711.94/3–2646
Mr. Max W. Bishop, of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan, to the Secretary of State
[Received April 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Office’s despatch no. 98, December 13, 1945, enclosing memorandum of conversation with Prince Konoye [Page 422] on November 7, 1945,59 during the course of which Konoye offered the following description of developments leading up to the fall of his Cabinet in October 1941:
“Through informal but entirely reliable information the Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) learned that the Japanese Navy was far from confident of Japanese ability to wage a successful war against the United States and that the real desire of the most important leaders in the Japanese Navy was to avoid war. The Army and General Tojo were also informed of this basic attitude on the part of the Navy. On October 13 or 14, 1941, the Gummu Kyoku Cho (Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau) of the Army went to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and told the latter that the Army would not give up its idea of preparing for war immediately against the United States if such were merely the wish of the Prime Minister. However, the Army would consent to give up this program if the Navy were formally to express its opinion that the Japanese Navy was not prepared for war against the United States. The Army therefore asked the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to obtain formally the official views of the Navy Ministry. Consequently the Chief Secretary called upon the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy and asked him to present formally the official views of the Navy. The Naval Chief of Military Affairs refused to consent to this proposal and stated that the Navy, officially and formally, would go no further than to agree to leave the entire matter in the hands of the Prime Minister and to support whatever decision the Prime Minister should reach. The Army continued to oppose the views of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet was forced to resign.”
While this account of events has since been confirmed from several sources, the first authoritative explanation of the Navy’s position as above reported to come directly to the attention of this Office was provided by Admiral Toyoda Teijiro, Foreign Minister in the third Konoye Cabinet, in conversation with a member of the staff of this Office at the Admiral’s home on March 22. Admiral Toyoda stated that but for a last minute change of plans he would have been Navy Minister instead of Foreign Minister in the last Konoye Cabinet, and that in that post he would have officially advised Konoye and the Emperor of the Navy’s active opposition to and incapacity for war with the United States. He pointed out, however, that the Navy was in a very difficult position, because the advice which he would have been ready to give would have been followed by question from the Army as to just why Japan had gone to the trouble and expense of building a Navy if when the crisis came it was unwilling or unable to fight the very Power which had always been regarded as its most probable opponent. He said that the Navy leaders, while desiring peace, being far from sanguine of Japan’s chances of ultimate victory, could not summon courage to face this charge.
[Page 423]The Army extremists, the Admiral’s statement clarifies, clearly were in an advantageous position. If the Navy had declared itself unwilling to fight the United States, the Army could have proceeded with the liquidation of the China War while placing the major portion of the blame for its mistakes and failures of the past ten years on the Navy, which, it could then have said, had failed it in the supreme effort before victory. If, on the other hand, the Navy refused to be made a scapegoat, the war which these extremists in greater or lesser degree desired would follow. An express Imperial Command, issued on the advice of the Prime Minister even though he were not formally supported by the Navy, that war with the United States should be avoided, might have provided them with a similar face-saving opportunity. While Prince Konoye states that the Army would not give up its idea of preparing for war immediately against the United States merely on his say-so, there is reason to believe (reference despatch no. 124, December 26, 194560) that if the Prince had formally advised the Emperor to declare for peace the Emperor would have done so and the Army would have obeyed.
Respectfully yours,
Foreign Service Officer
- Despatch No. 98 not printed; for memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, p. 955.↩
- Not printed.↩