Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

FE Files (Peace Treaty)

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs (Martin)⁸

secret

[Washington,] October 3, 1946.

Alternative Drafts on Post Peace Treaty Control Organization in Japan

In order that the Committee may have an opportunity to see in Writing several alternative approaches to this problem and choose more intelligently between them, I attach the following [:]

1. Attachment 1⁹ is a revised draft of the document already distributed without important change in substance.

2. Attachment 2¹⁰ is an alternate to paragraphs 1a and 2 of the above which substitutes a Council of Ambassadors for a Far Eastern Commission.

3. Attachment 3¹¹ is an alternate to paragraphs 1b, 3, 4, and 6 of Attachment 1 as modified by Attachment 2, which transfers directive power from the Allied Administrator to the Council of Ambassadors and makes a few other verbal changes.¹²

[Annex]

1. For the purpose of ensuring that the Japanese Government and people do carry out and perform the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, the Instrument of Surrender and this Treaty, and for as long as may be necessary to make certain that the full intent and purpose of these documents with respect to Japan and the Japanese people has been carried out, there is hereby established

a. The Far Eastern Commission, to be responsible on behalf of the Allied and associated powers for policy guidance to the Allied authorities engaged in Japan in seeing that the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the Instrument of Surrender and this Treaty are being executed, and particularly responsible for determining when both individually and as a whole the various steps required by these documents have been completed satisfactorily by the Japanese Government and people, and to perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by this Treaty.

b. The Allied Administrator for Japan, appointed by the U.S. Government with the concurrence of the FEC, who shall have executive authority in Japan under the terms of this Section and of policy directives originated by the Far Eastern Commission for seeing that the Japanese Government and people carry out expeditiously the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration, the Instrument of Surrender and this Treaty.

2. The Far Eastern Commission shall have the same terms of reference as the body with the same name established by the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945. It shall be responsible for the abolition of the Office of Allied Administrator for Japan and for its own dissolution.

3. The Allied Administrator for Japan shall be a civilian with a civilian staff, assisted by such military forces, subordinate to him, as he deems necessary to insure effective enforcement of his orders, drawn from the countries participating in the Far Eastern Commission in accordance with arrangements made by it.

4. The Allied Administrator for Japan and his staff, including such military forces as he may require, shall be given full cooperation by the Japanese Government, including access to all parts of Japan, to all sources of information on conditions and developments in Japan, including all files of the government, and shall be authorized to issue such directives to the Japanese Government as may in the judgment of the Allied Administrator be necessary to secure prompt execution of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the Instrument of Surrender and this Treaty, which directives shall be binding on all branches of the Japanese Government until rescinded.

5. After consideration of the recommendation of the Allied Administrator, the Far Eastern Commission may at any time declare particular requirements of the Instrument of Surrender, the Potsdam Declaration or this Treaty to have been executed satisfactorily and thereon relieve the Allied Administrator of further responsibility for the enforcement of such requirements, and, where appropriate, the Japanese Government and people of such obligations as they may have had in connection therewith. At such time as it considers appropriate, but not before all nonpermanent articles of this Treaty have been rescinded and all requirements of the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender have been formally determined by the FEC to have been fulfilled, and the Office of the Allied Administrator for Japan shall have been abolished, the FEC shall recommend Japan for membership in the United Nations.

6. Subject to such additions as the Far Eastern Commission may make and to such deletions as may be made in accordance with the procedure described in paragraph 5 above, particular attention should be paid to the following:

a. Enforcement of Japanese Disarmament as prescribed in Section . . . . . of this Treaty.

b. Regulation of Japanese Research activities to prevent Rearmament as prescribed in Section . . . . . of this Treaty.

c. Enforcement of limits on Japanese imports of strategic materials, production capacity in selected war supporting industries and merchant shipping activities as prescribed in Section . . . . . of this Treaty.

d. Strict compliance with the provisions of International Treaties and Agreements to which Japan is required to subscribe by the terms of Section . . . . . of this Treaty.

e. Continued compliance with and execution of policy decisions of the pre-peace treaty FEC and of directives issued by SCAP and in effect at the time of signature of this treaty designed to carry out the terms of the Instrument of Surrender and the Potsdam Declaration, particularly those on elimination of active nationalists from positions of influence, agricultural reform, reform of economic organizations (Zaibatsu, patents, cartels), workers’ organizations, etc. (See Annex . . . . . for list).

f. Execution of the provisions of this Treaty with respect to Restitution (Section . . . . .), Reparations (Section . . . . .), and Property Rights and Interests (Section . . . . .).

7. Pending specific authorization by the Far Eastern Commission for direct Japanese representation, the U.S. Government shall represent the interests of the Japanese Government, speaking through the Allied Administrator, on the United Nations and affiliated organizations.

[In a confidential memorandum on September 26, 1947, Mr. Martin wrote Mr. Borton in regard to the Japanese peace treaty as follows (extract):

3. The decision to press for an early peace treaty arose out of the following considerations:

(a) General MacArthur had indicated publicly a desire for an early treaty.

(b) The present occupation organization did not seem suited to cope with the type of problems which were becoming increasingly important in Japan, and an early peace treaty seemed the only way to replace that organization with more suitable Allied supervision.

(c) It was felt that a peace treaty, by removing cumbersome restrictions placed upon Japanese economic activity by the present military organization, and by transferring substantial responsibility to the hands of the Japanese, would stimulate Japanese incentives and thus facilitate the recovery of the Japanese economy and a consequent reduction in U.S. costs. Optimism on this point appears to have had an especially important influence on SCAP’s views.

(d) It was expected that the signing of a peace treaty would terminate the substantial requirement for U.S. military resources attendant on the occupation.

4. It was therefore felt that the objective of the United States policy with respect to Japan—namely, the creation of a peaceful, stable, self-supporting, and pro-American Japan—could most effectively be realized through the drafting of an early peace treaty. That decision was based on the following assumptions:

(a) that all governments which are members of the Far Eastern Commission would adhere to the treaty;

(b) that the treaty would be negotiated through democratic voting procedures which would maximize the probability of securing a treaty along the lines desired by the United States;

(c) that the treaty would result in the establishment of a more effective Allied supervisory authority in Japan;

(d) that security considerations in the Pacific area would not militate against termination of the present pre-eminent U.S. position in Japan;

(e) that economic condition in Japan and the Far East would, during the next several years, be such as to make possible an early Japanese economic recovery without more than minimum U.S. assistance continuing beyond the peace treaty.]

8. Addressed to Warren S. Hunsberger, Division of Research for the Far East; James K. Penfield, Deputy Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs; John K. Emmerson, Assistant Chief, Division of Japanese Affairs; and Ruth E. Bacon, Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Miss Bacon, Hugh Borton, Acting Chief, Division of Japanese Affairs, and Messrs. Emmerson, Hunsberger, and Martin made up a working group on the Japanese peace treaty.
9. Annex 1; it was drafted by Mr. Martin on October 2.
10. Not printed; it was drafted by Mr. Martin on October 3.
11. Not printed; it was drafted by Mr. Martin on October 2.
12. At a meeting of the three Secretaries (State, War, and Navy) on September 11, Assistant Secretary of War Petersen reported on conversations with General MacArthur in Tokyo. Mr. Petersen informed General MacArthur “of the interdepartmental committee on the Japanese peace treaty and MacArthur stated he would welcome a visit of the committee. MacArthur will no doubt have a draft treaty of his own by the time the committee arrives. The General is opposed to the FEC as the organization to handle negotiations on the peace treaty and thinks it will have to be done at some Four-Power level.” (811.002/1–2446)