There is attached a draft statement of policy on Turkey which represents
the present thinking of NEA in this
regard. It is partially based upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum
of August 2311 which you have seen, and incorporates all main
points made in that memorandum. In line with the wish expressed in one
of your telegrams from Paris, we have not attempted to go into detail
regarding the means of implementing our suggested policy but have
confined our statements in this respect to general outlines.
If you concur in the attached memorandum, I suggest that it be sent to
the Secretaries of War and Navy for their consideration and adoption as
an agreed statement of the Government’s policy. This would be of great
assistance to the Department by furnishing a definite basis for further
practical action. It would also serve to demonstrate to the War and Navy
Departments our identity of views with respect to the Turkish
situation.
With reference to the section of the statement dealing with arms, I
should mention that we have heard the Turks are about to present a
request to us for arms which, presumably, the British cannot or will not
supply them. We do not know what the Turks want, but we are concerned
lest a refusal on our part to let them have any combat equipment in any
circumstances, even though the need should be clear and the British
should not be able to deliver it, might be interpreted as an indication
of a lack of determination to back our policies to the hilt.
[Annex]
Memorandum on Turkey Prepared in the Division of
Near Eastern Affairs12
top secret
[Washington,] October 21,
1946.
Events of the past year have brought to the fore the vital importance
of Turkey in the international picture. It is one of the few nations
peripheral to the Soviet Union which is not under effective control
of the USSR, but there are unmistakable signs that the Soviet
Government plans to add Turkey to its group of satellites. These
signs include a persistent campaign by the Soviet press and radio
against the Turkish Government, Soviet assertions that various
portions of eastern Turkey must be incorporated in the Soviet Union,
denunciation by the USSR of the Turko-Soviet treaty of friendship of
1925, and the Soviet notes of August 7 and September 24, 1946 to
Turkey in which the Soviet Government insisted upon an arrangement
for joint Turko-Soviet defense of the Black Sea Straits.
It is the considered opinion of the United States Government that
these moves on the part of the Soviet Union are designed to weaken
Turkey with the objective of bringing it under the direct influence
of the USSR and enabling the Soviet Union to use Turkey both as a
defense against possible outside attack from the Mediterranean and
as a springboard for political and military expansion by the USSR
into the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East.
[Page 895]
It is further the view of the United States Government that the
successful execution of this Soviet policy would have the most
serious consequences. Strategically, Turkey is the most important
factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. By its
geographical position, Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of
the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence
could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and
Middle East. A Russian-dominated Turkey would open the floodgates
for a Soviet advance into Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine,
Transjordan, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, all of which are at
present still relatively free from Russian activities and direct
Russian pressure because of their relative remoteness from the
sphere of Soviet dominance. It would also dangerously, perhaps
fatally, expose Greece and Iran, two countries whose governments are
already having the greatest difficulty in standing up to the Soviet
Union and its agents. None of the nations mentioned has a government
or social order so stable and united as Turkey, and none could be
expected to stand against Soviet pressure after Turkey had gone
down.
From the purely military point of view, it is the opinion of the War
and Navy Departments that if the Soviet Union attained military
dominance of Turkey (as would be the case if it were permitted to
share in the defense of the Straits), there would be grave doubt
whether the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East could be
considered tenable for the non-Soviet powers. Political consequences
might be even more far-reaching. Because Turkey is so obviously a
key point and is so obviously under powerful Soviet pressure, all
other nations, large and small, which fear the spreading power of
the USSR are watching the current diplomatic struggle with the most
intense concern. Any weakening which resulted in even partial
attainment of the Soviet objectives in Turkey would have a
disastrous effect upon these nations, influencing them to come to
terms with the Soviets and abandon support of the United States in
its efforts to see that the principles of the United Nations are
upheld throughout the world. Such a development would produce a
considerable weakening in the comprehensive security situation of
the United States.
Fortunately, Turkey appears to be itself firmly determined to resist
present and future Soviet pressure. From all information, the
Turkish Government and people are united with regard to foreign
policy. There does not exist in Turkey the cleavage of public
opinion which makes it difficult for Greece, Iran, China and others
to defend their positions. Furthermore, alone among Near and Middle
Eastern states, Turkey possesses a relatively effective military
force which could render difficult the task of an aggressor, even if
it were the Soviet Union.
[Page 896]
Despite these favorable conditions, it is obvious that Turkey cannot
stand in the face of the USSR if left entirely alone. Turkey lacks
the economic and industrial resources, to say nothing of the
population, necessary to oppose a major power. Its economic
structure is still shaken by the war. The unrelenting war of nerves
being waged against it forces the maintenance of a large military
force which is a dangerous drain on the nation’s economic strength.
On the strictly military side, Turkey is unable to produce for
itself the modern weapons and equipment required for defense under
present-day conditions.
It is, therefore, the policy of the United States Government to give
positive support to Turkey. This policy should be implemented along
the following main lines:
- 1.
-
Diplomatic. The United States should
maintain the firm, though reasonable, position it has
already taken with regard to the Straits. If and when
occasion arises it should adopt a similarly firm stand with
regard to other issues, such as the Soviet desire to annex
parts of eastern Turkey. The Turks, the Soviets and the
world at large should be left in no doubt whatsoever as to
our stand with regard to such questions.
- 2.
-
Moral. The United States Government
should continue to make clear to the American people the
essential elements of the situation, explaining carefully
the moral as well as political and strategic bases of our
policy. At the same time, we should make sure that the
Turkish Government and people also fully understand our
position and are confirmed in their belief that we are
determined to see the high principles of the United Nations
maintained with regard to Turkey. We must especially avoid
any action which, reasonable or expedient though it might
seem to us, would give the Turks the impression that we were
weakening in our support or deviating from our
principles.
- 3.
-
Economic. A beginning in economic
assistance has been made through the authorization of a
$25,000,000 Export-Import Bank credit and by assistance in
the purchase of vessels to rehabilitate the Turkish merchant
marine. This beginning must be followed up by all available
means, probably including additional financial credits but
not limited to this form of assistance.
- 4.
-
Military. For the present it seems
preferable for Great Britain to assume the obligation of
providing military equipment and munitions whenever
necessary to insure proper maintenance and development of
the Turkish military forces. This follows because of the
treaty relationship between the two countries and because
the world in general has become accustomed to the fact that
Turkey receives arms from Britain from time to time. If a
case should arise where Britain is not in a position to
furnish the necessary arms and military equipment, the
United States government is prepared to consider the
possibility of furnishing such supplies to Great Britain for
delivery to the Turks. In a very exceptional case we might
consider furnishing certain supplies direct.
[Page 897]
It is not inconsistent with United States policy, however, to provide
technical military advice, military instructions, etc., whenever
requested by the Turks.
