851G.00/1–3046
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard L. Sharp of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs
| Participants: | Brigadier General Philip E. Gallagher, War Department; |
| Colonel Vittrup, War Department Liaison; | |
| Mr. Charles S. Reed, FSO; | |
| Mr. Woodruff Wallner, WE; | |
| Mr. Abbot Low Moffat,6 SEA; | |
| Mr. R. L. Sharp, SEA. |
General Gallagher, who had been in Hanoi and vicinity between August 22 and December 12, 1945, was introduced by Colonel Vittrup.
Asked when, in his opinion, the Chinese would get out of Indochina, General Gallagher said that General Lu Han7 had told him the Chinese would move out when the job given them by the Allies was completed. General Gallagher said he thought they really intend to do this although the whole matter depends upon the removal of the Japanese. To date, shipping for this purpose has not been available but now it is understood that United States bottoms will be used. The question is, therefore, when will such ships be allocated. General Gallagher said he had recommended to General Wedemeyer8 that high priority should be given such allocation. There are some 20 to 30 thousand Japanese in Haiphong and the Do Son Peninsula. No political settlement can be reached in Indochina until the Chinese move out and they cannot do that until the Japanese are repatriated. General Gallagher added that he thought US army teams would have to be put into Indochina to concentrate and prepare the Japanese for evacuation.
General Gallagher was asked whether he knew of any arrangement whereby French forces moving into the north would overlap departing Chinese forces. He replied that in December Sainteny9 said that no French would enter until the Chinese left. General Gallagher thought the French were probably not getting very far in negotiating with the Chinese on problems connected with their removal. Unless in the meantime something has been arranged between the French and the Chinese, the French would probably infiltrate overland from the south rather than land in force in northern ports.
General Gallagher pointed out that little love was lost between the Chinese and the French; that the presence of the American group in Hanoi restrained anti-French Chinese action; and that he himself had influenced General Lu Han to bring Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh together and confront both with a strong directive that order must be maintained. The existence of a vacuum in the north with neither French nor Chinese troops present would be extremely dangerous, for the Annamese would react strongly against all French in the area, who would be helpless in protecting themselves. To take over successfully, the French would need a sufficient force to cover the whole [Page 17] north. One or two modern French divisions could, in General Gallagher’s opinion, defeat the Annamese.
In response to the question whether the French could do more than take key cities, he admitted that the Annamese would take to the hills and continue guerrilla warfare. Even in Saigon, he pointed out, things are far from peaceful despite British and French claims to the contrary. Establishment of French control could be speeded up if they were able to make large-scale air drops throughout the north. The Annamese, however, are well organized and, so far as small arms go, are quite well armed, although they have no navy, shore batteries and probably little artillery.
The question was raised whether the French mission in Hanoi was in fact negotiating with Ho Chi Minh. General Gallagher replied that the Viet Minh Provisional Government was at first willing to negotiate; then in October, after de Gaulle’s10 pronouncements on colonial policy, the Annamese refused to negotiate with the French and reacted vigorously against all French nationals in Hanoi. The Chinese may succeed in putting in a less anti-French Annamese government so that negotiation might go forward. All French efforts to stimulate a palace revolution against Ho were of no avail. Ho himself will not deal with the French. The Viet Minh is strong and, regardless of possible superficial changes in the Provisional Government, Ho will be behind any continuing Annamese movement. General Gallagher said that Sainteny had told him he expected peaceful agreement between the French and the Annamese would be reached by negotiation.
General Gallagher was asked how effective the Viet Minh administration would be with neither French nor Chinese forces present. He replied that on the whole he was impressed by the remarkably effective Annamese administration. There was an able personnel; they were all enthusiastic and young, but there were too few of them. Whatever their technical skill, they perhaps lack executive ability and experience since the technical services in Hanoi were at first very well run but gradually deteriorated. Trained people for the government and at the municipal level are lacking. In General Gallagher’s opinion the Annamese are not yet ready for self-government and in full-fledged competition with other nations they would “lose their shirts”. However, the demand for independence is widespread and even in the villages the peasants refer to the example of the Philippines.
Ho is willing to cooperate with Great Britain, USSR, or the United States and would perhaps even settle for French tutelage if that were subordinated to control by the other nations. French control alone, [Page 18] however, will be strongly resisted. The deep-seated hatred for the French has been fanned by exceedingly clever Viet Minh propaganda.
General Gallagher was asked whether the Annamese were realistic regarding their ability to stand up against French military force. While they are too enthusiastic and too naive, he said, they probably know that they will be licked. They are strong on parades and reiterate their willingness “to fight to the last man”, but they would be slaughtered and they have been told that and probably know it. The Annamese would be no match for forces with modern arms even if they themselves have some, which they may have since the Chinese found no Japanese rolling artillery and numerous Japanese antiaircraft guns seem to have completely disappeared. United States Army representatives never did learn the extent of arms controlled by the Viet Minh. Certainly the Chinese are not turning Japanese arms over to them. Before V–J Day the Japanese undoubtedly had armed and trained many Annamese. A Japanese general claimed they had taken over on March 9 simply because the French could no longer control the Annamese, but this statement General Gallagher characterized as a lie. He had heard that under the pretext of arming Annamese gendarmes for police duty in Hanoi, the Japanese had actually armed three distinct contingents, dismissing each group when armed and bringing in a new one to be armed and trained. Furthermore, the Annamese had acquired Japanese arms from arsenals which had been opened. General Gallagher did not know whether or not Tai Li11 was sending arms to the Viet Minh.
General Gallagher was asked whether the presence of French hostages in the north would restrain French forces when they enter the region. He pointed out that only a few French civilians had been removed by air. All the rest, besides some five thousand disarmed French troops, were still to be removed. The Chinese cannot take them out nor would Lu Han even permit their evacuation to the Do Son Peninsula. Their presence had been a constant restraining influence on Sainteny. Asked whether the Annamese would let these French be evacuated, General Gallagher replied that they would have to if the Chinese were still there, but that these French nationals would be a real problem if the Chinese were moved out. The American Army group had to exert considerable pressure on the Chinese to get them to give any freedom at all to French civilians in Haiphong, Hue and other centers besides Hanoi. However, the Chinese and French alone had arranged for shipments of food from the south. The American group, incidentally, had to intervene to prevent the monopoly by the French of such food or of food distributed by the U.S. Army. The [Page 19] French nationals could be evacuated from Hongai and Tourane by the United States when the Japanese were removed if the Chinese would concentrate them at those ports. However, General Gallagher noted, that would place us in a position of working against the Annamese.
Originally, General Gallagher explained, the French expected the United States to play the same role in the north that the British were playing in the south. When they found us neutral they became more and more antagonistic and did everything possible to persuade United States personnel to favor the French position. They had no appreciation of the actual help which the American group gave to the prisoners of war and some of the civilian French in the form of food, medical aid, and so on. The Annamese, too, expected American help originally, having been thoroughly indoctrinated with the Atlantic Charter and other ideological pronouncements. In our neutral role we were thus a disappointment to both sides.
In response to a question, General Gallagher gave his opinion that Lu Han would be faithful to Chungking although as governor of Yunnan he would also be influenced to maintain as fully as possible relations between Yunnan and north Indochina which would be profitable to him.
General Gallagher said that the half dozen or so top French military officers held by the Japanese had been returned to France shortly after Sainteny reached Hanoi. He did not know what had happened to Decoux.12
Asked how “communist” the Viet Minh were, General Gallagher replied that they were smart and successfully gave the impression of not being communist. Rather, they emphasized their interest in independence and their Annamese patriotism. Their excellent organization and propaganda techniques, General Gallagher pointed out, would seem to have the earmarks of some Russian influence. General Gallagher stated that the minority Cao Dai group were definitely Communist. In his opinion, however, the Viet Minh should not be labeled full-fledged doctrinaire communist.
At the present time the Hanoi radio is controlled by the Chinese so that there is communication between Hanoi and Saigon. A British military and civilian liaison team was sent to Hanoi and a Chinese counterpart to Saigon. The British in Hanoi at first made little progress with the Chinese but General Gallagher understands they have since made more headway.
The Chinese 60th Army in the south of the Chinese zone and the 93rd Army around Hanoi, both totalling some 50 thousand men, have [Page 20] been told to concentrate for removal to Manchuria, but whether they have actually moved out or not General Gallagher does not know. By December, however, the Chinese 53rd Army had begun to come in from Yunnan and would probably provide replacements for the other two Armies.
General Gallagher noted that magnetic mines have not been entirely cleared at least from the northern ports and that the threat provided by these mines has helped and would continue to help keep the French from undertaking large-scale landing operations in that area. He felt that regular rail communications between Saigon and Hanoi might not be opened for another year.
- Chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs.↩
- Commanding General of Chinese armed forces in Indochina.↩
- Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, and concurrently Chief of Staff, China Theater.↩
- Jean Sainteny, French Commissioner of Tonkin and North Annam.↩
- Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of France until January 26.↩
- Deputy Director, Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, Chinese National Commission of Military Affairs.↩
- Vice Adm. Jean Decoux, Governor of French Indochina, became a prisoner of war of Japan in March 1945.↩