Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

124.45C/11–3046: Airgram

The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State

secret

Rangoon, November 30, 1946.
[Received January 8, 1947—9:12 a.m.]

A–142. For the Department’s consideration in connection Deptel 231, October 9,¹⁸ mytel 409, November 4:¹⁹

1. We could undoubtedly gain prestige with Burmans generally and particularly with Aung San and company were we first in the field to arrange exchange of diplomatic representatives with Burma. Such action would, I believe, be long remembered in Burma to our advantage in many ways.

2. Disadvantages of immediate action may be:

(A) Unfavorable British reaction: Britain which in postwar period has reversed prewar attitude and has been less liberal (perhaps because pressure was less) in her treatment of Burma than of India might resent our pushing matter. (I am of course without knowledge as to details of discussions which resulted in recent arrangement for exchange of ambassadors between US and India,²⁰ and as to whether that case might in principle serve as a precedent in respect of Burma.) Britain’s attitude toward Burma is based in part, hypothetically at least, on slowness of pace of economic recovery here and on Burmese business ineptitudes (enclosure my despatch No. 65, November 7,²¹ page 4) and also undoubtedly to some extent on desire of British business interests to maintain or strengthen their position here. London also may be hesitate [hesitant] to take action likely to strengthen position of Aung San and AFPFL.

(B) Increase of Aung San’s prestige: While Aung San will, I believe, in any case win elections, any pre-election prestige he might gain from indicated action on our part would pro tanto enhance his chances and pro tanto attach responsibility to us for aiding however indirectly election of man who is considered in some quarters, both British and Burmese, as embryo Hitler, and who some time ago had certain unproven serious charges made against him (which have, however, not recently been revived.) Aung San’s political opponents (Communists possibly included) might later accuse us of contributing to his success at polls. It may be noted that (a) there is little in Aung San’s past to suggest he will ever become a second Kerensky and hesitate to meet force with force and (b) almost any future Burmese chief of state will probably employ strong-arm methods against opponents at times. (One non-AFPFL member of Executive Council remarked to me recently that he objected to “fascist methods used by anti-fascists” referring to intimidation methods employed by Aung San’s followers.[)]

(C) Establishment of diplomatic relations before status of Burma proper and of Frontier Areas in relation to Commonwealth and to each other is fixed and before internal order fully established: Precedent seems to have been already established in case of India where somewhat analagous sub-problems of Pakistan and principalities as well as that of internal order are likewise not yet settled.

3. I believe it will prove desirable to skip entirely proposed state of having our first diplomatic representative here rank as Commissioner (Deptels 231, October 9, and 242, October 18). While I am ignorant of reasons which prompted the timing of appointment of erstwhile Commissioner to India, development toward a responsible national government in Burma has apparently already passed stage which then existed in India. Programs of AFPFL and Executive Council foresee exchange of ambassadors and ministers (mytels 417, November 7, and 427, November 8²²) with other countries.

4. While Governor’s present Executive Council may not in fact have full Cabinet powers, it has powers closely approximating them. See mytel 333, October 3 and despatch 37, October 3²² reporting Governor’s statements to me that he would treat members as ministers; also Deptel 269, November 12 [15] and recent note^* to Department from British Embassy, Washington concerning price of Burmese and Siamese rice in which substantially same statement is made.

. . . . . . .

7. Although we may possibly wish to appoint envoy with rank no higher than that of Minister, it should, I believe, be assumed Burma national government will wish to appoint Ambassador to Washington (on basis of U.S.–India precedent) especially if, as seems probable from my 417 and 427, exchange of ambassadors with India and China should be decided upon (on basis of India–China and Siam–China precedents). It seems obvious our representative here should have equal rank. Possibly discreet suggestions to Governor and various Burmese leaders here and by Embassy, London, could avert appointment of any ambassadors but this is doubtful and probably in final analysis (considering current world trend) not worthwhile. Moreover, it would seem desirable to have our representative rank as Ambassador not only because of the prestige such rank would give him among the Burmese but because of the prestige it would give him among the British officials of the GOB and particularly vis-à-vis the Governor of Burma in the event that Burma should accept dominion status. My guess would be that the British will, in the light of their past action in Egypt and Iran, seek to have their diplomatic representative have the rank of Ambassador—perhaps be the only Ambassador—in the event Burma achieves full independence. Chinese Consul General informs me he recently informed Aung San he hoped China would be one of the first countries to which Burma would send a diplomatic representative.

8. My opinion as of this writing is that the question of exchange of diplomatic representatives with United States will be raised by the Government of Burma, irrespective of whether the AFPFL or another political party then attains office, not later than shortly after April elections. If [It] may be sooner, if the British Government or Governor of Burma declares the present Government an Interim or National Government before January 31, 1947, date on which recent AFPFL ultimatum (mytel 432, November 31 [13]²⁵ expires.

9. Myint Thein, brother (see also mytel 339, October 4²⁶) of Tin Tut, Finance Member, has recently been mentioned in confidence as possible appointee to Washington.

10. Acknowledgment by telegraph of the receipt hereof would be appreciated.

Packer

18. See footnote 13, p. 5.
19. See footnote 16, p. 6.
20. For further documentation on this subject, see vol. v, pp. 77 ff.
21. Not printed.
22. Neither printed.
22. Neither printed.
23. Dated July 27, 1946. [Footnote in the original; note under reference not printed.]
25. Not printed.
26. See footnote 12, p. 5.