740.00119 Control (Japan)/11–1346

The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Echols)

My Dear General Echols: There is enclosed a draft message to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers summarizing a statement by the Soviet Representative on the Far Eastern Commission with reference to the question of the execution of the purge directive of January 4, 1946.47

In view of the fact that this matter is now under discussion in the Far Eastern Commission and an urgent reply is desired, it is requested that the enclosed draft message be transmitted by the War Department to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers by cable.

Sincerely yours,

J. H. Hilldring
[Enclosure]

Draft Telegram for General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

On November 4, 1946, the Soviet representative on the FEC submitted a statement with regard to the question of the execution of the purge directive of January 4, 1946. Basing his comments on a summary of the purge prepared by the Dept of State and circulated to the FEC, the Soviet representative stated that the Soviet group did not feel that up to the present the Japanese Govt had fully carried out the directive of the Supreme Commander in spite of the fact that the directive was to be fulfilled six months from January 4, 1946.

I.
The Soviets stated that the U.S. report “admitted that ‘as of 29 July 1946 remained to be screened about 1000 officials of 165 corporations, in various fields.’ These corporations, as it was further pointed [Page 366] out, are to be purged ‘because their largest stockholders are national policy companies.’” [It should be noted that the U.S. report reads as follows and gives a different impression than when read out of context: “As of 29 July 1946 there remained to be screened about 1000 officials of 165 corporations in various fields. These corporations are not Government-owned or controlled, but under a more rigorous application than originally employed they have been added to the list because their largest stockholders are national policy companies. This group represents an addendum to rather than a residue of the original program.”]48
II.
The Soviets pointed to the following statement in the U.S. report as evidence of incompleteness of purge: “In the Demobilization Board (formerly the First and Second Demobilization Ministries) are about 4000 officials who have not been screened. These are all former Army and Navy officers subject to mandatory removal under Category ‘B’ of Appendix ‘A’ but are listed in formal requests of the Japanese Govt to continue their employment as provided in paragraph 8 of SCAPIN 550 in order to carry out the repatriation, demobilization and re-absorption into civilian life of the approximately 1,500,000 Japanese military personnel who are still overseas.”
III.
The Soviets stated that they were in possession of some data that there were still in the House of Representatives 18 members who were elected through bribery and other violations of the law and that the results of the “inquests” of these Diet members were still unknown. Among them are the following members of the Liberal Party: Ida Tomohei, Arafune Seijiro, Makino Kansaku, Hiroaka Ryozo; Progressive Party: Sekine Kyuzo, Abe Shungo; non party: Zushi Yasumasa and others.
IV.
The Soviets stated that there were certain members of the House of Representatives who had compromised themselves due to their association with the militarists and their activity in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association during the war. As described by the Soviets they are:
  • Matsuda Shoichi—former adviser to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and in 1942 elected to the Diet on the recommendations of the IRAA;
  • Inukai Ken—former economic adviser to the Wang Ching-wei49 Government and one of the leaders of the “House for Development of Asia”;
  • Tahara Haruji—Administrator of New Guinea during the war; chief of the second section of the Department of South Seas in the Navy Department; in 1942 recommended by the Imperial Rule Political [Page 367] Association to Diet; and follower of ideology for alliance of the Axis powers and for the undermining of the relations with the Allied Powers.
V.
In view of this statement the Soviet delegation has proposed that the following policy decision be presented to the FEC for its consideration:
  • “1. To consider the fulfillment of the SCAP’s purge directive of January 4, 1946, by the Japanese Government as unsatisfactory.
  • “2. To formulate a policy decision according to which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers could issue a directive to the Japanese Government to accelerate the complete fulfillment of the purge directive in the nearest future.
  • “3. To recommend that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers delete paragraph 8 of his directive 550 of January 4, which permits the Japanese Government under the pretext of ‘irreplaceability’ to keep in public office persons which who fall undoubtedly under the purge directive of January 4.”
The Supreme Commander is requested to comment, particularly on paragraphs I to IV and reply as soon as feasible.
  1. Scapin–550, Political Reorientation of Japan, p. 482.
  2. Statement in brackets in the original draft.
  3. Chinese head of Japanese-sponsored regime in occupied China during World War II.