Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

894.5018/12–2046

The British Embassy to the Department of State⁶⁸

undated

1706/–/46

The United Kingdom Government are much perturbed by the information which reaches them as to the present policy of food collection and distribution in Japan. Stated in general terms, their anxiety arises in the first place from the fact that the per capita food supply now available to the Japanese people is much greater than that available to the people of territories in South East Asia for which the United Kingdom is responsible, a disparity concerning which they are liable to attack in Parliament and in the Press. They are further influenced by the striking anomaly of a situation in which the Japanese people are so fortunate as to be receiving increased rations, which put them in a better position than during the war, whereas the people of the United Kingdom are in a worse position and even faced with the prospect of further reductions.

There are three main points to which His Majesty’s Government attach importance:

1. The rice collection, its relative proportion to the crop, and the measures taken by the Japanese to see that the quota is in fact collected.

2. The consumption level, not only of the staple ration, but also as supplemented by other controlled and free supplies. Related to this are the inadequate measures which the Japanese have taken for the equalization of consumption.

3. The attitude of the Japanese Government to their own responsibilities, and the extent to which the occupying authority should endeavour to regulate that attitude.

Taking these points separately, the views of His Majesty’s Government, stated on broad lines and with a minimum of statistical elaboration, are as follows:

1. Rice Collection. Out of a total crop for the 1947 crop year estimated at 68 million koku or 9 million tons, the Japanese Government proposes to collect 28 million koku (4 million tons). This is an even smaller proportion of the total than the target figure of last year. It leaves 35 million koku or 5 million tons to be consumed by the self-supplying part of the population, who account for only 43% of the total population. It is admittedly difficult to exercise full control over consumption by self-suppliers, but unless the Japanese government can get more than 4,000,000 tons of this year’s rice crop into its hands, it is to be feared that over-consumption by self-suppliers and the black market will in 1947 again jeopardize the staple ration for urban Japan.

It would be unrealistic to suggest that the self-suppliers should be reduced to the standard of the non-self-suppliers; but a rough estimate shows that, if methods of collection were improved, for every 100 calories per diem taken from self-suppliers, imports of food could be reduced by 380,000 tons per annum.

These and related facts constitute, in the view of the United Kingdom Government, most urgent reasons for strengthening and improving the control and distribution of rice and other indigenous foodstuffs in Japan. On present estimates, the self-suppliers,—less than half the population—will consume some 70% of all indigenous supplies in 1947.

2. The consumption level. Before the war rice consumption per capita per diem in Japan was about 13 oz. The current ration is 12.8 oz. which is well above the war-time ration of 10.24 oz.

The Japanese have asked for imports of 2 million tons or 14 million koku of rice equivalents, which would give them a total of 77 million koku of rice or imported rice equivalents. That is to say, the Japanese are aiming at 1 koku (of rice and imported foodstuffs in rice equivalent) per head of the population per annum, which is the average prewar consumption, and this takes no account of indigenous supplies of other foods.

The figures cited above are based upon information which appears to be reliable, but His Majesty’s Government have not seen any detailed official estimates by the Japanese Government of indigenous resources and proposed consumption in 1947. They assume that the S.C.A.P. obtained such an estimate before sanctioning the increased ration, and would be grateful if, as in 1946, it could be furnished to them.

3. The Attitude of the Japanese Government. It is no wonder that the Japanese daily press and such organs as the Oriental Economist write optimistically of the food situation, refer to the “unbelievable generosity” of the occupying authority and by implication approve the imperfection and corruption in food distribution.

The Japanese Government for its part appears to be taking it for granted that unequal consumption levels, black markets, and other shortcomings in food administration are inevitable and incurable; and there are not wanting, in intelligence reports from the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters, indications that some officials there take a similar pessimistic view.

The United Kingdom Government therefore feel justified in enquiring whether the Supreme Commander is definitely of the opinion that no further pressure can be brought to bear upon the Japanese Government to induce them to improve their controls and bring about more equitable distribution, by declaring that imports of food will be conditional upon such action or by other appropriate means.

68. On December 20 this was referred by General Hilldring’s Executive Assistant. W. M. Cameron, to James A. Stillwell of the International Resources Division; notation by Mr. Stillwell: “This was answered verbally by the General and me, and no formal answer is required.” (894.5018/12–2046)