740.00119 Control (Japan)/12–3145

The Acting Secretary of State to the Australian Minister (Eggleston)

secret

Sir: I have the honor to refer to your note no. 544/45 of December 31, 1945,55 relative to the participation of forces of the British Commonwealth in the occupation of Japan. In this note it is indicated that the statement of general principles proposed by the United States Government as communicated in my note of December 7, 1945,56 has been the subject of consultation between the British Commonwealth Governments concerned, and also between General MacArthur and Lieutenant General Northcott, Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. By your note under reference you inquire whether the arrangements agreed upon between General Mac-Arthur and Lieutenant General Northcott as contained in a memorandum signed at Tokyo on December 18, 1945, are acceptable to the United States Government.

The tentative agreement relative to the establishment of the British Commonwealth Force in Japan, as agreed upon between General MacArthur and Lieutenant General Northcott, follows:

1. Command relationships:

a. Mission
The British Commonwealth Force will constitute a component of occupation forces in Japan under the supreme command of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. It will be charged with the normal military duties of a force of its size and composition, including military control of Hiroshima Prefecture and such other ground and air areas as may be allocated to it for this purpose, demilitarization and disposition of Japanese installations and armaments within such ground areas and measures necessary for the security of the force. These areas do not constitute a national zone. It will accomplish such ground and air patrol and surveillance missions within [Page 118] allocated areas as may be directed. Military government functions within areas allocated to the British Commonwealth Force will be conducted by U.S. agencies as directed by SCAP. Relationships of the British Commonwealth Force with the Japanese, and routine security functions pertaining primarily to Eighth Army operations as a whole, will be prescribed by the Commanding General, (CG), Eighth Army. The British Commonwealth Force will conduct such military operations outside normally allocated areas as may be directed to the CG, Eighth Army for ground forces and the CG, Fifth Air Force for air forces.
b. Command organization:
SCAP will assign ground forces of the British Commonwealth Force to operational control of the CG, Eighth U.S. Army. SCAP will assign operational control of the air component of the British Commonwealth Force to the CG, Pacific Air Command, U.S. Army (PACUSA). Such air component will function as a separate air command under the Fifth Air Force. SCAP will assign operational control of Royal Naval Port Party, British Commonwealth Force, to the U.S. naval commander exercising jurisdiction over Japanese ports, for operation of the port of Kure. Such assignments to operational control will become effective upon arrival of the forces concerned at Japanese ports of debarkation. Ground forces of the British Commonwealth Force will function as a corps of two divisions under the command of the GOC, British Commonwealth Forces, as corps commander. The corps will be composed of one British-Indian Division of two brigade (bde) groups with supporting troops, and an Anzac division of one brigade and one brigade group with supporting troops. Logistic organization of the British Commonwealth Force will be as prescribed by the commander thereof. GOC, British Commonwealth Force will remain responsible for the maintenance and administration of the British Commonwealth Force as a whole.
c. Command and administrative channels:
(1)
GOC, British Commonwealth Force will have the right of direct access to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for matters of major policy affecting the operational capabilities of the force.
(2)
GOC, British Commonwealth Force will retain the right of direct communication with the British Commonwealth Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia on administrative matters affecting the force.
(3)
It is understood that for matters of governmental concern affecting the policy and operations of the British Commonwealth Force, the channel of communication lies from the Australian Government as representative of the British Commonwealth of Nations through the United States Government and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
(4)
In administrative matters pertaining to relations with United States forces or with the Japanese, the GOC, British Commonwealth Force will be governed by policies prescribed by commanders exercising operational control. Such policies will in general conform to those prescribed for United States forces. In case of conflict between such administrative instructions received from the CG, Eighth Army and the CG, PACUSA (or his designated representative), the matter will be referred to General Headquarters (GHQ) SCAP for decision.

[Here follow paragraphs on liaison and areas of responsibility.]

3. Forces:

a.
It is understood that the total strength of the British Commonwealth Force will be determined by inter-governmental decision. It is also understood that the British Commonwealth Force plans to maintain its basic organization as a corps of two divisions of two brigades each, with suitable air and (air and ground) service supporting elements within the strength eventually determined. Major unit strength will be adjusted to meet the total strength determined by inter-governmental decision. Composition and strength of the air component of the force is also subject of inter-governmental decision.
b.
It is understood that the British Commonwealth Force may be withdrawn wholly or in part upon agreement between the Governments of the United States and Australia or upon six months’ notice by either party. It is also understood that reductions will be made in the British Commonwealth Force from time to time in conformity with progressive reductions in United States occupation forces in Japan.

[Here follow further paragraphs on the British Commonwealth Force, miscellaneous matters, signal communications, press releases, and logistics.]

The military authorities of the United States request that particular reference be made to section 3b of the foregoing agreement which states that “It is also understood that reductions will be made in the British Commonwealth Force from time to time in conformity with progressive reductions in United States occupation forces in Japan”, and request that specific acceptance of this provision be noted by the Australian Government.

The United States Government also wishes to make it a matter of record that the size of the British Commonwealth Force shall be subject to re-examination in the light of any arrangements which may be made in the future relative to the participation of the Republic of China or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the occupation of Japan.

Subject to the foregoing, the arrangements made between General MacArthur and Lieutenant General Northcott are accepted by the United States Government as the agreed basis on which the British [Page 120] Commonwealth Force will proceed to and participate in the occupation of Japan.

I shall appreciate receiving your early confirmation that the arrangements set forth in this note are acceptable to the Government of Australia.57

Accept [etc.]

Dean Acheson
  1. Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, p. 897.
  2. Ibid., p. 879.
  3. In his note 27/46, January 24, 1946, the Australian Minister replied on behalf of the British Commonwealth Governments concerned, confirming the arrangements set forth as the basis upon which the British Commonwealth Force would participate in the occupation of Japan. Details would be completed with SCAP. (740.00119 Control (Japan)/1–2446)