The purpose of this report is to present to the Secretary of State the
primary accomplishments of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission during
its recent visit to Japan and to make brief recommendations as to the
stand which I believe the, United States should take in regard to the
future early decisions of the newly constituted Far Eastern Commission.
There are attached hereto the reports of various members of my staff and
of the Secretary General which cover in detail the activities and
investigations of the Commission and which outline the impressions these
gentlemen received as a result of their observations and contacts. I
forward them for such distribution and use as you may deem
desirable.
The most satisfactory result of the Commission’s visit, from the point of
view of the United States was the feeling of confidence in the Supreme
Commander engendered in the minds of the foreign representatives.
Regardless of their views concerning the policies established by the
United States for the control of Japan, all delegates are convinced that
those policies are being carried out effectively and with the utmost
wisdom by the Supreme Commander and his staff. They were all impressed
by General MacArthur’s grasp of the problems which face him and by the
statesmanship he has shown in performing his difficult task. They were
particularly gratified by his consciousness of the international
character of his position and the attendant responsibilities.
Of equal importance was the ability of the Commission to erase from the
minds of General MacArthur and his staff the natural suspicion which
they harbored before they were able to establish personal contact with
the representatives. There has now been established a mutual confidence
and respect, a cognizance of each other’s problems which will aid
materially in furthering United States objectives not only in the
control of Japan but in the general field of international
cooperation.
I feel that certain subjects stand out as being in need of policy
guidance in the very near future. Such subjects include Reparations, (on
which depends the restoration of Japanese economy,) an export-import
program closely integrated with the production and provision
[Page 160]
of the food required to
maintain a viable economy and a definite decision on the part of the
United States to support the Supreme Commander’s views in regard to the
Emperor.
It is my intention to press for consideration of these matters in the
Commission not only because of their intrinsic importance but because
they offer an opportunity for the Commission to take the initiative in
areas where policy is as yet undecided rather than to concern itself
with academic discussions of well established policies whose change or
modification at this late date is virtually impossible.
[Annex 2—Extracts]
Memorandum by Colonel C.
Stanton Babcock to the Chairman of the Far
Eastern Advisory Commission (McCoy)
[Tokyo,] 10 February 1946.
Subject: Impressions Gained During our Visit to
Japan
Introduction:
The notes which follow hereafter represent an attempt to record my
impressions after numerous interviews with Staff Officers in G.H.Q.,
[Page 161]
officers on duty with the troops occupying the
Tokyo district, and a number of Japanese with whom I came in
contact. None of the personnel, either American or Japanese, were
senior in rank or acknowledged leaders in their groups. Knowing that
others in our group would have more opportunity and be better
qualified to talk to the better known figures, I tried to meet
younger and less prominent persons. Japanese with whom I came in
contact represented the Army, the Navy, the Protestant Church, the
Imperial Household, the Foreign Office, the fringes of big business,
minor Communists, farmers and fishermen. Some were men and some were
women. Most were in the age group between 30 and 45.
General:
There seem as yet to be no clearly defined patterns of thought in
Japan strong enough to break through class or occupational barriers.
The defeat, the resultant depressed conditions and the occupation do
not yet seem to have been brought home to the Japanese as national
problems. Each individual, or class of individuals, thinks of these
matters solely in terms of how they will affect him or his group.
The attempt to adjust to strange and unpleasant conditions of life,
the uncertainties of the immediate future as they affect the
individual’s livelihood are taking up so much of the energy and
thought of the people that the problem of Japan and the nation’s
future is shoved into the background or relegated to “Makasa.”
As yet there have arisen no leaders, there have emerged no political
or economic philosophies virile enough to arouse in the people any
enthusiasm. This is natural under present conditions, but those with
whom I talked felt that Communism, with its positive policy and
organized pressure, would take enormous strides unless a strong new
movement completely divorced from association with older political
movements could emerge and capture the imagination of that great
mass of people who are disillusioned by the leadership of the past.
Communism they fear and distrust at present, but its potentialities
are great when measured against the purely defensive attitude of the
other political groups. Moreover, there is a feeling, (particularly
strong among discharged service men), that militarism alone is not
responsible for Japan’s ills, but that much of the blame must be
shouldered by the oligarchic system out of which militarism arose.
Discharged soldiers and sailors may feel that the generals and
admirals led them into a hopeless war, but they do not forget the
paternalistic interest that the services took in conditions among
the poorer classes, particularly the farmers and fishermen. No
leaders who fail to champion the cause of the underprivileged can
count long on the support of the former soldiers and sailors and
those whom these latter influence.
[Page 162]
Army and Navy:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
One of the, most interesting expressions of opinion that I heard was
the constantly expressed hope among Japanese officers that the
occupation would be a long one. This was prompted in part, of
course, by the fear of being left helpless in the face of Russia,
but also by the feeling that their way of life had been destroyed
and that we must stay long enough to train a new generation which
really understood our way of life. These men made no attempt to make
me think that they approved of our way of life, but they felt that
Japan’s future was hopeless if we merely destroyed the old and then
pulled out before establishing the basis for a new and stable form
of existence. Democracy may be unpalatable but it is better than
chaos.
The feeling toward the war was fairly uniform. There was no feeling
of guilt; not even that they had made a mistake. The attitude was
that of men who had taken a desperate but necessary gamble, done
everything possible to ensure success, but had lost. To accomplish
their objective of a Japan supreme in East Asia, they had had to go
to war. They knew that their only chance lay in prolonging the war
to the point where we would tire and give up. They failed, and admit
their failure and the end of their hopes and ambitions, but they
still think they took the only course open to them.
The Imperial Household:
This is the only group in Japan which has not been materially
affected by the defeat and the occupation, and over which G.H.Q. has exercised no real influence.
The impression I got was of a selfish group intent on preserving
their special privileges, indifferent to events except as they would
affect their own privileged positions. They are fearful of any
outside influence reaching the Emperor, and are particularly worried
lest American influences cause them to lose their hold over the
Crown Prince. They pin their hopes on the British and (perhaps as a
result of wishful thinking), are fairly confident of success.
There seems to be some feeling among those interested in preserving
the status quo that the Imperial Household
may furnish a nucleus around which they can all gather. No steps
seem to have been taken in this direction as yet and the jealousy of
the Kunaisho towards those without the pale may prove a serious
barrier if, and when, such a movement starts. The idea is there,
however, and events may force this small group of reactionaries to
assume such a leadership for their own preservation.
[Page 163]
Conclusion:
I desire to stress once more that these are personal impressions
gained as a result of conversations with a group of unimportant
people whose only claim on my attention was that, in a confused and
bewildered land, they had been thinking.
C. Stanton
Babcock
Colonel,
GSC
[Annex 3—Extracts]
Report by Dr. George E. Blakeslee on the Far
Eastern Commission’s Trip to Japan, December 26, 1945–February
13, 1946
I The Trip
The Far Eastern Commission visited Japan in order to consult with the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to study conditions.
Three full weeks were spent in Japan, most of the time in Tokyo,
with week-end trips to Nikko–Sendai, and
Kyoto–Nara–Kure–Hiroshima–Osaka. These side trips enabled the
Commission to see the areas of Japan not damaged by the war and to
realize the destruction in the cities which had been severely
bombed. On the last day a visit was made to the 8th Army
Headquarters at Yokohama and to the Yokosuka Naval Base. In Tokyo
Army officers from the staff of SCAP usually met with the Commission daily, both
mornings and afternoons, to describe the work of the occupation
authorities. In addition the members of the Commission and the
assistants had conversations with many Japanese and gained a good
idea of the Japanese points of view.
A summary of the personnel of the Commission and of its daily
activities has been prepared by the Secretary General and is
attached.15
II The Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers
General MacArthur welcomed the Commission to Japan and facilitated
its work in every way, especially by directing his officers in
charge of the several sections of the Occupation Administration to
appear before the Commission, explain their work, furnish all
requested material, and answer all inquiries. General MacArthur
spoke to the Commission shortly before it left Tokyo and in strict
confidence explained frankly his policies in regard to the treatment
of Japan, his evaluation of conditions and his forecast of future
developments and problems. A summary of General MacArthur’s talk,
which is to be regarded as secret, is attached.16
[Page 164]
III Reports or the Occupation
Officials
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An outstanding fact is that the Occupation authorities are the real
government of Japan. They permit the Japanese Government a measure
of initiative and action, but only within the framework of
Occupation policy. SCAP issues many
directives to the Japanese Government and watches to see that they
are properly executed. The Report of the Government section of
SCAP states, “Government in
Japan has become increasingly a matter of directive from the Supreme
Commander rather than acts initiated by the Japanese Cabinet or
Diet.” The Office of SCAP, further,
makes suggestions to the Japanese Government, as in the case of
women’s suffrage, which are dutifully carried out as if on the
initiative of the Japanese. An illuminating instance of the close
control of government by the Occupation authorities was shown during
the recent sessions of the Diet, from November 26 to December 18,
1945. Most of the bills presented were Japanese Government bills.
Each bill, however, was submitted to the Office of SCAP before it was presented. The U.S.
Army officers watched the progress of the bill through the Diet, and
when it was passed it was referred to SCAP for approval before it received Imperial sanction
and was promulgated.
IV Views of the Japanese
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Japanese as a whole approve the personnel and the measures of the
Occupation Government. The U.S. soldiers have made an excellent
impression and General MacArthur is widely popular. The natural
resentment of the Japanese against their former enemies has largely
been turned against their own military leaders, for whose punishment
there is a considerable demand.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In politics the interest of the Japanese is much less than it is in
solving their economic problems. The danger of a return to power of
the militarists was sometimes referred to, but it was generally
regarded as slight, especially in any near future. There was an
almost universal and deep fear, among the upper and middle classes,
of Communism and of the Soviet Union. Many were under the
apprehension that SCAP was favoring
the Communists and left-wing Socialists, an impression doubtless due
to SCAP’s insistence on freedom of
the press, assembly and discussion, which resulted to the advantage
of the formerly proscribed parties and organizations. There was much
discussion of a SCAP directive
issued on January 4, 1946, which is
[Page 165]
popularly termed the Purge Directive. It bars
from public office and from public life all men who had held in the
past a designated list of public offices in the Government or in
certain parties. This purge of those assumed to be militarists or
prominent totalitarian leaders was generally approved, but there was
an almost equally strong feeling among the upper and middle classes
that the directive was unjust in its application in certain cases,
and purged men who were essentially liberal and anti-military, but
who had at some time held one of the proscribed positions. No point
was stressed more strongly by many Japanese than the advisability of
a just, reasonable and fair-minded interpretation and application of
this directive.
The future of the Emperor was discussed by every Japanese. Most of
them felt strongly that the institution of the Emperor should be
retained, but that it should be modified so that it would come to be
similar to that of the British crown.
V Conclusions and
Problems
One of the earliest and strongest impressions on one who has known
Japan in the pre-war days is the comparative absence of goods of all
kinds and the poor appearance of the clothes of both men and
women.
According to an estimate by Professor Shiroshi Nasu of the Tokyo
Imperial University, now a consultant on one of SCAP’s sections and a recognized
authority, Japan has lost one-third of its total wealth and from
one-third to one-half of its total potential income. The actual
present income is less than one-half of the pre-war level. The rural
population in Japan, comprising 40% of the population, has a present
standard of living about 65% of the pre-war level; the non-rural,
about 35% of its pre-war level; and the nation as a whole, about
one-half of the pre-war level.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. The Attitude of the
Japanese
After the surrender both Americans and Japanese were surprised. The
Japanese were surprised at the good conduct of the U.S. soldiers and
the Americans at the cooperative attitude of the Japanese. The
frequent prophesies regarding the conduct of the Japanese were not
realized; there were no mass murders, no assassinations, no
guerrilla warfare, no passive resistance. The Japanese accepted the
defeat and carried out the directives of the Supreme Commander.
Their attitude and conduct on the whole have been excellent,
although the Occupation authorities feel that the Japanese
Government has shown too little initiative and at times has delayed
in executing orders. There are at least
[Page 166]
three factors which may explain in part the
conduct of the Japanese: (1) they are habituated to obey the orders
of the Government, and the Emperor ordered them to surrender and to
carry out the directives of SCAP;
(2) they were disillusioned with their own Government and military
leadership, and turned to the U.S. authorities for a new and better
leadership; and (3) throughout their history they have shown the
ability to recognize a new situation and to adjust themselves to
it.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. The Emperor
Aside from economic problems the chief topic of discussion on the
Commission’s visit to Japan was the Emperor. The outstanding fact is
that the great majority of the Japanese desire him to remain on the
throne and that the Occupation finds him of great service and is
opposed to any effort by Allied authorities to remove him or to try
him as a war criminal.
A Japanese Gallup Poll reports that 92% of the Japanese people are in
favor of retaining the Emperor; and approximately this estimate was
generally supported by Japanese with whom members of the Commission
talked. Of political parties only the Communists have expressed a
wish to remove him.
Not only are the Japanese in favor of retaining the Emperor; they
have a deep emotional attachment to the Imperial Institution.
Thoughtful Japanese state that the Emperor is needed in Japan as a
symbol of national unity, binding the people together, by strong
ties of sentiment, and as a moderating and harmonizing factor in
Japan’s political life. The people regard the Emperor not merely as
head of the state, but as head of the national family of which they
are all members.
In favor of the present Emperor is the fact that the people as a
whole are deeply grateful to him for ending the war, and that among
the well-informed it is common knowledge that in August, 1945, when
his advisers were divided as to continuing the war or making peace,
he decided for peace and subsequently, when doubts arose, strongly
maintained his position. His New Year’s Rescript, disclaiming
divinity, was apparently approved by most well-educated Japanese and
was received with acquiescence by the people at large. The Emperor’s
advisers are older statesmen of well-known liberal views and
friendly sentiments toward the United States.
The Occupation has found the Emperor to be a great asset in its task
of disarming and administering Japan. The Chief of the Civil
Information and Education Section, who spoke to the Commission on
the subject of the Emperor, said that the Occupation could do a
great deal through the Emperor that could not be done otherwise, and
[Page 167]
that to try the
Emperor as a war criminal would be the greatest mistake the Allies
could make.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI The Future
The accomplishments of the Occupation within the relatively short
period of five months have been remarkable and far greater than
anticipated before the surrender. The Japanese armed forces have
largely been demobilized and disarmed and their military materiel
destroyed. Security in Japan has been established. Militarists and
ultra-nationalists have already been removed from important posts,
and the Japanese Government is functioning under the strict
supervision and direction of the Supreme Commander. The
democratization of Japan has been well begun, especially in the
fields of Government and Education, and along lines which it is
hoped the Japanese themselves will wish to follow and to complete.
All of these achievements appear to have the approval of the large
majority of the Japanese people.
Nevertheless, Japanese sentiment at present is still plastic. The
Japanese have not yet completely adjusted their thinking to their
shattering defeat and to the changed world in which they must live.
To mold and to harden Japanese thought and institutions in
accordance with a pattern desired by the United States will require
much more than has already been achieved and will necessitate the
utmost wisdom on the part of the Occupation.
The kind of a Japan which the United States should desire, some
twenty to thirty years from now when the immediate problems of the
war have been settled, is a Japan peaceful, democratic, efficient,
meeting its obligations to other states and cooperating with them
for the common interests of the family of nations, particularly in
the Far East, and with a measure of prosperity which will be
deserved under the existing circumstances. It is particularly
desired that Japan should continue to develop the type of democracy
which has already been started by the Occupation and that it should
be friendly to the United States and sympathetic with American
ideals.
To achieve these ultimate objectives and to avoid the dangers which
threaten them it is essential to prevent economic distress for the
Japanese and to introduce such further reforms as the Japanese will
eventually approve and make permanent. The immediate problem is
economic. A sane democracy cannot rest on an empty stomach. Economic
distress normally leads to an attempt to change the existing
government to one which promises relief—either an extreme right wing
or an extreme left wing movement.
[Page 168]
In Japan a right wing movement would probably be led by the
militarists. At present they are so widely discredited that it is
believed they could not gain any strong popular support, but
organized underground as champions of relief from economic
suffering, they might become politically dangerous. An extreme left
wing movement is more probable. It is the natural tendency in
history for every fundamental change in a nation to develop toward
the extreme left, and the trend in political thought in Japan since
the surrender has been distinctly to the left. Economic distress
might well result in the establishment of a political and economic
system in Japan closely similar to that in the Soviet Union—with all
of its unfortunate political, economic, international and even
military consequences for the United States.
To safeguard the American type of democracy in Japan and to remove
the causes of either right or left wing movements, the Occupation
and the United States should prevent acute food shortage and should
take such measures as may be feasible to help the Japanese revive
their industries and their export trade. As pre-requisites, the
stabilization of their currency and especially an initial decision
on reparations will be almost necessary.
To establish an American type of democracy which will give promise of
permanence, it will be advisable for SCAP, now that the broad foundations of democracy have
already been laid and appear to be acceptable to the Japanese, to
proceed with moderation in his administration and in introducing
further drastic changes. All reforms should be such that the
Japanese will themselves probably wish to continue them after the
withdrawal of Allied troops. Finally, as friendly Japanese point
out, it will be particularly helpful to the Japanese to give them
some assurance of hope for the future of their people and their
nation.
