Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–1346: Telegram

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁸¹

top secret

Tokyo, 4 May 1946.

C 60606. I am in full agreement with the need for a closer working arrangement and understanding between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and the Commission⁸² and stand ready to do everything in my power to such end. I do not believe, however, that the dispatch of an officer from my staff to confer with the Commission would provide a solution to the problem. In the first place, as Supreme Commander I have given my personal attention to the matter of constitutional reform, and there is no other officer in position to express in detail my views on that subject. In the second place, my key officer personnel situation has become so critical, due to the rapid demobilization of officer personnel, that the release of a key officer for such purpose could not be effected without impairment to the Command. Furthermore, the situation here is a fluid one, necessitating constant on-the-ground observation to permit a comprehensive understanding of it from day to day. SCAP is engaged in constant operations involving immediate rather than long range action. A more profitable relationship between SCAP and the Commission is largely dependent upon a better appreciation of the related responsibilities of each in the administration of the occupation. I believed this could be foreseen when the Commission was in Tokyo, but the great distances involved rendered it utterly impossible for the Commission effectively to achieve more than the development of broad guiding policies, leaving to the full discretion of the Supreme Commander the timing and method of their implementation. Such was the relationship envisaged at Moscow when the agreement was reached and such had been the previous relationship between the American Government in Washington and SCAP.

With respect to the matter of constitutional reform, perhaps a review of the evaluation of the Government’s draft would be helpful to you in your understanding of the present situation. In compliance with my basic directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as oriented from the principles stated at Potsdam and embodied in the surrender terms, I instructed the Higashi-Kuni⁸³ Cabinet last September to draft a plan for revision of the constitution of Japan with the view of its democratization to permit development of the type of a government and society required by the Potsdam Declaration. When the Shidehara Cabinet assumed office, it acquired full responsibility in this matter. During that early period and subsequently until the Government’s draft constitution was formulated, I held frequent personal conferences with state ministers with the view of their understanding of and acquiescence in the enlightened principles which of necessity would guide the revision to bring it within Allied general policy as interpreted in more specific form by the American Government. During that early period, the Political Adviser, upon instruction from the State Department, additionally held conferences with Japanese political leaders. On October 17th the Allied policy was further interpreted in instructions to the Political Adviser from the Secretary of State of the United States⁸⁴ contained in radio Svc 5477, reading in part:

“There should be assurance that the Japanese Constitution is amended to provide for government responsibility to an electorate based upon wide representative suffrage. Provision should be made that executive branch of government derive its authority from and be responsible to the electorate or to a fully representative legislative body. If Emperor institution is not retained constitutional safeguards against that institution will obviously not be required but provision should be made for

(1) Complete control by an elected congress of financial and budget council [budgetary matters],

(2) Guarantee of fundamental civil rights to all persons within Japanese jurisdiction, not to Japanese only, and

(3) Action by Head of State only pursuant to authority expressly delegated to him.

If Emperor is retained, following safeguards in addition to those enumerated above would be necessary:

(1) A cabinet to advise and assist the Emperor should be chosen with advice and consent of and responsible to representative legislative body,

(2) No veto over legislative measures should be exercised by other bodies such as House of Peers or Privy Council,

(3) Emperor should be required to initiate amendments to constitution recommended by Cabinet and approved by legislative body,

(4) Legislative body should be permitted to meet at will, and

(5) Any ministers for armed forces which may be permitted in future should be civilians and all special privileges of direct access to Throne by military should be eliminated.

We concur in general in the review [views] summarized in your CA–53137, October 11th⁸⁵ and desire that you continue your discussions and keep Department informed.”

Again in SWNCC 228 dated 7th January 1946⁸⁶ the United States laid down still more detailed policy rules, concluding that:

• “A. The Supreme Commander should indicate to the Japanese authorities that the Japanese governmental system should be reformed to accomplish the following general objectives: (1) A government responsible to an electorate based upon wide representative suffrage; (2) An executive branch of government deriving its authority from and responsible to the electorate or to a fully representative body; (3) A legislative body, fully representative of the electorate, with full power to reduce, increase or reject any items in the budget or to suggest new items; (4) No budget shall become effective without the express approval of the legislative body; (5) Guarantee of fundamental civil rights to Japanese subjects and to all persons within Japanese jurisdiction; (6) The popular election or local appointment of as many of the prefectural officials as practicable; (7) The drafting and adoption of constitutional amendment or of a constitution in a manner which will express the free will of the Japanese people.
• “B. Though the ultimate form of government in Japan is to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, the retention of the Emperor institution in its present form is not considered consistent with the foregoing general objectives.
• “C. If the Japanese people decide that the Emperor institution is not to be retained, constitutional safeguards against the institution will obviously not be required but the Supreme Commander should indicate to the Japanese that the constitution should be amended to conform to the objectives listed in A above and to include specific provision: (1) That any other bodies shall possess only a temporary veto power over legislative measures, including constitutional amendments approved by the representative legislative body, and that such body shall have sole authority over financial measures; (2) That the ministers of state or the members of a cabinet should in all cases be civilians; (3) That the legislative body may meet at will.
• “D. The Japanese should be encouraged to abolish the Emperor institution or to reform it along more democratic lines. If the Japanese decide to retain the institution of the Emperor, however, the Supreme Commander should also indicate to the Japanese authorities that the following safeguards in addition to those enumerated in A and C above would be necessary: (1) That the ministers of state, chosen with the advice and consent of the representative legislative body, shall form a cabinet collectively responsible to the legislative body; (2) That when a cabinet loses the confidence of the representative legislative body, it must either resign or appeal to the electorate; (3) The Emperor shall act in all important matters only on the advice of the Cabinet; (4) The Emperor shall be deprived of all military authority such as that provided in articles 11, 12, 13, and 14 of chapter 1 of the Constitution; (5) The Cabinet shall advise and assist the Emperor; (6) The entire income of the Imperial household shall be turned into the public treasury and the expenses of the Imperial household shall be appropriated by the legislature in the annual budget.”

Finally at culmination, about the middle of February, when a number of drafts had been discussed at length and the question had reached a state of intense universal consideration,⁸⁷ the Cabinet at the Government’s request joined in almost constant conference with SCAP’s Government Section from which discussions finally emerged the Government draft.⁸⁸ It thus will be seen that I have acted meticulously in accord with the instructions received from the United States Government, and been guided throughout by its policies in assisting the Japanese Government and people in the development of constitutional reforms.

It has been my purpose, in conformity with the principles laid down at Potsdam as developed in aforestated American policy, to take no formal action on any constitutional reform finally adopted by the Japanese people if it reasonably conforms to existing Allied policy, in order to avoid any implication which might arise, even from the formality of approval by the Allied powers, that such reform resulted from Allied pressure. Such policy and its purpose was clearly stated in SWNCC 228, reading in part as follows: Paragraph 5 “Only as a last resort should the Supreme Commander order the Japanese Government to effect the above listed reforms, as the knowledge that they had been imposed by the Allies would materially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japanese people for the future”; conclusions, paragraph 4 A (7): “The drafting and adoption of constitutional amendments or of a constitution in a manner which will express the free will of the Japanese people;” and Appendix “B”, paragraph (7): “Only as a last resort should a formal instruction be issued to the Japanese Government specifying in detail the reforms to be effected”. The only policy decision thus far handed down by the Far Eastern Commission in the matter of constitutional reform⁸⁹ had the effect of reversing this all-important policy provision by its requirement of the formality of its approval as a prerequisite to the final adoption of any constitutional reform by the Japanese people. The purpose underlying such requirement is not clear, but its effect is capable of doing immeasurable harm to the occupation as it will undoubtedly prejudice many Japanese people against the instrument itself, who will look upon it as a thing forced upon Japan at the point of Allied bayonets, however admirable its purposes and noble its aims. It will completely negative the expressed purpose underlying aforestated policy that the drafting and adoption of a constitution be done “in a manner which will express the free will of the Japanese people.” There can be no free will when the threat of disapproval by the Allied powers overhangs all deliberation, discussion and debate on the constitutional issue. My own personal approval of the Government draft, evolved from joint studies between the Japanese Government and SCAP Headquarters, was designed merely to give moral support and encouragement to the liberal forces struggling in Japan for reform against tradition, prejudice and reaction.⁹⁰ It was given by me in direct compliance with my American policy directive to encourage the establishment of democratic processes in Japan in implementation of the requirement of the Potsdam declaration that the “Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people,” and because the suggested draft embodied all the principles theretofore enumerated as a guide to constitutional reform. It did not commit the Allied powers in any way or even the Supreme Comander himself except on general principles nor did it restrict in any way or degree the freedom of discussion and action by the Japanese Government and people upon the issues involved. This was fully understood by both the Japanese Government and people as eloquently demonstrated by the subsequent public discussion still in progress which has occupied large sections of the Japanese daily press.

The Far Eastern Commission, by its terms of reference, is a policy making body with no executive powers, functions or responsibilities in the administration of Japan, which are reserved exclusively to the Supreme Commander. While it has the right of review of any action taken by the Supreme Commander which involves its own “policy decisions within its jurisdiction”, it is not empowered, in my belief, to require prior approval of any action taken either by the Supreme Commander or the Japanese Government to implement, fulfill or enforce the terms of surrender. It thus far has formulated no action setting up “policies, principles and standards” to govern in the revision of the Japanese constitution. It has not given the slightest indication of whether it concurs or nonconcurs with the stated American policy, other than that contained in its apparent reversal of American policy designed to maintain the voluntary character of Japanese action on constitution reform. Approval or disapproval of acts of the Japanese Government as a prerequisite to their validity is a function wholly executive in character. For the Far Eastern Commission to assert such power seems a clear violation of the terms of the Moscow agreement and the interpretation of the American Government thereof, as publicly stated by the Secretary of State. To the contrary, it appears patently clear that the function of the Far Eastern Commission in the matter of constitution reform for Japan is limited to the formulation of guiding policy within the framework of the Potsdam Declaration and the surrender terms. In the absence of any such policy statement from the Far Eastern Commission, the Supreme Commander is clearly unrestricted [in] his authority to proceed in the implementation of the Potsdam Declaration and surrender terms as he interprets them or may be guided by developed American policy in point. In this matter speed is of the essence due to the fact, too readily lost sight of, that the Japanese people are now subject to their present wholly undemocratic constitution and will remain subject thereto so long as reform is delayed. Such delay, furthermore, but serves the interests of those who would much prefer that such reforms be not instituted at all.

It is too early to forecast either the course or time-table of legislative action, once the Government’s draft constitution is formally submitted to the Diet, nor is it known whether any further procedure, such as by constitutional convention or plebiscite, will be determined upon for direct ratification by the people. I personally believe that provision for such direct ratification, however, is both unnecessary and undesirable. It would be cumbersome, and involve further protracted delay, with little likelihood of beneficial result. The new constitution is now being evolved on an entirely voluntary basis by the Japanese Government and people; the Government’s draft was squarely before the electorate throughout the recent election campaign; it has been and is being fully discussed in all circles and through all media, and its final form is still problematical. The Diet, which will act upon it as required by the existing constitution, is composed of a membership elected with the express view of acting upon it. The important thing is to encourage the people, by their own voluntary action and method, to establish the reforms sought under Allied policy, and to do so as quickly as possible; thereafter further refinement is always within the people’s right, with such leadership or direction as we may determine should be extended.

All political parties and various private groups and individuals have proposed constitutions and constitutional provisions. Such proposals have, throughout the election campaign, been widely disseminated and debated in the vernacular press and radio, and all were considered, as were the existing constitutions of nearly all of the free peoples of the earth, in the development of the Government’s draft. As I stated when I indicated my approval thereof, it constitutes a realistic compromise between the several divergent political faiths. The consideration by the people of the constitutional question has been thoroughly democratic, and when it emerges in final form it will probably have been the most freely discussed and considered constitution in history. As well over 95 percent of the Japanese people are clearly disposed to retain the Imperial institution, while free discussion thereon has been encouraged, no effort has been made to persuade them to abolish the same. Such action would do violence to the spirit of the Potsdam Declaration which left this matter to the free will of the Japanese people. The drastic reformation of the Imperial institution along democratic lines, with its survival rendered subject to the people’s will as proposed in the Government’s draft, bespeaks the encouragement SCAP has given this reform. The Commission could render no better service to the cause of democracy than to permit the Japanese Government and people, as I propose to do, to proceed unshackled, unhindered, and in complete freedom to work out their constitutional reforms, examining the situation only after action thereon has been completed to determine that the results achieved meet Allied standards.⁹¹

I strongly urge the Commission to reorient itself from consideration of the past, to meet those great issues on which policies have not yet been determined; to accept the proposition that the sweeping measures which the United States of necessity alone has taken, with all attendant hazards, risks and costs, in the occupation of Japan have been within the spirit of Allied purposes, and are now matters which have been largely accomplished and upon all of which action is proceeding in accordance with determined policies; to proceed at once to decide policies to govern in the solution of the remaining vital problems, foremost of which involve reparations and the position which Japan is to occupy in the post-war world, on the solution of which rests the entire question of Japan’s internal economic and social reconstruction; and, in full mutual confidence and friendly spirit, to work closely and constructively with the Supreme Commander in serving the common purpose. Thereby, and thereby alone, may the objective of the Moscow agreement, in constituting the Commission as an agency to shape Allied policy for the guidance of the Supreme Commander in the discharge of his executive responsibilities, be fully and harmoniously reached. For my part, the Commission may be assured that I as Supreme Commander will make available to it copies of all special and periodic reports covering the administration of Japan, and any other special information which it may from time to time specifically desire, and do everything else reasonable within my power to facilitate discharge of the Commission’s responsibility in the over-all task to which the Allied nations jointly are committed.

81. Copy of telegram transmitted to the Department by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee with its SWN–4284, May 13, “for information only” and not to be sent to the Far Eastern Commission. The “substance”, however, was given the Commission on June 4.
82. See annex, dated April 10, to General Hilldring’s memorandum of April 12, p. 195.
83. Prince Naruhiko Higashi-Kuni, Prime Minister, August 17–October 5, 1945.
84. See telegram 38, October 16, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, p. 757.
85. See telegram 31, October 10, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, p. 739.
86. Annex 1, p. 99.
87. For documents, see Political Reorientation of Japan, pp. 605 ff.
88. For first Government draft, see ibid., p. 625.
89. Dated March 20; see annex to memorandum of March 25 by Mr. Matthews, p. 181.
90. March 6, Political Reorientation of Japan, p. 657.
91. In telegram 205, May 6, 1946, from Tokyo, the Political Adviser (Atcheson) called General MacArthur’s telegram “sound analysis of the relationship of SCAP to the Far Eastern Commission” and, in regard to the foregoing paragraph, added: “I would submit my full endorsement and that of the Japan experts in this office”. (740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–646)