662.9031/6–1046
The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
No. 454
[Received July 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch No. 429, May 22, 1946,90 subject, “Report of Hellmut Wohlthat, Head of the Former German Economic Delegation in East Asia” and to enclose91 copies of two statements prepared by Admiral P. W. Wenneker, former [Page 435] German Naval Attaché in Tokyo, on the subject of German-Japanese naval cooperation prior to and during World War II. The first statement, March 20, 1946, is in narrative form. The later statement, undated, comprises answers to specific questions submitted by interrogators. These statements were prepared at the instance of the 441st Counter-intelligence Corps Detachment, United States Army Forces, Pacific, and copies of two letters of transmittal, March 30, 1946 and May 3, 1946 respectively, are also enclosed.
Summary of Statements. After a tour of duty in Tokyo as Naval Attaché, 1934–1937, Wenneker was given command of the Deutschland. Shortly before the second Munich Conference (October [September] 1938), the Deutschland was ordered to the Atlantic to attack British shipping should these negotiations fail. With the outbreak of war with Great Britain on September 3, 1939, the Deutschland was again ordered to stand-by to attack shipping, but this order was revoked because of Germany’s intention to make peace with France and England after the Polish campaign. In October, 1939, the Deutschland patrolled the north and mid-Atlantic, and on October 9 the City of Flint, an American vessel, was stopped and eventually sent to a Norwegian port.
On November 25, 1939, Wenneker was reappointed Naval Attaché to Tokyo and promoted to Rear Admiral, arriving in Tokyo on February 27, 1940. Major General Ott was the German Ambasador, and Wenneker’s relations with Ott were cordial. Early in 1941 Ott ordered his staff to study the possibilities and probable outcome of a Japanese-American war. After a three-day exposition by the staff of the German Embassy, it was concluded that such a war would be a hopeless venture for Japan. This information was forwarded to the German Foreign Office.
With the advent of Stahmer as Ambassador, the entire complexion of the German Embassy changed: all outgoing reports were purposely tinged in an optimistic hue, and an atmosphere of distrust permeated the Embassy.
Politically, the Japanese Army and Navy did not see eye to eye. The Navy had no part in the formulation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and only agreed to accept the Tripartite Pact because it was thought that the pact would prevent the United States from entry into the war. On the other hand, the younger officers of the Navy desired war with the United States, but the older officers did not. The former finally won, and war resulted. Wenneker was never instructed to exert pressure upon the Japanese Navy to bring about a war with the United States. In the spring of 1943, and again during the summer of 1944, when the war was turning in favor of the Allies, the Japanese Navy requested Wenneker to ask the German Navy to try to conclude [Page 436] the Russo-German war. About the time Saipan was invaded, Wenneker advised some “reasonable” Japanese naval officers, who raised the question, that Japan could bring about peace by surrendering all conquered territory, including Korea. This proposition was vetoed by the Army.
Wenneker had no knowledge of Japanese intentions to attack Pearl Harbor, “although it had been known two weeks before the attack that the Japanese had made up their minds to somehow get the ball rolling,” and throughout the war the Germans were kept in almost total ignorance of Japanese naval plans and operations. There was also an almost total lack of cooperation by the Japanese on technical subjects. Wenneker’s impressions gained on his one tour of inspection, in 1942, of conquered territories were that the Japanese desired completely to exploit their conquests, indulged in pleasures, and failed to prepare against possible enemy counter-attacks.
The most extensive activity of the Naval Attaché’s office during the war dealt with the so-called Special Service (Supply). This service was concerned with shipping problems, blockade runners, communications, German submarine supply and repairs, supplies, personnel, and similar matters. American submarines, according to Wenneker, contributed more to Japan’s collapse than is generally assumed.
In the early thirties a net-work of confidential agents was established in the Far East by the Germans to assist German naval vessels in the event of war. Espionage was forbidden to these agents, and their main task was to procure food, oil, provisions, etc. They were reliable Germans of old stock and generally chiefs or former leading employees of trading houses. (A list of agents is given.) These agents were responsible to the Naval Attaché in Tokyo.
Until near the end of 1943, Wenneker’s relations with the Nazi Party in Japan were not unfriendly, but when Spahn became its chief, friction of various kinds arose, culminating in a request to Berlin by Spahn for Wenneker’s removal. The German Navy, however, refused to remove Wenneker and shortly thereafter promoted him to Admiral.
Of 217,415 tons of cargo sent to Germany from the Far East during the war, a total of 113,805 tons arrived in Europe.
The only formal agreement as to joint German-Japanese naval operations was contained in the naval clause of the Military Pact concluded in December, 1941.92 This clause delimited areas of operations in the Indian Ocean and was supplemented from time to time by temporary operational agreements of similar nature. A special [Page 437] agreement was later made, forbidding German naval attacks on Russian vessels in the Pacific. (The balance of Wenneker’s later report is primarily of naval interest and is concerned with such subjects as descriptions of naval facilities at Penang, Singapore, and Surabaya; German submarine operations; and operations of auxiliary cruisers.) End of Summary.
Respectfully yours,