740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–2046
Report by the State–War–Navy Coordinating
Subcommittee for the Far East40
secret
SWNCC 162/2
[Washington, 8 January 1946.]
Reorientation of the Japanese
the problem
1. What action should be taken to fix U.S. responsibility for basic
planning for and the continuing development of the reeducation and
reorientation of the Japanese people for the purpose of bringing about
the development of a peaceful and democratic Japan?
facts bearing on the problem
2. See Appendix “A”.41
discussion
3. See Appendix “B”.
conclusions
4. It is concluded that:
- a.
- Since many of the initial steps designed to attain the basic
objectives of the Allied Powers through reorientation and
reeducation of the Japanese have already been taken by SCAP in compliance with his
current directives or soon will be implemented, it is
unnecessary at this time to specify further action in detail as
contemplated in SWNCC
162/D.
- b.
- The long-range character of reorientation makes it desirable
to fix at this time the U.S. responsibility for basic planning
and continuing development in order that (1) the present program
as implemented by SCAP may be
properly integrated with the long-range program of
reorientation, and that (2) the transfer from military to
civilian control may take place in an orderly manner.
- c.
- Because of the inherent nature of the problem, the basic
planning for and continuing development of a U.S. program of
reorientation and reeducation is an appropriate responsibility
of the Department of State subject to existing arrangements with
respect to control machinery for Japan and the channel of
command for issuing instructions to SCAP.
- d.
- The Department of State should immediately undertake basic
planning for and the development of such a program for the
approval of SWNCC, and where
necessary, for that of the FEC.
Such a program should be implemented by SCAP and where appropriate and after coordination
with SCAP by the State
Department in the United States.
- e.
- This program should be considered as a matter of priority and
should be given adequate support in funds, material and
facilities to
[Page 106]
insure
that maximum advantage is taken of present more favorable
psychological conditions of the Japanese people.
recommendations
5. It is recommended that:
- a.
- The paper be transmitted by SWNCC to the JCS
for comment as a matter of priority.
- b.
- After receipt of the comments of the JCS, the SWNCC
approve the “Conclusions” in paragraph 4 above.
- c.
- This report be transmitted to the War and Navy Departments for
their information, to the State Department for implementation
and to the United States representative on the Far Eastern
Commission for his information.
- d.
- The integrated program as developed by the State Department
pursuant to the “Conclusions” in paragraph 4 above be submitted
to SWNCC as early as possible
for its consideration as a matter of priority.
[Annex]
Appendix “B”
secret
Discussion
- 1.
- Most Japanese, in greater or lesser degree, at present share a
common attitude of mind of which the following are salient
elements:
- a.
- The persistence of feudal concepts, including class
stratification, the glorification of the military, and a
habit of subservience to authority.
- b.
- A belief in the superior qualifications of the
Japanese for world leadership, closely connected with
the cult of emperor-worship fostered in recent years by
the military to serve their own purposes.
- c.
- Extreme racial consciousness, and an anti-foreign
complex, which, however, is often combined with great
admiration for foreign achievements and learning.
- 2.
- It is probable that the attainment of the ultimate objectives
of the Allied Powers in regard to Japan cannot be assured in the
absence of changes in these ideologies and ways of thinking,
which have in the past motivated the Japanese people as a whole
in the pursuit of chauvinistic and militaristic policies.
- 3.
- It will not be necessary to recast all Japanese cultural
concepts; rather, it is proposed to develop those particular
Japanese concepts which will create new attitudes of mind
conforming to the basic principles of democracy and fair
dealing.
- 4.
- It is recognized that the character of our occupation of Japan
and the commitment to act through the Japanese Government
require that the approach to the Japanese be made through their
own leaders.
[Page 107]
It is
also recognized that the Japanese may offer resistance to new
ideas and points of view advanced directly by the occupation
authorities, whereas the same ideas, put forward by leaders of
their own and in whom they have confidence, may very well be
favorably received and acted upon. There are numerous Japanese
who, through prior contacts and earlier education, will be
disposed to accept and assist in the development of our ultimate
objectives and along lines which will further the interests of
the United States. For this reason a fundamental responsibility
of the Allied authorities in Japan should be to seek out such
persons, ensure that they are placed in positions that will
enable them to accomplish these aims, and afford them counsel,
guidance and support.
- 5.
- If it is to be successful the process of reorientation cannot
be restricted to formalized education or to a mere reform of the
educational system. It must be extended to a reeducation not
only of the youth but of the population as a whole, and must be
developed in such manner as to reach into the minds of the
Japanese through every available channel. The influence of
Japanese leaders in every field should be utilized as well as
all appropriate media, including books, text books, periodicals,
motion pictures, radio, lectures, discussion groups and the
schools. The methods of approach and character of materials used
must be carefully considered, must be persuasive rather than
didactic, and must be designed to ensure the maximum response
and acceptance by the Japanese.
- 6.
- On the national level, our objective should be to encourage
the Japanese to develop the political responsibility of the
individual citizen, and thereby to develop a gradual
reorganization of the Japanese political system. It is axiomatic
that the only effective political reform must stem from the
people themselves. Political reforms imposed solely by the fiat
of a military occupant will either be resisted by the people, or
will be ignored by them. Our policy must be designed to supply
to the Japanese themselves the ideas and incentives essential to
the indigenous development of a political reorganization
stemming from the people as a whole.
- 7.
- The Japanese are a literate people. They realize that an
education is desirable and this fact coupled with their habit of
obedience to authority and uncritical acceptance of the
teachings of their leaders, makes them receptive to a process of
ideological reorientation which is properly presented. One of
the most effective means of achieving this objective will be to
furnish information concerning the world outside Japan.
- 8.
- It will be the policy of the United States not to repress
ideas and information from other sources, but to ensure an
adequate presentation through Japanese media and channels and an
adequate understanding
[Page 108]
by the Japanese of the aims and ideals of the United States.
Other aims and ideals will undoubtedly be promoted, and it is
essential, in order to give the Japanese a true picture and
enable them to make up their minds intelligently as to their
future in relation to the United States and the world at large,
that we present our case effectively and comprehensively.
- 9.
- It should be borne in mind that a process of reorientation
will only be effective as it goes hand in hand with some gradual
improvement in the economic condition of the ordinary Japanese
toward whom it is directed, as compared with the conditions
existing at the time of surrender. To this end, it is essential
that the economic policies of our occupation, including the
encouragement of appropriate agrarian and economic reforms, be
integrated as a part of the entire process of reorientation of
the Japanese, and that whatever relief is furnished and whatever
economic improvement is made be utilized in influencing the
minds of the Japanese in the direction of such
reorientation.
- 10.
- The entire program in type and scope should be designed so
that it can be carried on by the Japanese themselves following
withdrawal of controls, and, to this end, it will be essential
from the beginning to encourage participation by local groups
and organizations. It must be emphasized that reeducation
promptly and adequately made effective will materially speed the
development of a responsible and trustworthy government in
Japan, thereby materially shortening the period of occupation
and reducing the commitments of the United States.
- 11.
- In the main reorientation will be accomplished through the
channels of information, education and religion. Unlike other
aspects of the occupation, information, education and religion
will present long-range problems extending in some instances
over several decades. At the same time the ground work for these
aspects of the reorientation program must be laid at once, lest
there crystallize in the Japanese mind attitudes and concepts
the possession of which would defeat the purposes of occupation.
Reorientation and reeducation are primarily civilian tasks and
will require large numbers of civilian experts for their
performance. Their early recruitment by some agency of the U.S.
Government would appear to be esssential to the success of any
program.
- 12.
- While the process of reorientation has already been initiated
by SCAP, it will necessarily
extend beyond the earlier and predominantly military phase of
our control of Japan into the period of predominantly political
and economic controls. The program of reorientation should be
considered as a unit, designed to cover both phases of control.
It is of great importance to give early consideration
[Page 109]
to its implementation
in the later phase. The principal responsibility for the
long-range aspects of reorientation will rest ultimately with
the Department of State. In order to assure continuity to the
program and to bring about an orderly transition from military
to civilian control it is of utmost importance that arrangements
be made for the Department of State to assume responsibility for
its execution at as early a date as feasible.
