740.00114 PW/9–1146
The Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel)86
The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer to a telegram dated August 12, 1946 from the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, to the War Department of the United States in which there is expressed an intention to retain 104,500 Japanese prisoners of war in the area of the Southeast Asia Command for the purpose of repairing the ravages of war, the final contingents to [be] embarked for repatriation not later than the end of 1947.
The United States Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum of August 28, 1946, informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the decision of the British Chiefs of Staff to postpone the repatriation of Japanese from Southeast Asia for reasons other than the availability of shipping had certain undesirable features from the point of view of the United States. This memorandum was occasioned by an inquiry from the British Chiefs of Staff as to whether the United States Chiefs of Staff would be agreeable to the chartering by the British at the end of 1946 or early 1947 of some of the ships which are being used for the present evacuation program. The memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff stressed that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers now has the organization and the shipping to complete all repatriation commitments by the end of the year 1946 and that the United States Chiefs of Staff expect that by the end of 1946 all United States shipping will have been withdrawn from this service and no United States shipping will remain under military control for repatriation purposes.
While fully cognizant of the importance of the reasons which have led to the decision by the British Chiefs of Staff to retain Japanese prisoners of war for another year in an area which has suffered so severely as a result of the war, the Department of State believes that primary consideration should be given to the serious consequences of a political nature which are likely to result from the retention of this number of Japanese prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. The Department of State also has in mind the commitments assumed by the Allied Powers under Article 9 of the Potsdam Declaration, which promised that Japanese military forces after being completely disarmed shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity [Page 312] to lead peaceful and productive lives. The Department of State earnestly hopes, therefore, that the decision to postpone the repatriation of more than 100,000 Japanese prisoners of war from Southeast Asia may be reconsidered and that His Majesty’s Government will proceed with the repatriation as rapidly as the available shipping will permit.87
- Similarly a note on the same date was sent to the Netherlands Ambassador (Loudon) in regard to 10–15,000 Japanese retained in the Netherlands East Indies (740.00115 PW/9–1146). On October 25, 1946, the Netherlands Ambassador replied in note 7585 to the effect that 13,500 Japanese were needed for absolutely essential work and would be repatriated when circumstances permitted (740.00115 PW/10–2546).↩
- The British Embassy’s note 553 on October 7, 1946, replied that 82,000 Japanese were expected to be retained in south-east Asian areas for the present; this was justified by devastation wrought during the war, by an acute food shortage in Malaya, and by a shortage of labor. However, the British agreed in principle that Japanese should be repatriated with minimum delay (740.00115 PW/10–746).↩