740.00119 Control (Japan)/7–2646: Telegram
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State51
[Received July 26—8:52 p.m.]
C 63473. Appreciate sincerely your radio circr July 24, 1 p.m.52 and similar messages giving advance information. Such action is most helpful. The position taken by the American member on the FEC with reference to the authority of the Commission is entirely in accord with the views held and expressed here. For information and such use as you may desire, hereunder are my comments on the items enumerated for consultation:
- (a)
- I believe the limitation that the Prime Minister and majority of Ministers of State must be selected from membership of the Diet is unwise as such requirement would deprive the Japanese Government of the services, in ministerial capacities, of many men of possibly higher qualification than might be found in the legislative body. It is an unusual and arbitrary restriction upon government which certainly is not to be found within our own governmental system, and I doubt if it can be found in any governmental system in the world. The existing requirement in the draft constitution that the Prime Minister must be designated by the Diet and approval of the Diet must be obtained to the appointment of all Ministers of State should satisfy every reasonable requirement of democratic process in such matter.
- (b)
- While I feel that Articles 39 and 40 of the constitution adequately provide against the discrimination suggested, I shall endeavor to secure amendment to the draft constitution now before the Diet to specifically cover the points indicated.
- (c)
- While I feel that the draft constitution, not only in the specific terms of the preamble but throughout, clearly demonstrates that the sovereign power resides in the people, in order to satisfy those who appear to be in doubt on this point, I shall endeavor to have the draft constitution further amended to place within its body the provision suggested.
Reference first query contained in last paragraph of your radio, it is my opinion that the implementing legislation referred to is not appropriate for inclusion in the constitution, as such detailed matters of government should remain susceptible to change as conditions require by normal legislative process rather than by extraordinary constitutional amendment. The laws designed to implement any constitution finally adopted, such as the Imperial Household Law, will, of course, be closely scrutinized by SCAP to determine that they conform both to the principles laid down at Potsdam and the constitution itself. [Page 280] It is believed, furthermore, that the specific grounds on which a Diet member may be expelled finds no appropriate place in the constitution. Under normal practice, a legislative body is left free to make rules governing the qualifications of its own members. The draft constitution provides that the expulsion of a member of the Diet may be effected only by a two-thirds vote of the members present. This provision would appear to provide reasonable safeguard against arbitrary action by a majority group, and there appears to be no inconsistency with democratic process such as would warrant Allied interference.
The last query as to whether selection of the Prime Minister should not be a matter for the House of Representatives alone is believed to be academic in view of the provisions of Article 63 of the draft constitution providing that where an irreconcilable difference of opinion exists between the two houses on selection, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be that of the Diet. There is some possibility that in the constitution finally adopted provision will be made for a unicameral legislature.
Throughout the queries of the members of the Far Eastern Commission there appears to be some indication of a tendency to attempt to obtain a perfection in constitutional government which we would not seem to be at liberty to insist upon in the implementation of the Potsdam requirement which is merely that a democratic state be established. In this connection, sight should not be lost of the fact that this entire constitutional process now under way is one by the Japanese Government and people, and that the underlying purpose of our intervention is to assert in that the steps taken lead toward desired democratization. To attempt to force perfection in detail, among several democratic alternatives against Japanese objectors, would vitiate our very aim and purpose to secure adoption of a constitution which expresses the free will of the Japanese people.53