740.00119 Control (Japan)/8–2346
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Hilldring)
to the United States Member on the Far Eastern
Commission (McCoy)
secret
[Washington,] August 28, 1946.
In accordance with instructions of August 23, 1946, from the
State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, there is enclosed a statement of
United States policy regarding A Definition of the Relationship Between
the Far Eastern Commission and the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, comprising the substance of the Appendix of SWNCC 297/3, which was approved by the
State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee on August 21, 1946, after
amending.84
The United States Member, Far Eastern Commission, is advised that the
statement of United States policy is furnished for his assistance and
that it is not believed desirable for him to introduce or discuss this
paper as a whole in the Far Eastern Commission.
Ernest A. Gross
for
J. H. Hilldring
[Annex]
Appendix of SWNCC 297/3 Approved August 21, 1946, by the
State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee
Statement of United States
Policy Regarding a Definition of the Relationship Between the
Far Eastern Commission and the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers
Regarding the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission and
the Allied Council for Japan, following are the views of the U.S.
Government:
[Page 308]
- 1.
- Review of U.S. Directives to the Supreme
Commander: U.S. directives issued through the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, either pursuant to policy decisions of the Far
Eastern Commission or prior to the formulation of such
policy decision, are subject to review by the Commission to
the extent that the subject or substance of such directive
is within the review jurisdiction of the Commission. In any
case where the Commission is dissatisfied with a U.S.
directive within the Commission’s jurisdiction the
appropriate action by the Commission is to issue a statement
of policy which will cause the U.S. Government to change the
directive.
- 2.
- Review of Actions Taken by the Supreme
Commander.
- a.
- Action Taken Pursuant to
Specific Directives. Whenever the Commission
is dissatisfied with an action taken by the Supreme
Commander and the U.S. Government determines that
such action was taken pursuant to a specific
directive issued to him through the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the appropriate action by the Commission
would be to review the directive, not the action of
the Supreme Commander.
- b.
- Action Taken by Supreme
Commander Pursuant to Broad Directives. The
Supreme Commander takes many actions upon his own
initiative to implement broad directives issued by
the United States Government. When the Far Eastern
Commission has under consideration a policy which
would reverse any such action, the recommendations
of the Supreme Commander thereon should be given
full weight by the Commission because of the
political undesirability in Japan of reversing the
Supreme Commander on any important phase of the
occupation. The statement in the Moscow Agreement
that “the functions of the Far Eastern Commission
shall be …85 to review … any
action taken by the Supreme Commander involving
policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the
Commission” shall be interpreted to mean that,
although the Far Eastern Commission in arriving at a
policy decision may discuss any action taken by the
Supreme Commander, formal review action should be
limited to those matters upon which the Commission
has reached a policy decision. The action taken by
the Commission as a result of such review should be
either a clarification of its earlier policy
decision or a statement to the United States
Government indicating the Commission’s objection to
the Supreme Commander’s action and its reasons for
considering the action to be inconsistent with its
policy decision.
- 3.
- Administrative Authority of the Supreme
Commander. It is to be noted that in the discharge
of his responsibilities as the sole executive authority for
the occupation, the Supreme Commander necessarily initiates
and accomplishes many details of administration, flowing
from the surrender terms and the basic policy directives,
which are not covered by individual directives. The Supreme
Commander’s duty and authority to undertake such necessary
administrative actions are implicit in the Moscow
Agreement.
- 4.
- Role of Allied Council. It is to be
noted that the occupation authority is now vested in three
agencies: the Far Eastern Commission for the formulation of
policies; the Supreme Commander for execution; and the
Allied Council for advice and consultation with certain
limited powers to cause executive action to be temporarily
withheld in specified instances. There is no direct
relationship between the Far Eastern Commission and the
Allied Council, the latter being a separate body whose
inherent value depends upon its independent operation under
the control of the four participating powers.
- 5.
- Information Regarding the Progress of
Occupation Required by the Commission. It is the
intent of the U.S. Government to keep the Commission at all
times adequately informed of the progress of the occupation,
to the end that the Commission’s policy decisions may be
made in the full light of all necessary facts. When the
Commission is of the opinion that its information on a
subject within its jurisdiction is inadequate for its
purposes, it should make the fact known to the U.S.
Government, which will make every effort to meet the
Commission’s requirements. In addition, the Commission may
arrange through its chairman for direct consultation with
the Supreme Commander. Such consultation may, in the event
of clear desirability, include visits to Japan by the
Commission or one or more of its representatives. Such
visits should be held to a minimum to avoid unnecessarily
involving the Commission in the recognized chain of command
from the U.S. Government to the Supreme Commander, or in the
functions of the Allied Council. The Far Eastern Commission
is authorized to meet in other places than Washington as
occasion requires, including Tokyo, if and when it deems it
desirable to do so; but it is not a function of the
Commission to maintain continuous inspection in Japan of the
Supreme Commander’s action in implementation of directives
received by him.
