740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–1946
Mr. Max W. Bishop, of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan, to the Secretary of State
No. 311
[Received March 26.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Office’s despatch No. 296, March 8, 1946, transmitting copies of the Japanese Government’s recently published draft constitution, and to enclose a memorandum of comment by a member of the staff of this Office on the new draft constitution. Also enclosed are copies (in sextuplicate) of the Headquarters’ daily Press Analyses of March 7 through March 16, presenting a summary picture of the reaction of the Japanese press to the new constitution, and certain additional press excerpts.40
It is pointed out in the memorandum that the new constitution is unquestionably a liberal and progressive document. At the same time it is stated that the manner of the draft’s preparation and presentation and its un-Japanese phrasing and style, among other factors, have led most Japanese to assume that the document is more of American than of Japanese authorship, a fact which may reduce the possibilities for its long-range acceptance and support by the Japanese people. Article IX of the draft, wherein Japan “forever” renounces the right to maintain armed forces, is termed a provision which must immediately commend itself to all forward-looking persons but the beneficial or, not inconceivably, harmful effects of which can be revealed only by future developments.
It was first reported that the Government planned to introduce bills at the next session of the Diet to alter existing regulations for the revision of the Constitution in order to permit the Diet to amend instead of merely to oppose or reject in toto proposed Constitutional changes, and to effect a provisional reform of the House of Peers. With these changes accomplished, a second session was reportedly to be called in August or September especially to consider the new draft constitution. The Asahi of March 15, however, reported that a majority of Ministers had taken the position at a Cabinet meeting March 12 that “it would be better, considering the internal and external situation, to accomplish the revision as soon as possible”, and that it had accordingly been decided to submit the draft revision to the extraordinary session of the Diet immediately following the elections. The report indicated that the Cabinet planned to remain in office to sponsor its draft before the new Diet.
In the intervening weeks before submission of the draft to the Diet and during the period of debate, much may be accomplished to develop [Page 181] a greater sense of Japanese authorship and responsibility for constitutional revision. There is enclosed copy of an editorial (see Enclosure No. 3) which appeared in the Nippon Times on March 16 in which it is strongly urged with well reasoned arguments that the Japanese people must give deep thought to the draft constitution and must carefully debate its provisions. It is reliably reported that the Supreme Commander has directed inquiries from Japanese press representatives regarding certain aspects of the Cabinet’s draft to the Japanese Government with the statement that revision of the Japanese constitution is the duty and responsibility of the Japanese people and Government.
Any draft revision to command serious attention of the Japanese people as likely of adoption must clearly be without objection to the recognized center of power, i.e., SCAP. Until there were clear knowledge of SCAP’s lack of objection, hesitancy and indecision would in all likelihood prevent accomplishment of desirable constitutional revision. Nevertheless, for the fundamental principles clearly established and approved by the Supreme Commander and the Emperor to become accepted by Japan, the Japanese people must now constructively take hold of the constitutional problem and create a finished product of their own which will endure. If there is developed among discerning Japanese a true feeling that the new constitution is sui generis to Japan and if a popular belief in its Japanese origin is created, the fundamental and progressive changes now officially advocated by the Government will have much greater prospect of enduring than may appear at this moment.41
Respectfully yours,
Foreign Service Officer
- Enclosures not printed.↩
- In despatch 395, April 26, 1946, from Tokyo, the Political Adviser in Janan (Atcheson) enclosed “the revised draft, written in colloquial Japanese and containing a number of minor substantive changes, made public by the Government April 17.” (894.011/4–2646) The text is printed in Political Reorientation of Japan, p. 637.↩