740.00119 Control (Japan)/8–1246: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 13—2:55 p.m.]
364. I shall expect to make comment at special procedural meeting Allied Council, Tuesday morning, August 13 as follows:65
“This is a special meeting called for the purpose of reviewing the procedural organization of the council with a view to determination of what procedures, to be observed by all members, may be expected to facilitate and regularize the council’s work, to place the council on a businesslike basis and in general to improve the work of the council.
“Before we enter into discussion of details, I wish to offer comment in regard to what in my mind is the fundamental question before us. It is a question which long has given me concern both as United States member and as chairman having responsibility for the conduct of meetings. It is the broad question of the council’s possible contribution to the furtherance of the occupation in cooperation with the Supreme Commander.
[Page 287]“I am sure that the other members would wish me to offer some concrete solution of the fundamental question which I have mentioned. I propose to offer what I feel to be such a solution along broad and far-reaching lines.
“There are perhaps a number of reasons for the state of affairs which has arisen in the council. I have neither intention nor desire to engage in a survey of the council’s past activities or to undertake a general probing in the various aspects of this situation. On one important aspect, however, I think I may freely touch.
“Observers of our proceedings have had the impression, rightly or wrongly, that there is resentment in the council that the United States, by dictate or circumstance, has taken a predominant role in the occupation. There should be a way to overcome this obstacle to a smoother and more effective working of the council and the proposal which I shall submit to you in due course has that end specifically in view.
“But I must say at this juncture that I do not know why any such feeling should exist.
“Militarily it fell to the United States, through no desire of its own, to take leadership in the great sacrifice of lives and matériel and in the heartbreaking effort necessary to encompass the defeat of Japan through the long years and over the vast spaces between Pearl Harbor and Atsugi.66 It fell to United States Forces under General MacArthur to venture the historic landing into the armed camp that was Japan in late August and early September 1945. It fell to the United States to maintain the occupation for many months alone.
“In the field of political matters it fell to the United States to formulate and put into effect the initial Post Surrender Policies for the occupation. Some time before the surrender, the United States invited the other Allies to join in establishing a Far Eastern Advisory Commission, but the response was such that the commission was not set up until several months after the surrender. Meanwhile, the United States had no recourse but to carry forward the task and lay down necessary policies to achieve Allied objectives as set forth in the Potsdam Declaration. The Allies subsequently gave approval to United States policies and the actions thus taken. The Far Eastern Commission has been functioning since February and is formulating Allied policy decisions. What General MacArthur is engaged upon, therefore, is the momentous enterprise of moulding into history the concrete results of agreed upon Allied policies.
“The occupation authorities already have Jap cooperation. More and more as time goes on, the Japs have come to realize with increasing force and clarity that our ultimate aims are in the best interests of the Japs as well as in the interests of the world at large.
“If we accept that the agreed upon policies of the Allied govts continue to be in fact the policies of those govts, it is incontrovertible [Page 288] that all the Allies seek in fact the goals which they have announced as common and if this is the case, it follows that the Allied representatives on this council must wish to see the occupation continue a success. It follows that the occupational authorities may rightly expect the wholehearted collaboration of all Allied representatives. It follows that the Allied representatives sitting here will give the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ungrudging cooperation in the great task to which he is committed on behalf of their govts as well as on behalf of his govt and mine. I hope that this will come to be considered a fundamental principle, and that in placing subjects on the agenda, and in presenting and discussing agenda subjects, the members will make that principle the basis of future proceedings in the council.
“There is a long step which we can take toward facilitating and enhancing Allied cooperation at this table by broadening the forum of discussion so that all available Allied resources in knowledge and experience can be utilized to practical advantage and all directly concerned Allies, contribute on the spot to the furtherance of Allied objectives. General MacArthur and I propose that the council invite representatives of those eleven Allied powers which waged the Pacific War and which now have missions in Tokyo to sit here with us, informally and unofficially, and contribute their views. We would be glad to see our friend the British Ambassador67 sitting at this table. We would be glad to see our friend General Pechkoff, the French Ambassador,68 at the council table. We would be glad to have our friend General Schilling, head of the Netherlands Military Mission,69 here with us. We would be glad if a representative of the Philippine Govt were to join in our discussions. We would be happy to have all Allied representatives concerned make a valued contribution to our work and to the furtherance of occupation objectives.
“There are, as you know, eleven nations represented on the Far Eastern Commission, which is now the Allied agency for the formulation of policies, principles and standards in regard to occupational matters within the commission’s jurisdiction. It would be helpful to the Supreme Commander to have the advice and counsel of individual representatives of all those eleven nations. General MacArthur desires and seeks constructive advice and counsel from any and every source to assist him in his discharge of the tremendous responsibilities which rest upon his shoulders. That he seeks and welcomes the advice and counsel of all is, in my opinion, a reflection of the great wisdom, profound insight, and far seeing statesmanship with which he has handled the occupation.
“Revision of the terms of reference of the council is not proposed and is not in our hands. But we can, nevertheless, invite the Chief Allied representatives in Tokyo to join with us at the council table, informally and unofficially, in the discussion of substantive matters, other than procedural, which may properly be brought before the [Page 289] council. By so doing, I submit, we will unquestionably increase the effectiveness of the council in assisting the Supreme Commander, and will bring the council to the forefront of the field, so vital today to all the world, of international good will and cooperation.”70
- Released to the press in Washington, August 14.↩
- From the Japanese attack, December 7, 1941, to the landing of U.S. forces at Atsugi Airport, near Yokohama, late in August, 1945, prior to the signing of the surrender instrument on September 2, 1945, aboard the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay.↩
- A. D. F. Gascoigne.↩
- Gen. Zinovi Pechkoff, former French Ambassador in China, head of the French liaison mission to SCAP.↩
- Lt Gen. Willem Schilling, Netherlands Indies Army, head of Netherlands military mission to Japan.↩
- On August 20, 1946, Mr. Atcheson cabled his proposed statement giving reasons why General MacArthur and he had made their proposal; the new statement would be made on August 21 at the meeting of the Allied Council. Mr. Atcheson concluded that “General MacArthur and I would hope most earnestly to see this Council become an effective agency for full allied cooperation. We can think of no more effective way to accomplish this than to invite the distinguished representatives of the other allies in Tokyo to join freely and informally in our discussions.” (740.00119 Control (Japan)/8–2046)↩