740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–1546: Telegram
Mr. Max W. Bishop, of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan, to the Secretary of State
urgent
[Received April 16—1:05 p.m.]
179. For the Secretary. I have just read the following message from General MacArthur to General McCoy.64 I feel strongly that [Page 202] this matter is of the utmost importance and merits your personal attention. General MacArthur’s vigorous and cogent defense of United States policy and of the procedure developed by the Secretary at Moscow should, I believe, be given every possible support.
Begin Message from General MacArthur to General McCoy: Reurad W 83719 confirm your second paragraph. Revision of the Jap constitution, pursuant to existing American policy (SWNCC 228 and radio W 80789 March 16) giving effect to the purpose of the Potsdam Declaration that there shall be “established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Jap people a peacefully inclined and responsible Govt”, is being evolved on an entirely voluntary basis by the Jap Govt and people. It is being freely discussed in all circles and through all media, and its final form is entirely problematical. The govt draft, and perhaps other drafts, unquestionably will be submitted to the Diet, but it is impossible to predict either the course of time or legislative action. It had been my purpose, in conformity with the aforestated American policy, to take no formal action on any constitutional reform finally adopted by the Jap people if it conformed to existing Allied policy, in order to avoid any implication which might arise, even from the formality of approval by the Allied Powers, that such reform resulted from Allied pressure. Such policy and its purpose was clearly stated in SWNCC 228, reading in part as follows:
Paragraph 5. “Only as a last resort should the Supreme Commander order the Jap Government to effect the above listed reforms, as the knowledge that they had been imposed by the Allies would materially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Jap people for the future;” conclusions, paragraph 4 a (7): “The drafting and adoption of constitutional amendments or of a constitution in a manner which will express the free will of the Jap people,” and appendix B paragraph 7: “Only as a last resort should a formal instruction be issued to the Jap Government specifying in detail the reforms to be effected.” The Far Eastern Commission is reversing American policy in this respect by insisting that the formality of its approval be a prerequisite to final adoption of any such reform by the Jap people. The purpose underlying such requirement is not clear, but its effect is capable of doing immeasurable harm to the occupation as it will undoubtedly prejudice many Jap people against the instrument itself who will therefore look upon it as a tiling forced upon Japan at the point of Allied bayonets, however admirable its purposes and noble its aims. It will completely negative the expressed purpose underlying American policy that the drafting and adoption of a constitution be done “in a manner which will express the free will of the Jap people.” There can be no free will when the threat of disapproval by the Allied powers overhangs all deliberation, discussion and debate of the constitutional issue. My own personal approval of the Government draft, evolved from joint studies between the Jap Government and SCAP Headquarters, was designed to give moral support and encouragement to the liberal forces struggling for reform against tradition, prejudice and reaction. It was given by me in direct compliance with my American policy directive to encourage the establishment of democratic processes in Japan in implementation [Page 203] of the requirement of the Potsdam Declaration that “The Jap Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Jap people,” and because the suggested draft embodied all the principles prescribed in the United States policy governing constitutional reform. It did not commit the Allied Powers in any way or even the Supreme Commander himself except on general principles nor did it restrict in any way or degree the freedom of discussion and action by the Jap Government and people upon the issues involved. This was fully understood by both Jap Government and people as eloquently demonstrated by the subsequent public discussion still in progress which occupies large sections of the Jap daily press.
The Far Eastern Commission by its terms of reference is a policy making body with no executive powers, functions or responsibilities in the administration of Japan, which are reserved exclusively to the Supreme Commander. While it has the right of review of any action taken by the Supreme Commander which involves its own “policy decisions within its jurisdiction,” it is not empowered, in my belief, to require prior approval of any action taken either by the Supreme Commander or the Jap Government to implement, fulfill or enforce the terms of surrender. It thus far has formulated no action setting up “policies, principles and standards” to govern in the revision of the Jap constitution, nor given the slightest indication of whether it concurs or non-concurs with the stated American policy, other than that contained in its apparent reversal of American policy based upon the Potsdam Declaration, designed to maintain the voluntary character of Jap action on constitutional reform. Approval or disapproval of acts of the Jap Government as a prerequisite to their validity is a function wholly executive in character. For the Far Eastern Commission to assert such power seems a clear violation of the terms of the Moscow Agreement and the interpretation of the American Government thereof, as publicly stated by the Secretary of State (WCL 33525, January 3 reading partially): “This Far Eastern Commission will have the authority to formulate principles to govern the control of Japan”; and “These are questions which by their nature require agreement among the principal Allies if there is to be a common Allied policy. To reserve them for decision by the Commission does not affect the administration of Allied control by the Supreme Commander”; and “the proposals we offered regarding Japan make it clear that we intend to cooperate with our Allies and we expect them to cooperate with us. But at the same time, our agreement safeguards the efficient administration which has been set up in Japan under the Supreme Allied Commander. It assures that the authority of General MacArthur will not be obstructed by the inability of the Far Eastern Commission to agree on policies or by the inability of the Allied Council to agree upon the methods of carrying them out. We were determined to assure that the outstanding and efficient administration set up and executed by General MacArthur should not be obstructed”; and “I really believe as to that it leaves two questions as to which you cannot issue interim directives but must await policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission”; and “if there was a proposal of a policy that we did not like and we did not concur, then no matter what the other eleven did, the policy would not become [Page 204] effective. As it now stands, it does require unanimity which gives to the United States the power, if it does not like any policy that is proposed, to veto it. That is one place where we are in control in Japan.” Throughout his interpretation the Secretary of State made it patently clear that the Far Eastern Commission’s powers were limited to policy making and are specifically so designed as to preserve inviolate the power of the Supreme Commander as the “sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan.”
As W 82394 is in due form as a directive, I have complied fully therewith, but have done so most reluctantly in view of the invalid premise upon which, in my view, it is based, the failure of the United States Government to exercise its right of veto at the appropriate time, and its potentially adverse consequences. This encroachment upon the authority of the Supreme Commander follows closely upon the effort of the Far Eastern Commission to interfere with the elections just concluded. You yourself recognized the invalidity of its attempted action (NRW 98139). It matters not that the ultimate votes of the Commission supported the election plan of the Jap Government; the effect of its formal action on the question at all, with the attending publicity given it, can only have an adverse effect upon the local situation, tend to undermine the authority of the Supreme Commander in the execution of Allied policy in the administration of Japan, and confuse the Jap Government and people. Throughout, the Far Eastern Commission has totally ignored the Allied Council for Japan which plans to study, on the ground, the identical questions with a view to advising and assisting the Supreme Commander, or suspending any action proposed by the Supreme Commander on the Constitution which any member may feel is inappropriate and should await a policy decision by the Far Eastern Commission. The Commission thereby has rendered the Allied Council practically powerless in so far as the issue of constitutional reform is concerned, one of the only 3 issues on which, by its terms of reference, has the right of interference in the executive functions of the Supreme Commander. It has apparently overlooked that limitation in its terms of reference reading: “The Commission in its activities will proceed from the fact that there has been formed an Allied Council for Japan, and will respect existing control machinery in Japan”. What is at stake in this matter? It is not merely the unimportant question of a division of authority between various agencies but is the retention of American influence and American control which has been established in Japan by the American Government in a skillful combination of checks and balances designed to preserve American interests here. There is a planned and concerted attack to break this down. It exists in the Far Eastern Commission in a most definite and decisive form under the veneer of diplomacy and comradeship therein. There is an implacable determination to break down the control of the United States which that country exercises so comprehensively through SCAP. I beg of you to protect in every possible way, including the veto power, the position and policy of the United States Government. Appeasements, small as they may seem, rapidly [Page 205] become accumulative to the point of danger. If we lose control of this sphere of influence under this policy of aggressive action, we will not only jeopardize the occupation but hazard the future safety of the United States. (Signed) MacArthur.