Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

711.00/4–2246

The Consul at Rangoon (Abbey) to the Secretary of State

secret
No. 90

Rangoon, April 22, 1946.
[Received May 24.]

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Department’s letter of March 21, 1946, and the enclosed Policy and Information Statement on Burma.¹ The letter did not arrive until April 17. The Policy Statement is such a well coordinated document on Burma that it leaves but little in the way of comment from the field. In view of several local factors and the constant shifting of the scene the following items may be of interest.

1. It should be constantly borne in mind that Burma was completely devastated during the war. If she attains independence within the next two or three years, the country, if left to her own resources, faces bankruptcy and economic chaos. The other alternative is that she is afforded material assistance by some international organization or a large nation interested in helping Burma redevelop.

2. The Government of Burma has not as yet been able to collect any very detailed or comprehensive information on the precise nature of the country’s economic condition and the potential ability of a self-governing Burma to complete work of putting the country on a firm economic basis. It is doubtful that the Burmese by themselves can by any means extricate themselves from the present state of economic prostration.

3. This inability is due to three factors:—(a) the complete lack of public financial assets; (b) the peculiar Burmese lack of acumen with respect to business; and (3) their lack of political and administrative experience. There is not a single phase of the country’s economy which does not require almost total reconstitution. This requires long range planning; great patience; the application of experienced minds; good administrators; and a vast amount of capital. The foregoing are complicating factors not only with respect to the future stability of Burma itself but to surrounding territories.

4. There appears to be no doubt that the British Government is now desirous of having Burma attain Dominion status shortly. This is apparent from the various activities of Government officials; the reorganization of the Burma Army; and other overt signs. Certain local elements and I.C.S. officials are not too keen on Burma becoming self-governing but this arises chiefly out of fear of personal loss rather than concern over the public weal.

5. The problem of Burma does not appear to be comparable to that of India and Ceylon. The latter countries have factional troubles which are (aside from the Shan States and certain other districts) largely missing in Burma. On the other hand India and Ceylon escaped bombing and invasion and are in relatively easy financial circumstances. Therefore parallels should not be too freely drawn when considering Dominion or other status.

6. A further complicating factor is that the possibly stabilizing influences in Burma, i.e., the large non-Burmese firms who could contribute much to reconstruction, are not willing to restore their installations until such time as the British Government agrees to recognize claims for destruction which took place during the British withdrawal from Burma. These firms and others are also unwilling to invest a large amount of new capital in the country until such time as the attitude of the local Government to come is made clear.

7. While it is highly desirable that Burma achieve Dominion status or independence, any breakdown of self-government under the force of economic collapse would be harmful to the peace and stability of other Asiatic areas. Unless the new Government can get off to a good start economically, its democratic form of government will undoubtedly be subjected to infiltrations of totalitarian methods. The current dilemma is that the Burmese will not work with the British in the reconstruction program because they do not trust British intentions. It is possible that the Governor will have to come to terms with the AFPFL as the price of achieving Burmese trust. A continuing reconstruction program under British control will be difficult as the Burmese are extremely chary of what have been termed “continuing obligations” of His Majesty’s Government. It would be a solution acceptable to most Burmese, if the United States, in pursuance to its interest in expansion of opportunities for foreign investment in Burma and in the economic development of the country along lines that will contribute to growth of world trade, should participate in some way with the Burmese and British in the reconstruction of the country, either before or after independence is achieved.

8. The statement on page one of the Policy Statement that Burma was one of the most politically advanced countries among dependent areas is quite accurate but it is believed that mention might be made that distinct Russian leanings have been evidenced among influential Burmese politicians.

9. With respect to the first paragraph on page two of the Statement, it is pointed out that it is difficult for any great capitalist nation to disassociate itself from the aura of imperialism in the minds of the Burmese. The United States has been quite successful in overcoming that difficulty but if and when the United States moves to help Burma develop its economy, it will be an extremely delicate undertaking to find a middle ground between outright philanthropy and that degree of good business which will not arouse Burmese suspicions of imperialism. The reaction to President Truman’s speech² varied from mildly enthusiastic to decidedly cool reception. The Pro-AFPFL press saw hobgoblins of imperialism in the President’s affirmation that the United States must remain strong in order to maintain its leadership.

10. The comments under Withdrawals from AFL were accurate conclusions at the time the Statement was prepared. However, there are no present signs that the Thakin Party will return to the League.

11. With regard to the AFL Delegation to London, as already reported the proposed trip has been abandoned and the League is now pressing for a Government mission to come to Burma to investigate on the spot.

12. It has been rumored on several occasions that Dr. Ba Maw³ is in Burma but investigations have failed to confirm this. In the light of recent events, the comment that U Saw⁴ is now engaged in a strenuous campaign to wrest control of the AFL from Aung San⁵ is no longer pertinent and it is not believed that he is carrying on an overt campaign along these lines at the present time. There is no doubt that U Saw will bend every effort to gain control but his line of procedure is not yet fully clear. He may endeavor to achieve his aims by using his old party with AFL collaboration or he may have to dispense with AFL association. U Saw’s latest press statement in which he commented upon the similarity of aims of the Myochit Party and the AFL indicate that he may be attempting an amicable arrangement with the League.

Yours respectfully,

Glenn A. Abbey

1. Neither printed.
2. For President Truman’s address in Chicago, April 6, see Department of State Bulletin, April 21, 1946, p. 622.
3. Wartime premier of Japanese-sponsored government of Burma; he was in Japan until July 1946 when the American authorities turned him over to the British for return to Burma in August.
4. Leader of the Myochit Party, former government official and Premier in 1940, detained by the British in Uganda during World War II.
5. Commander of wartime Burma Defense Army.