets that such steps would inevitably drive Japan to seek elsewhere and perhaps in other ways the necessary imports and raw materials upon which to operate?

A. One could hardly know in advance what somebody else is going to do.

Q. Did not the Department of State consider it highly probable that Japan would be compelled to do so?

A. Not necessarily, because at that time the President offered Japan a peaceful alternative to the course she was pursuing.

Q. What offer do you refer to?

A. His offer for the neutralization of Indochina of July 24th.³³

Q. But I refer to the time when it was decided to impose the assets freezing order, and I ask you whether the State Department did not consider it highly probable then that with the imposition of that order and its consequent effects Japan would turn elsewhere to secure the necessary trade and supplies?

A. That was only one alternative. The other put by the President’s offer in regard to Indochina was still pending. It was only two days since the offer was made.

Asked by Mr. Blewett what was the meaning of the State Department in terming the freezing order of July, 1941, a move of self-defense, Mr. Ballantine replied: “Well, when a desperado gets into position to shoot you, you don’t want to give him ammunition for that purpose”. Mr. Blewett then asked whether that order was not considered by the State Department as practically the waging of economic warfare. Mr. Ballantine replied: “I think the State Department recognized that economic measures of that character could only be taken in a very serious situation, but then we were concerned at that moment with a very imminent [peril]³⁴ and overt act which necessitated our taking steps of self-defense.” Mr. Blewett next asked whether this freezing action might not be considered by the Japanese as an act of hostility. Mr. Ballantine replied: “We were concerned, as I said before, then with the question of self-defense which, in view of the imminence of the peril that was created by Japan’s move into southern Indochina—that consideration overrode any other consideration in the situation. I think I explained that in my affidavit.” Finally Mr. Blewett inquired whether the freezing measures had a deterrent effect upon the conversations, and Mr. Ballantine replied: “The Secretary of State had already suspended the conversations before the freezing order, and after the freezing order it was the Japanese who came back and asked that the conversations be resumed.”

With regard to the subject of the proposed meeting between Prince Konoye and the President, Mr. Blakeney asked questions and Mr. Ballantine gave answers as follows:

Q. In explaining in your affidavit, page 11, the American reasons for inability to adopt this proposal, you dwell on the effects which might have been expected to result from the failure of the proposed meeting. I am quite sure, however, that equal consideration must have been given to the prospects of success of such an extraordinary meeting between the President and the Premier?

A. We had given careful consideration to that, but we had concluded that unless we reached an agreement in advance on essential principles and their application, that the meeting would result—would not be productive of results.

Q. Especially since you say months of close up conversations with the Japanese Ambassador had failed to produce results?

A. That is correct.

Q. Now I ask you whether this very fact was not so much the more reason for making the effort through this meeting of the highest responsible officials to secure the concrete and clear-cut commitments from Japan which were desired?

A. The chances, in the light of the circumstances, of getting anywhere when the Japanese had so clearly failed to move on these fundamental points were so dim that naturally we had to give important consideration to what the effects would be if no agreement resulted.

Q. Prince Konoye was Premier at that time?

A. That is correct.

Q. Was there a feeling in the State Department that Prince Konoye was a representative of a liberal—moderate group in Japan which might be the best hope of achieving the peace desired?

A. What loomed largest in the consideration of the Department of State was that the military party was dominant in Japan.

Q. Was the Department at that time aware of the line of thought that the best way to destroy the dominance of the military party was to encourage the moderates in some way?

A. Yes, we had heard that before.

Q. And the further suggestion that a measure of agreement with the United States would probably be the best means of establishing the moderates firmly in control of Japan?

A. That argument had also been brought up in April by those friends, unofficial Japanese and American friends, when these proposals were first brought to us;³⁵ but the proposals they brought did not seem to, without considerable revision, to offer a prospect for agreement.

Q. In fact, such a meeting had been one of the ingredients in the original draft of the 16th (sic) of April, had it not?

A. That is correct.

Q. So far as concerns the desirability of such a meeting between the President and the Premier, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo expressed to the Department, did he not, a great enthusiasm for and hopefulness concerning such a meeting?

A. That is so; but he was only reporting from the viewpoint of Tokyo as he himself stated.

Q. And from the viewpoint of Tokyo did he not feel that, in his own words: “The good which might flow from such a meeting is incalculable”?

A. There is no question about what Mr. Grew reported in his telegram. It has been published.³⁶ It is in the record.

Q. I should like to ask you also whether the Department took into consideration this further suggestion of Ambassador Grew contained in his long telegram to the Department of the 29th of September³⁷ reviewing the whole situation, wherein, speaking of the proposed meeting, he says this: “He raises the questions whether the United States is not now given the opportunity to halt Japan’s program without war or an immediate risk of war; and, further, whether through failure to use the present opportunity, the United States will not face a greatly increased risk of war. The Ambassador states his firm belief in an affirmative answer to these two questions”?

A. We gave capital consideration to that as well as all other suggestions of Ambassador Grew.

Q. Did the Department consider further at that time the likelihood also referred to by Ambassador Grew that Prince Konoye would be in a position to give to the President more directly explicit and satisfactory engagements than his Ambassador could do?

A. We did not see how——what explicit commitments that would have been of a satisfactory character could be given in the light of the failure to reach an agreement on so many fundamental points during all those months of conversation.

Q. In any event, the meeting did not occur because of the facts which you have stated in your affidavit?

A. And also for the many considerations stated in our communication of October 2nd³⁸ and in further explanations made in the published record.

Q. Then with the closing of the question of a meeting between the President and Premier, the conversations were thrown back to the same state approximately in which they started, were they not?

A. We never closed the question of a meeting with the Premier.

Q. Well, perhaps I should have said, with the final decision of the State Department to send its answer to the proposal for a meeting?

A. In our communication of October 2nd, we indicated that we were still willing to have the meeting, and we asked for further consideration to be given to certain points that we mention in that communication. We never got anything further back on that point from the Japanese.

Mr. Smith asked a number of questions with reference to the Amau statement referred to by Mr. Ballantine in his affidavit. The Amau statement, by Eiji Amau, spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office on April 17, 1934,³⁹ dwelt upon the special position arrogated to herself by Japan in China. Mr. Smith also referred to Ambassador Grew’s account of a conversation he had with Mr. Hirota, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Mr. Hirota endeavored to play down the impressions created abroad by the Amau statement.⁴⁰ Mr. Ballantine in his affidavit had made no reference to Mr. Hirota’s interpretation. In the course of cross-examination the following colloquy occurred:

Q. Well, then, would you explain in detail why you chose to accept an unofficial statement of a Foreign Office spokesman in preference to what the Foreign Minister of Japan said on the subject to Mr. Grew?

A. In the first place, Mr. Amau’s statement that he made was never repudiated publicly by the Japanese Government so far as I recall. Mr. Hirota’s statement was a private statement, not a public statement. Finally, as I have already stated, subsequent developments in Japanese policies in China bore out that Amau’s statement seemed to represent more clearly what was—what conformed more closely to subsequent developments in Japanese policy.

Q. Are you aware that on April 21st, 1934, Mr. Amau made another unofficial statement to the newspaper men in which he expressed desire—I mean surprise—at the interpretations which the press had placed upon his statement of April 17th? Are you familiar with that statement?

A. Nevertheless, subsequent developments and manifestations of Japan’s policy in China would bear out the interpretation that was made, which would seem to be the sound one.

Q. I have just handed to you Mr. Amau’s own notebook as to the statement he gave out on April 21, 1934.⁴¹ I would like to have you read it and see if you remember that statement?

A. I do not recall having read this before, but I do not think that this explanation helps very much. There is, for example, a passage in here, “We should not forget for a moment that Japan, serving as the only cornerstone for the edifice of peace of East Asia, bears the entire burden of responsibilities.”

Q. What else do you find in there that does not help us any?

The President: You need not answer.

In connection with the question of offering Japan a modus vivendi which was given consideration in the American Government between November 20 and November 26,⁴² Mr. Ballantine explained in reply to questions as to provision therein for giving Japan petroleum that there was provision herein for a small quantity for civilian purposes—small indeed with what Japan expected to receive under its proposal of November 20. Asked then whether after the freezing measures had been adopted the State Department had considered it apparent that there could be no agreement on the petroleum question, Mr. Ballantine replied:

“If Japan had reverted to peaceful courses, there would have been no difficulty about any petroleum or any other trade question.”

Questions were then asked and answered as follows:

Q. Well, I’m asking you whether, as a practical matter, the State Department believed that Japan was going to do anything which would render an agreement on this petroleum question at all likely.

A. When Japan moved into southern Indochina in a position to attack us, we couldn’t see our way clear to give Japan petroleum for that purpose.

Q. If the petroleum question was one on which the parties were so far from agreement, did the State Department believe that there was any real prospect of an agreement on the modus vivendi at all?

A. We thought there was very little prospect of an acceptance by Japan of the modus vivendi that had been drafted.

Q. Do you remember Secretary Hull saying something about there being one chance in three that it would be acceptable?

A. He said, I believe, “not more than one chance in three.”⁴³

Q. Yes, I believe that’s correct. Nevertheless, Secretary Hull did urge it upon the Chinese Ambassador⁴⁴ on the 25th of November,⁴⁵ did he not, saying that “we have been carrying on conversations and making some progress so far?”

A. Yes, he proposed it to the Chinese Ambassador.

Q. So that the Department felt, did it not, that there was some reasonable prospect that the presentation of the modus vivendi would result in the achievement of further progress?

A. He didn’t think there was a reasonable prospect. He thought there might be a very slight prospect of the thing—the proposal was a worthwhile proposal, but he did not think there was much of a chance of the Japanese accepting it. The Japanese had given a very clear indication in their intercepts that that of November 20 was their minimum proposal, and what we were offering was chickenfeed compared with what they were asking.

Q. You already said, I believe, that the modus vivendi was never presented.

A. I don’t remember whether I said it or not, but that is a fact.

Q. Would it be correct to say that it was not presented finally because of the opposition of the Chinese as expressed by the Chinese Ambassador?

A. That was one important factor in the situation. There were other factors.

Q. At this time, however, the position of the Department of State was, was it not, that it was not acting for the other interested nations?

A. The proposed modus vivendi—our proposed modus vivendi called for certain steps in cooperation by these other countries. It could not have been carried out by the United States alone.

Q. The modus vivendi draft was thought of, was it not, in the Department of State, as being merely a continuation of the previous conversations?

A. The modus vivendi was a part of the whole proposal. The communication of November 26—the whole communication was a part of that, too, of which the modus vivendi was to be just one part. What we envisaged was that during the life of the modus vivendi we would carry on conversations toward the objectives of a permanent peaceful agreement.

Q. And those conversations would have been a continuation of the conversations which had been in progress, would they?

A. That is correct.

In reply to a question by Mr. Warren as to why Mr. Hull abandoned the modus vivendi,⁴⁶ Mr. Ballantine replied:

“As Mr. Hull explained in his Pearl Harbor testimony very clearly, the Chinese were very much opposed to it. We felt, or Mr. Hull felt that it would be very discouraging factor on the Chinese, who were being hard pressed, might cause their resistance to collapse. The other powers were luke-warm toward it. There was a strong body of opinion in the United States who we felt were opposed to it.”

With regard to the President’s message to the Emperor,⁴⁷ Mr. Ballantine testified, in reply to questions, that the Department of State thought that the chances were very slim that the message would accomplish anything but that in view of the desperate situation it was believed that even the slightest chance should not be overlooked. He described the desperate situation as follows: “The Japanese fleet had already sailed from that extreme southern part of Indo-China. We were in imminent danger. The situation was right then upon us.”

20. In a letter of November 27 to the Secretary of State, Mr. Keenan congratulated Mr. Ballantine on his testimony. In a memorandum dated February 14, 1947, the Division of Japanese Affairs stated it had “examined the testimony and considers it entirely consistent with United States policy and effectively presented.” (740.00116 PW/11–2746)
21. Not printed.
22. Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276.
23. Note No. 1153, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 820.
24. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 420.
25. See memorandum of August 28, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 576, 577.
26. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 768, 770.
27. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 787, 790.
28. Omission Indicated in the original.
29. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 486.
30. See page 96, Joint Committee Print, Pearl Harbor, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and December 8, 1941. [Footnote in the original.]
30. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 486, 490.
31. Ibid., p. 755.
32. Executive Order No. 8832 signed by President Roosevelt, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 267.
33. See memorandum of July 24, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 527, 529.
34. Brackets appear in the original.
35. Document of April 9, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 398; see also Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 123, footnote 78, and p. 135, footnote 85.
36. See telegram 1268, August 18, 1941, 10 p.m., Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 565; cf. memorandum of August 18, 1941, ibid., p. 560, and telegram 1266, August 18, 1941, 8 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 378.
37. Telegram 1529, September 29, 1941, noon; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 483; for substance, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 645, 648.
38. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 656.
39. See Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 224.
40. See telegram 75, April 25, 1934, 1 p.m., from Tokyo, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 227.
41. Cf. enclosure 1 to note of April 25, 1934, from the Japanese Ambassador (Saito), Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 229.
42. See Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, pp. 626 ff., passim.
43. See memorandum of November 22, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 640.
44. Hu Shih.
45. See memorandum of November 25, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 652.
46. See memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, November 26, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 665, and footnote 97.
47. Telegram of December 6, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 784; cf. telegram 817, December 6, 1941, 8 p.m., to Tokyo, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 727.