894.011/6–2446
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Subject: Japanese Constitution
There are attached four papers in regard to Japanese governmental reform with particular reference to basic principles for a new Japanese constitution.
Paper (A)29 is from an early SWNCC paper pre-dating the advent of FEC.
[Page 260]Paper (B)30 is an FEC committee re-draft of the early SWNCC paper.
Paper (C)31 is a drastically simplified British paper on the same subject.
Paper (D)32 is, as it states, a reconciliation of the British original paper to meet the views of some of the FEC committee members.
The question of the adoption of a paper is now actively before the FEC and will probably come up for consideration this week. Only Papers (B) and (D) are being currently considered. (B) is considered a satisfactory substitute for (A) by many committee members. The British, I understand, have withdrawn (C) in favor of (D) and therefore (C) is of interest only in showing the great latitude which the British were willing to grant the Japanese in the matter of constitution. Almost any constitution could be made to square with the broad terms of the British original paper.
4 members of FEC favor Paper (B). They are, if I am correctly informed, Australia, New Zealand, The Netherlands, and the Soviet Union. 4 members favor Paper (D). They are Great Britain, the Philippines, France, and India. The United States and Canada members have reserved their position. The Chinese apparently will vote for either paper but would, I believe, vote for the one for which we vote.
I have discussed this matter with General Hilldring, with members of General McCoy’s staff, and with representatives of the War Department. Either draft is acceptable to the War Department. General McCoy, I am told, favors (D). General Hilldring has a “leaning” towards (B) but would not make an issue of the matter if unanimity could be achieved for (D).
I prefer (B) primarily because it represents our thinking in the matter and it would seem to me that we would look a little foolish at this date if we came out for the modified British draft when we have 4 members in favor of the draft which incorporates our original ideas.
The argument against (B) is that it is too detailed and also that it seems to keep alive the question of whether there shall be an Emperor in Japan when it is assumed that the Japanese have already settled that issue, at least for the time being. I do not consider this a valid objection. Draft (B) still represents our thinking on the matter, would be favored by a majority if we and the Chinese stood by it, and provides a more precise measuring stick for the Japanese constitution, quite aside from the so-called “dead” Emperor issue.
The British have said that they would veto (B). It seems to be assumed, without definite knowledge, that the Russians would veto [Page 261] (D). I would be willing to support (D) if by so doing we could avoid any veto. But if there is to be a veto, I would prefer that we stand by (B) on the issue. As a matter of fact, I have my doubts that the British in the last analysis would veto (B) provided some small concessions are made to their point of view. On the other hand, I have a feeling that Australia and New Zealand would be right out in front voting with a Russian veto of (D) if the Russians decided on a veto.
I have been asked to put the question before you. The question is whether we continue to stand for (B), facing the possibility of a British veto, or whether we switch to (D) and take a chance on adverse votes by the Soviet Union, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly the Netherlands. We shall, of course, continue to work for a draft agreeable to all concerned but if this fails I would like to have your advice on our stand.33
- FEC 19, “Reform of the Japanese governmental system”, not printed.↩
- FEC–031/13, “Basic principles for a new Japanese constitution”, not printed.↩
- SC 012/6, not printed.↩
- FEC–031/13, not printed.↩
- On June 26, 1946, Mr. Vincent wrote General Hilldring that Mr. Acheson preferred draft (B) instead of (D), but it would be better “to work out some compromise paper which could at least receive majority support including the support of the 4 members having veto power.” General Hilldring then informed General McCoy of this. (894.001/6–2446)↩