Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

740.00119 PW/2–1646

Mr. Max W. Bishop, of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan, to the Secretary of State

confidential
No. 259

Tokyo, February 16, 1946.
[Received February 25.]

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Sakomizu⁴⁵ and some members of this office. Mr. Sakomizu mentioned certain events which would support the thesis that the Emperor was personally opposed to the war, but refrained from official action to prevent war because of the theory that the Emperor should not himself make decisions but should accept the advice of his Ministers who are responsible for action taken. In this connection events reported by Mr. Sakomizu were:

1. On December 4 or 5, 1941, the Emperor by “facial expression” indicated that he agreed that war was not the only means to protect Japan’s welfare.

2. In the Imperial Rescript declaring war, the Emperor himself inserted one phrase revealing that war with the United States and Great Britain was not personally favored by the Emperor.

3. The Emperor had informed Prince Konoye on the occasion of the signing of the Tripartite Pact⁴⁶ that this treaty might bring Japan one of its greatest misfortunes.

In presenting these observations, Mr. Sakomizu undoubtedly hoped to contribute to evidence which would help to absolve the Emperor from war responsibility. No opinions were expressed by the members of this office.

Respectfully yours,

Max W. Bishop

Foreign Service Officer

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Russell L. Durgin, of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan

[Tokyo,] February 6, 1946.

Participants:	Sakomizu Hisatsune;
	Kubo, Hisaji;
	Mr. William J. Sebald;
	Dr. Karl C. Leebrick; and
	Mr. Durgin

Subject: Observations About War Responsibility and the Attitudes of the Emperor.

The following is a brief summary of an informal conversation with Sakomizu Hisatsune at a meeting arranged at the request of Mr. Sakomizu and the home of Mr. Kubo.

Mr. Sakomizu stated that:

Admiral Okada Keisuke, former Premier,⁴⁷ was opposed to Tojo and his policies from the beginning. In November, 1941, soon after becoming Premier, Tojo arranged a conference at which Okada was present. Okada frankly said that he felt Japan was not in any position for war, the unfavorable shipping position alone being adequate proof for such a statement. Tojo replied that Japan could keep three million tons of shipping afloat.

Early in December, 1941, (4th or 5th), the Emperor invited the former premiers for tea, at which time both Okada and Admiral Yonai⁴⁸ expressed doubts about war being the only way to protect Japan’s welfare. (At that time Tojo did not say he had decided on going to war, but remarked that he thought war was the only way to save Japan.) The Emperor made no comment in response to Okada and Yonai, but the impression Okada got from the Emperor’s facial expression was that he agreed with them. (The Emperor does not make decisions, the only usual gesture of disapproval of a measure being to withhold his seal for a day or two.)

The December 8th War Rescript differed from the usual practice in that the Emperor did not merely put his seal on a document previously fully prepared by the Cabinet. He personally added two clauses which revealed that he did not personally favor the war. The first one indicated that it was not his wish that war with the United States and Great Britain had to be, and then added the hope that his ancestors’ spirits would provide guidance and protection in this step.

The general feeling of the intelligentsia at the outbreak of the war was one of regret. On the evening of December 8, 1941, a broadcast announced [announcement?] said that the purpose of the war was to protect the Emperor and expel the foreigner. Four of six men at a Geisha party at which Sakomizu was present that night agreed that such propaganda by the government was just the opposite to the real feeling of the Japanese people.

Another episode referred to a conversation between the Emperor and Prince Konoye at Hayama on the occasion of the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The Emperor told Konoye that by this act Japan may have to face one of the greatest misfortunes of her history. The Emperor saw what this Alliance meant, but in keeping with the policy of not interfering with government decisions decided not to resist. Prince Konoye was then asked by the Emperor to agree always “to go along with” him even though it might mean passing through “water and fire”. Near the end of the war, the Emperor asked Konoye to go to Moscow as a special envoy. When Konoye tried to refuse, the Emperor reminded him of his earlier pledge mentioned above, after which Konoye agreed to go.

Mr. Sakomizu stated that he had had a long conversation a few days previous with Vice Aide-de-Camp Kinoshita of the Imperial Household Department, during the course of which Sakomizu requested Kinoshita to try to arrange an Imperial interview. The indications are that this is being arranged. Sakomizu attached considerable importance to such a prospective opportunity of placing before the Emperor his ideas and advice regarding the present situation. Sakomizu was of the opinion that many of the leaders who have access to the Emperor today are not sufficiently in touch with the thought of many of the Japanese, and therefore this contemplated interview would help to bring about a closer relationship between the Emperor and the people.

Russell L. Durgin

45. Hisatsune Sakomizu, Chief Secretary of the Japanese Cabinet, April 7–August 15, 1945.
46. Three Power pact of assistance signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940, by Germany, Italy, and Japan; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 387, or Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, vol. xi, p. 204. For negotiation of treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, pp. 647 ff.
47. July 4, 1934–February 26, 1936.
48. Adm. Mitsumasa Yonai. Japanese Prime Minister, January 16–July 16, 1940; Deputy Prime Minister, July 1944–April 5, 1945; Navy Minister, February 1937–August 1939 and since July 1944.