894.00/1–446
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to President Truman8
Dear Mr. President: Pursuant to your kind letter of November 20, 1945,9 I submit the following additional report:
With the issuance today of a directive for the “denazification” of the bureaucracy,10 the basic preparatory actions for the democratization of Japan will have been taken. The arrest of major war criminals has been practically completed. The mandates for freedom of speech, press and assembly, abolition of thought control, universal suffrage, dissolution of the Zaibatsu,11 agrarian reform, collective bargaining by labor, disestablishment of Shinto, demilitarization of education—all are now on the record. These actions are not in themselves complete: the changes sought are too great to be accomplished by fiat. Among the most important of all, the Constitution and its core—the Emperor institution—have not yet been touched. But the scaffolding has been prepared; it remains to be seen what kind of structure is to be erected on it through revision of the Constitution and the efforts of the Japanese themselves.
Those efforts will require our steady support and encouragement for a considerable time to come. Japan today, as is natural with its totalitarian background and after its recent demoralizing shock of defeat, [Page 88] is faced with a bankruptcy of capable, experienced, modern and progressive political leadership.
The recently concluded Diet session proved the inability of most of the old political leaders to rise above their compromising (if not more tainted) pasts.
The present Shidehara12 Cabinet, by its old-fashioned conservatism, lack of imaginative initiative, and general incapacity, has lost what little public confidence it once enjoyed.
A result of these failings is that government has had to become increasingly a matter of directive from Headquarters rather than acts initiated by the Cabinet or Diet. These directives, paradoxically, are welcomed both by Japan’s impotent leaders and by the majority of the people—as they become more dissatisfied with those discredited leaders. But though this may make us the most popular occupying force in history, it is not a satisfactory long-run situation.
The speed and completeness with which our final objectives can be realized will depend on the healthy development by the Japanese people of a democratic political consciousness. Japan’s first post-war political party was inaugurated only two months ago. Since then four principal groups—Progressives, Liberals, Social Democrats and Communists—have organized themselves and attained national importance. The “Progressives” are representatives of the past and wish no more change than necessary. The “Liberals” are by our standards conservative: their chief claim to liberalism is in impractical advocacy of a laissez-faire economy. The Social Democrats may be compared to the British Labor Party. They have the backing of many intellectuals, are winning support among the middle class and organized labor, and appear at present to be the most promising group. The Communists are for complete abolition of the Emperor institution, creation of a “republic”, nationalization of land, and other traditional Communist objectives—except that they espouse “democracy”, private property, avoidance of class struggle.
Other minor political groups have not yet shown importance. A large number of small Right Wing groups may become important if our control is greatly weakened or we lose our present goodwill and prestige, if the already severe economic hardship becomes desperation, or if Communist expansion breeds violent political strife.
In this situation, there is obviously considerable encouragement for the Communists. Japan is groping for a new ideology to replace the shattered one which was so carefully and deliberately constructed during the years of military-feudal control. The old has been discredited and the new is attractive. Liberalism is vague and difficult to define. [Page 89] Communism is positive and concrete. It will be favored by the present serious economic insecurity. It will take at least moral encouragement from Soviet participation in control of Japan. But the popular hatred and fear of Russia and of Communism will also be checks. The Communists as yet are too theoretical and too drastic for the political level of the people—particularly in their stand on the Emperor. The great majority of the Japanese with whom I have talked do not expect them to become a dominant group in Japan. But they will grow stronger.
We must expect for some time, I believe, a situation in Japan which may be compared to that in post-war Italy. It is only natural that in the confusion, chaos and demoralization, each group will try to salvage its own particular interests. However, the activities of the major parties are conducted against a background of at least four influential and favorable circumstances: (1) acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration13—by the Emperor—has committed the nation to some kind of democracy; (2) the old lenders who took the country into a war which ruined it are thoroughly discredited and hated; (3) even the conservative’s desire, as a whole, to make a good showing toward fulfilling the terms they have accepted, if only so that they may the sooner be able to rejoin the family of “respectable” nations; and (4) there has been encouraging liberalization of the great and influential Japanese newspapers so that they have become sympathetic to, if not outright spokesmen for, groups such as the Social Democrats who sincerely wish to go further than merely “satisfying” occupational demands.
On the whole, we can be satisfied with the political development which has taken place during this brief period. It is only a start—full development is still far away.
One fundamental factor that we must not lose sight of in dealing with Japan is the inescapable relationship of politics and economics. In the dire straits of the Japanese people today, political development depends upon solution of the problems of food, shelter and clothing. Today political education and experience in the practice of democracy are impeded by the preoccupation of the people with their economic distress. Left unsolved, these problems may encourage extremism of types we do not desire.
The courses for the future which are open to the United States (discounting drastic modification or restraint of our policy by the British, Soviet and Chinese) depend to a large extent upon how much further effort we are prepared to put forth. If we are prepared to maintain for a period of years a large occupational force, if we are [Page 90] prepared to undertake that the Japanese shall have sufficient food, clothing and shelter and be enabled to put their economy on its feet, if we are prepared—should that be necessary—to keep effective forces in Japan to take care of any contingency that might arise, then we can adopt a strongly aggressive political policy, try the Emperor as a war criminal and encourage the complete abolition of the Emperor system. If we are not so prepared, we may do what we can and continue to proceed cautiously to give the Japanese the framework within which they may work out their own destiny—and then withdraw in due course and let them try it alone, whatever the result may be.
Decision hinges on the choice between these two, admittedly oversimplified alternatives. The first is to my mind the ideal. I believe (and some of our Allies may insist) that the Emperor is a war criminal: even some Japanese argue that if he had sufficient power to stop the war, he had the authority to prevent it. And I have not altered my opinion that the Emperor system must disappear if Japan is ever to be really democratic.
But a number of circumstances seem to make the second, more cautious policy the best for us to follow at this time. The speedy demobilization of our military forces is already creating handicaps. In this situation, in which we must continue to utilize the Japanese Government for the administration of the country and the carrying out of reforms, there is no question that the Emperor is most useful. He is obeyed by officials and the people at large. He manifests sincerity in wishing to aid in the accomplishment of our general objectives and is seemingly more anxious to be democratic than some of the people around him. His New Year’s Rescript14 was encouraging.
Adoption of a “cautious” policy should not, however, mean passivity. I believe it important that we work for a satisfactory, liberal revision of the Constitution in the near future. Under the present Government it does not seem likely that there will be a purely voluntary revision which will provide a substantial and enduring framework of a democratic government. This lack of optimism is not universally shared by Americans here, including some of our Japan experts. But the Government plan, with which the Progressive and Liberal parties are in agreement, is to leave intact the first four Articles of the present Constitution which form the basis for the Japanese philosophy of the State: reign and government “by a line of Emperors unbroken through ages eternal”; the sacredness and inviolability of the Emperor who is the head of the Empire and “combines in himself the rights of sovereignty”. These are the foundation stones and the pillars of the “divine” Japanese State with which we have been at war. Excluding [Page 91] the Communists, only the Social Democrats, who are still a minority party, are willing to consider the Emperor and sovereignty in something approximating our terms.
Our adoption of this policy would, on the other hand, preclude—certainly for the reasonably near future—any trial of the Emperor as a war criminal. There is no doubt that at present the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people wish to retain the Emperor system in some form. In its simplest terms, the Japanese regard the relationship as that of a father to the family. It is a sentimental, deeply-rooted emotional feeling. Trial of the Emperor would cause such a wrench that most people who know Japan believe that it would be impossible to find suitable men to maintain the government.
We have been reliably informed that the Emperor is considering abdication. We can assume that an important element in any such planning is the fear, stimulated by foreign criticism, that he may be named a war criminal. Such abdication would not necessarily produce the chaos which arrest and trial might bring—a regency is provided for by the Constitution. It is to be hoped, of course, that he will not abdicate before the Constitution is appropriately revised in order that revision may be effected according to legal provisions therefor contained in the Constitution as it now stands. And abdication after appropriate revision would not likely cause as serious repercussions as otherwise might be the case. Of these, one of the most practical to us would be the weakening of the Throne through the loss of the leader to whom the Japanese are accustomed and to whom, strangely enough, most of the common people are grateful for bringing them peace. If we decide to continue to use the Emperor, he should be given some sort of immunity from arrest and at the same time told that we regard his continuing on the Throne as necessary to carrying out the surrender conditions.15
The agreements reached at the Moscow meeting may in some ways increase Japanese willingness to cooperate with us and accede to our wishes. We have made a good impression both as a nation and on the level of the individual American soldier. If the Japanese really like any foreigners, they like us. Toward the Russians there is a deep-rooted fear and hatred. From the Japanese point of view, the Soviets turned on them at the last moment to share the fruits of victory. There is expectation (or hope) in many Japanese quarters that the United States and Russia will eventually fight each other. They see in this a possibility of their redemption by fighting on our side: some actually [Page 92] believe that we will be forced to develop and re-arm Japan for this purpose. However deluded this idea may be, it is widespread and adds to the general gratitude for our actions such as ordering of free speech, and contributes to a rather common present attitude of the Japanese which regards us as both their mentors and possible saviors. As a people the Japanese have an ingrained feudalistic tendency to attach themselves to the powerful. During the next decade it seems probable that we shall be the Power of which they will seek to be a satellite. It will likely be the age of Japan’s imitation of things American—not only of American machines but also American ideas.
There is some pessimism here in American quarters at the decision for Allied participation in control of Japan. This seems to be shown in hesitancy to push forward with our own program as already planned. I do not share this pessimism and I feel that any delay would be a mistake. United States policy is well on its way to implementation. The system established for Allied participation is workable, and with the will it can be made to work. I believe that we should go ahead as rapidly as the situation will permit and get as much as possible of our policy laid down and operating. There are still unfilled gaps. An important one, for example, is our information program which is still inadequate. It should be organized and functioning before any foreign propaganda machines are set up.
I have not meant to seem unduly optimistic: our task here is indubitably great and our difficulties many. But I am confident that whatever political vicissitudes the Japanese must undergo, democratic ideas will grow among the people, if only slowly, and will affect their political life. A great part of Asia is in political ferment, as suppressed and underprivileged peoples seek to gain for themselves some measure of the individual freedom and dignity which Americans have struggled for and have achieved. The Japanese are not yet a part of this ferment but it is more than possible that, the way having been opened by us, they will in due course feel its impact and become a part of it. Many of them, especially urban populations, already feel that they are a liberated people. After three and a half months here, I still feel that United States policies and their implementation in general have been far more successful than we could have expected and that there is a fair chance that out of it all, and irrespective of whether we may be able to do all that we want to do, this country will eventually develop into a reasonably decent member of the family of nations.
Respectfully,
- Copy transmitted to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) in covering letter of the same date; notation on January 15: “President gave D A original of this also”. President Truman acknowledged the letter on January 30.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, p. 825, footnote 5.↩
- For text of directive, Scapin–550, January 4, on “Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel From Public Office”, see SCAP, Report of Government Section: Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948 (Washington [1949?]), p. 482.↩
- The financial oligarchy made up of the principal families of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda.↩
- Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Japanese Prime Minister since October 9, 1945.↩
- For text of the Potsdam Declaration or Proclamation of July 26, 1945, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1474.↩
- For text, see Political Reorientation of Japan, p. 470.↩
- Mr. Atcheson covered the same ground on the Emperor in a memorandum of January 7, 1946, which he submitted to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan, and his Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, U.S. Army. A copy was transmitted to the Department in despatch 180, January 7, 1946, not printed. (894.001 Hirohito/1–746)↩