Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

767.68119/10–1946

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

restricted
No. 1187

Ankara, October 19, 1946.
[Received November 20.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s telegram No. 1117 of October 19, 1946,⁷ and to transmit herewith a copy of the French text of the Turkish reply to the second Soviet Straits note, as furnished by the Anatolian Agency. The Agency text has been compared with the note as received from the Foreign Office and minor discrepancies corrected. An informal translation made by the Embassy is also forwarded herewith.⁸

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Warwick Perkins

First Secretary of Embassy

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Turkish Foreign Office to the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Turkey

The Government of the Turkish Republic has taken cognizance of the note of the Soviet Government dated September 24, 1946, in reply to the Turkish note of August 22,^8a regarding the eventual revision of the Montreux Convention. It hastens to set forth, hereunder, the views and reflections which the meticulous examination of the above-mentioned document has permitted it to reach.

In its first part, the Soviet note takes up again the theme of the alleged use of the Straits by ships belonging to the countries of the Axis and, replying to the refutation applied against this subject in the Turkish note of August 22, it cites the cases of passage in 1942 and 1943 of German rapid pinnaces, in order to deduce from them, once again, the justice of the Soviet allegation.

In its August 22 note in reply, the Government of the Republic furnished to the Soviet Government the most complete explanations on the subject of the perfect correctness with which Turkey was able, during the extremely difficult period of the Second World War, to acquit itself of the task which it assumed because of the Montreux Convention. It clearly set forth that the few cases of fraudulent passage which had caused the Soviet objections arose essentially from the lacunae of Annex II of the Convention treating of definitions, specifications, as well as of calculation of tonnages; that the Annex in question for this reason admitted of the necessity of an adaptation to present conditions and concepts; and that, moreover, if the Soviet Government nonetheless considered that it could raise complaints concerning the execution of the Montreux Convention, the Government of the Republic would undertake to show, if necessary, before an arbitral court, the good faith and the loyalty with which it had conducted itself in order to assure with perfection the execution of the Convention confided to its care. Therefore, the Government of the Republic is of the opinion that, given the definite position taken by the two parties as regards the appreciation of the substance and the reality of the facts, it would be desirable to consider discussion on diplomatic grounds to be exhausted, the Turkish Government holding itself at the disposition of the Soviet Government to have recourse to arbitration. As regards particularly the case of the German pinnaces of which the passage through the Straits seems to be emphasized as a violation of the terms of the Convention, let it be sufficient to observe that the pinnaces in question were constructed in shipyards on the Danube under German control, and their presence in the Black Sea was consequently completely independent of the will of the Government of the Republic. Moreover, if the ships in question were able to pass through the Straits, it is also because they did not present any of the characteristics belonging to auxiliary war vessels or war vessels.

Along these lines, the Soviet note points out that, during the war, the Turkish Government ceased to present to the belligerent states reports on the movement of ships in the Straits, as it should have done according to the terms of Article 24 of the Montreux Convention.

It is appropriate to set forth, first of all, as regards this subject, that the reports in question ought, according to the terms of Article 24, to be presented not to the belligerent states, but to the powers signatory of the Montreux Convention, as well as to the Secretariat General of the League of Nations. As regards their non-presentation, it suffices to observe that the Turkish Government, taking, on the one hand, into consideration the principle of refusal of passage for warships of the belligerents, and foreseeing that, on the other hand, no neutral power would consider, during the hostilities, sending warships through the Straits, considered that the contents of the Annual Report to be furnished to the signatory powers and to the Secretariat General of the League of Nations would, because of this, be deprived of their most important information. As regards the statistics concerning commercial movements to be included in the report, the Turkish Government considered that this movement, reduced to ridiculous proportions because of the hostilities, could not, if it were made public, but influence unfavorably the war efforts of the Allied countries, without, moreover, any counterpart of usefulness. It therefore decided to stop sending the report while continuing to compile it regularly. Moreover, it brought this fact to the attention of the Secretariat General of the League of Nations and of the Powers signatory of the Montreux Convention, in February, 1942 for the report of the year 1941, and in February, 1943 for that of the year 1942. The hostilities having ended in 1945, the Annual Reports referring to the years 1941–44 were sent to the interested states on January 29, 1946. It is useful to emphasize here that no power signatory of the Montreux Convention ever raised objections concerning this attitude of the Turkish Government. Let it be equally permitted to add that another consideration of special nature, which decided the Government of the Republic to enter upon this course, was present in the discovery that, during the years under reference, the powers bordering the Black Sea, including the USSR, did not think it necessary to conform to the obligation, set forth in Article 18, Paragraph B, of the Montreux Convention, to advise the Turkish Government on January 1st and July 1st of each year, of the total tonnage of their fleets in the Black Sea. Now, the figures to be furnished because of this obligation, were to be the basis of the information in the Annual Report to be presented by the Turkish Government. This abstention of Moscow during the war period was perfectly understandable and it never occurred to Turkey to address a complaint to the Soviet Government because of it. The Government of the Republic hopes likewise that the cessation of the sending of the Annual Reports during the same period, for the reasons set forth above, will no longer be considered by the USSR, as having prejudiced its security in the Black Sea.

The Soviet note then passes to the discussion of the grounds of certain other arguments included in the Turkish note of August 22nd as proofs of the circumstances which made difficult the control of the Straits. Notably it denies the probative character of the official annuals of war fleets, forcedly incomplete in the war period. Moreover, as reply to the Turkish argument drawn from the fact that the only kind of control to which ships in transit could be submitted, according to the Convention, was limited to a sanitary control, the Soviet note recalls the establishment, by the Turkish Government, of obligatory stops and of recourse to pilots in the Straits, as well as the surveillance by the Turkish customs authorities of ships in transit. The note adds finally that if the totality of these control measures was considered insufficient, on the other hand, not once during the war, did the Turkish Government inform the contracting powers of the need to strengthen them.

The Turkish Government has already strongly set forth and emphasizes once again that the essential difficulty in differentiating, between warships or commercial vessels, as regards ships in transit, rested in the imperfection of Annex II of the Convention. All the other arguments advanced by the Turkish note of August 22nd have no other end than to corroborate this elementary and patent truth, and to illustrate by facts and examples the conscious and considered correctness with which the Turkish authorities applied themselves, having resource to all the sources which could, more or less, carry authority in the matter, to discovering the true character of the ships requesting passage through the Straits. It is in this light that the recourse to the official annual should be considered. As regards the establishment of obligatory stops and the recourse to pilots, it is clear that these measures had no other end than to protect ships in transit against the risk of running into the nets installed at the entrance of the Straits. They could not, in the presence of the contractual conditions, involve any purpose of control; they do not therefore have any connection with the subject under reference. Likewise, the allegation according to which the customs authorities exercised surveillance on ships in transit is completely lacking in foundation, for the good reason that because of the stipulations of the Montreux Convention, the surveillance in question could never take on the character of a customs visit and was limited to a simple precautionary measure destined to prevent attempts at smuggling. Finally the reproach addressed to Turkey of not having asked of the contracting powers the strengthening of the measures for control of ships in transit also cannot be admitted, for it does not take into consideration either the procedure established for the revision of the Montreux Convention, above all during a war in which the signatory powers were divided between the two opposing camps, nor the fact that the question of the control today described as being imperfect, was not the object, during the war, of any request of the contracting powers who could feel the need to see bettered the conditions relative to this formality.

All the facts developed above, adding themselves to the explanations already furnished, confirm the correctness and the vigilance of which the Government of the Republic gave proof in the accomplishment of its historic task in the Straits, correction and vigilance thanks to which the USSR was able, during the entire length of the war, to remain in the Black Sea, sheltered from every Axis attack coming from the Mediterranean. This truth, which everybody possessing objectivity is pleased to recognize, cannot be covered up by isolated facts and special arguments. It also suffices to refute the allegation regarding the movements of troops which, according to the Soviet note, were alleged to have as their basis the supposed free passage through the Straits of war ships belonging to the Axis countries. In effect, the note affirms that this free use of the Straits by the Axis obliged the Soviet Government to withdraw an important number of military effectives from the principal sectors of the theater of war to assign them to the defense of the Black Sea region. Such would not seem to be, in the opinion of the Turkish Government, the real motive of the troop movements thus brought about. Judged in retrospect in the light of developments of the war and on the purely military plane, the despatch of troops to the Black Sea region presents no connection with the attitude of Turkey in the Straits, and this for the following reasons:

1. The real threat to the security of the Soviet Black Sea shores came from the occupation of a large part of the shore of that Sea by the German Armies, from the German possession of the Rumanian and Bulgarian fleets and from the presence of German and Italian ships sent to Black Sea ports by rail or through the Danube.

2. The despatch of troops to the Black Sea region is explained by the obligation to face the German offensive unleashed from the beginning of hostilities, and above all commencing in the spring of the year 1942, along the shore of that Sea. This same offensive was also the origin of the uneasiness felt in Turkey from the point of its eventual development and of the measures of defense which this country had to take on the Turkish shores of the Black Sea.

The reading of the present note, as well as the reading of that dated August 22nd, which it complements, is sufficient to determine what really should be amended in the Montreux Convention, in order to give the Black Sea powers all judicious and adequate satisfaction. In the first place, Annex II should be revised, account having been taken of present conditions and technical concepts. In the second place, the provisions of the Montreux Convention relative to the role and to the intervention of the League of Nations should give way to the system established by the United Nations Organization, in its task of preserving the peace of the world. Finally, Japan should be removed from the list of contracting powers, while the United States of America should be a signatory in the revised text. It is within this framework that the Government of the Republic would envisage an eventual revision of the Montreux Convention and if, deferring to the requests which have been addressed to it, it has been able to give its consent to be represented at a conference charged with the revision of the dispositions regarding passage through the Straits, one should see in this gesture only the manifestation of a laudable spirit of international cooperation in regard to any initiative which could reconcile the rights of sovereignty and the exigencies of the security of Turkey with the general interest. In consequence, and basing itself on the explanations and the reasoning formulated in the two Notes mentioned above, the Government of the Republic reiterates once more its intention to make no difficulty for the application, with the consent of the Contracting Powers of the Montreux Convention and of the United States of America, and at an international conference uniting the said Powers, of any request for revision specified by the Convention. But it can not admit unfounded complaints tending to justify this revision on the basis of an alleged responsibility on its part, born of pretended violations of the regime of the Straits in the course of the Second World War.

The Turkish Government has also studied with the greatest interest the complementary explanations furnished on the subject of point four of the Soviet Note. It thanks the Government of the USSR for the kindness shown in this respect, with the object of assuring a perfect understanding of this point whose delicate character can not escape attention.

It results from these explanations that, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, the establishment of the regime of the Straits should, for the following reasons fall within the exclusive competence of Turkey and of the other riverain Powers of the Black Sea:

1. The Black Sea, as a closed sea, is said to have a special situation. The Straits are said to represent, because of this, a maritime route leading only to the coasts of a limited number of Powers in the Black Sea and to differ in consequence from the maritime routes of world importance such as Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. It is therefore natural that the riverain States of this sea are those most interested in the regulation of the regime of the Straits.

2. The Montreux Conference has already established a preferential regime in favor of the riverain Powders. In addition, in accepting the three first points of the Soviet proposals as a basis of discussion, Turkey has recognized for the Black Sea Powers “a much more definitive preferential regime”.

3. The special situation of the Black Sea was also recognized by Turkey in Article 5 of the Turco-Soviet Treaty dated March 16, 1921, which establishes the agreement of the two Contracting Parties to entrust the elaboration of the international statute of the Black Sea and of the Straits, on the basis of the principle of free navigation, to a conference uniting the representatives of the riverain countries of the Black Sea. Invoking the authority of this Article, the Soviet Note declares that the regulatory procedure thus envisaged, which meets the legitimate interests of the riverain Powers of the Black Sea without being inconsistent in any way with the interests of other countries, should be applied without further delay.

The Government of the Republic permits itself to develop below the replies which are called forth by the points summarized above:

1. In the opinion of the Soviet Government the Black Sea, as a closed sea, is said to have a special situation which limits interest in it to the riverain Powers alone.

Without wishing to introduce into this debate the authority of the doctrine which, moreover, seems to be unanimous in considering the Black Sea as an open sea, the Turkish Government limits itself simply to the observation that all the regulations of an international character which have appeared thus far, in each case with the participation of Russia, on the subject of the Straits have admitted more or less severe restrictions on the freedom of passage of riverain and non-riverain states only as exceptions freely agreed to by Turkey, in common accord with the other interested powers, in the general interest. It is the exceptional character of the closure which explains the efforts made towards the middle of the 19th century by the Government of the Czar to have this same rule set up as a general principle of European public law. To cite only examples from the most recent conventions, in support of the point of view developed above, it suffices to refer to the acts of Lausanne and Montreux which, breaking with the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire sanctioned by international treaties, a rule in virtue of which it was forbidden at all times for foreign powers to enter the Straits while the Porte was at peace, have admitted the principle of the freedom of passage through the Straits, which includes equally the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. The exceptions made by the conventions mentioned above to the principle of freedom in favor of the riverain powers of the Black Sea prove, not the possibility of excluding the non-riverain powers from negotiations looking toward the amendment of certain provisions of the regime at present in force, but the necessity of basing the revision on the agreement and the consent of all the powers interested in a reasonable regulation of this problem. To depart from these general limits of competence would mean nothing less than the negation of the fundamental principle of the law of nations, according to which a Power can be released from the obligations of a treaty, or modify its stipulations only by the assent of the contracting parties. In consequence, since the point under discussion has reference to the regime of passage through the Turkish Straits and since the Montreux Convention places upon the signatory Powers the obligation of proceeding to a modification of the provisions of this document only in an international conference uniting the contracting States and in accordance with a procedure foreseen by the text of the convention itself, it follows that the Soviet point of view is difficult to reconcile with the principles of international public law.

Without doubt Turkey is the first power to recognize the vital interest which free navigation through the Straits has for the riverain countries of the Black Sea. This is, moreover, the reason why she has without difficulty consented to be represented at a conference of revision. But she can not fail to recognize the interest which the other Powers also have in an equitable regulation of the same problem. Turkey has a clear consciousness of her status as a Power of the Black Sea. But she cannot forget that she is also a Mediterranean country. Charged by a particularly delicate geographic stituation, with assuring the liaison between two worlds separated by the restricted space of the Straits, she is conscious of the obligation which this situation imposes on her with respect to the two seas which bathe her. The Turkish Government can therefore not consider the question of the Black Sea and of the Straits as a problem interesting the riverain Powers of this sea alone.

2. The Turkish Government agrees with the Government of the USSR that the Montreux Convention, going still further than the Lausanne Convention concerning the regime of the Straits, has established for the benefit of the riverain states of the Black Sea a sharply defined system of preference. It is equally clear that in adopting as a basis of discussion at the international conference foreseen for the revision of the Montreux Convention, the three principles suggested by the Government of the United States of America, and taken up again later by the Soviet Government, the Turkish, British and American Governments in a spirit of conciliation have consented to take into consideration the possibilities of giving greater satisfaction to the Soviet desiderata. It seems to the Turkish Government that, in these conditions, the argument advanced in the Soviet Note serves rather to emphasize the complete good will with which the requests of the USSR have been received by the Governments principally interested in the revision of the regime of the Straits; but it in no way removes the right and the interest which the same Powers as well as the other signatories of the Montreux Convention can have in seeing the procedure of revision begin and end under the happiest auspices, in the interest naturally not only of the Black Sea Powers, destined to derive a considerable profit from the new concessions foreseen in their favor, but also of all the States entitled to make their voices heard and to defend their interests in the course of the important meetings in prospect.

3. Considered from the strictly legal point of view, Article 5 of the Turco-Soviet Treaty signed at Moscow on March 16, 1921 expresses an undertaking. In actual fact, the two Contracting Parties disposed of it otherwise, and manifested their act of will in an absolutely opposite sense, in the first place, by their effective participation in the negotiations undertaken at Lausanne on the subject of the regime of the Straits within a considerably enlarged international framework. It is true that in the course of the discussion engaged in on this subject, Mr. Chicherin, First Soviet Delegate, who defended with ardor and eloquence the system of closure of the Straits, did not hesitate to announce his intention of “proposing to the Black Sea Powers the calling of a conference to establish the reciprocal conditions of an effective security of the shores of this sea.” This project, nevertheless, encountered the almost unanimous objection of the Delegations present at the Conference. It results from the declarations made on this subject that the Soviet point of view appeared not to take into account the views of the other riverain Powers, whose representatives in effect denied to the USSR the right to speak in their name and added that their ideas on the maintenance of the peace of the world and the security of their territories on the shores of the Black Sea differed substantially from those of the Soviet Government. Moreover, the same declaration made it apparent that the Soviet proposal excluded the principle of international law according to which the passage between two seas should be considered as an international route; that it would give to the USSR, if it were adopted by the Conference, an exceptional and unjustly advantageous position in the Black Sea; and that the Soviet argument according to which the opening of the Straits to warships would be to the advantage of the strongest naval power lost all its force and value in the presence of the contrary argument according to which the closing of the Black Sea would put the other riverain States at the mercy of the maritime power which possessed the strongest land forces, in other words, at the mercy of the USSR itself.

The same change in the attitude of Turkey and of the USSR toward the subject of the framework of elaboration of the regime of the Straits appeared, in the second place, in the participation of authorized representatives of the two countries in the conference which established the Montreux regime, the fruit of long and laborious discussions, in the course of which the eminent Soviet Delegate Mr. Maxim Litvinov, distinguished himself by the great competency with which he defended and carried to victory the points of view of his Government. It is not in vain that at the last plenary session of the Conference, he rejoiced in the excellent results obtained. It is also not in vain that in speaking at the closing session of the Conference, he addressed to his audience this moving appeal: “The Conference has had to understand that in place of the old imperialist Russia which sought to use the Black Sea as a base for its participation in the imperialist struggle of the great Powers and for the realization of new territorial conquests, there is today a new Soviet and socialist state which occupies the largest part of the Black Sea and one of whose first acts was to renounce completely all imperialist objectives, and which subsequently has invariably and systematically pursued a policy of peace, jealous not only of its own security, but also of that of all states near or far …⁹ All those who have participated in the conference will go away satisfied and there will be no one discontented.”

These words, just as well as realistic, which do honor to the Government from which they emanate, words which the Government of the Republic is glad to recall and which still sound in the ears of those who had the privilege of hearing them, have moreover the merit of proving that the Government of the Turkish Republic, initiator of the meeting at Montreux, and the Soviet Government were in 1936 no longer at the point where, in 1921, they envisaged for the regulation of the question of the Straits a conference limited to the Black Sea Powers only. There is no doubt that the terms on which an understanding between states is based, cease to be in force from the day when a subsequent accord of the parties replaces the former undertaking by new arrangements duly signed and ratified. This is the case, especially, with relation to the framework of elaboration of the regime of the Straits. The preceding explanations and the citations demonstrate clearly that the controversy that the Soviet Note has raised by invoking Article 5 of the Treaty of Moscow has today only a historic character. In any case, the facts set forth above are there to prove that the historic argument advanced by the Government of the USSR no longer appears of a nature to serve as a solid base for the thesis which it maintains.

The same explanations and citations also prove the fact that the Soviet formula directed toward the elaboration of a regime of the Straits by the riverains of the Black Sea alone does not seem, contrary to the opinion expressed in the Note of September 24, to satisfy any of the non-riverain countries whose interests in the Straits are involved.

The same reasoning and the same conclusions are equally valid in refuting the Soviet demonstration based on the authority of an article, drafted in the same manner as the said Article 5 and appearing in the treaty of October 13, 1921 concluded between Turkey and the Trans-Caucasian Republics, as well as in the treaty of January 21, 1922 concluded between Turkey and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

In its Note dated August 22, the Turkish Government was intent on setting forth the reasons of a contractual character which were opposed to the revision of the regime of the Straits except within the framework and according to the procedure foreseen by the Montreux Convention. In the presence of the complementary explanations obligingly advanced in the Soviet Note of September 24 on the subject of point four, the Turkish Government has felt bound to develop, in its turn, the manner in which it views the new commentaries furnished by the above mentioned Note. The Government of the Republic would consequently be grateful to the Government of the USSR if it would consider the explanations of the present note as supplementing those furnished on the same subject in the previous Note.

With regard to point five of the Soviet Note of August 7, which recommends a mixed system of Turco-Soviet defense in the Straits, the Government of the USSR states that the Turkish Government considers this proposition as incompatible with the rights of sovereignty and the security of Turkey and that it arrives at this conclusion without having previously examined the concrete considerations of the Soviet Government on this subject. In doing this, the Note adds, and in formulating suspicions which are baseless and incompatible with the dignity of the Soviet Union, the Turkish Government finds itself in full contradiction with its own declarations concerning the restoration of friendly relations, marked by mutual confidence with the USSR. The Soviet Government believes that the application of its proposal could be realized not only without the slightest prejudice to the sovereignty of Turkey, but with an appreciable augmentation of its security.

The Turkish Government cannot share the opinion according to which it has opposed the discussion of point five, which it regards as incompatible with the rights of sovereignty and the security of Turkey, without previously having examined the concrete suggestions of the Soviet Government on this subject. It is first of all necessary to underline here that the Government of the Republic has never failed to receive with interest and good will the démarches of foreign powers with which it has relations. In this connection, the Turkish Government wishes particularly to recall that, raised for the first time at Moscow in 1939 in the course of the Saraçoğlu-Molotov conversations, the question of a joint defense of the Straits by the Turkish and Soviet Governments was also taken up, later, by the Government of the USSR, in an aggravated form, in the course of a conversation with the Turkish representative at Moscow. It is because this subject has been justly considered as injuring the rights, through the respect of which a nation is and remains independent, that it has encountered the opposition of Turkey. The entire question of the Straits has continued, likewise to be, by means of the extensive correspondence recently exchanged on this subject between Ankara and Moscow, the subject of a substantial examination of the respective positions of Turkey and the USSR. It is therefore unjust to accuse the Turkish Government of avoiding the opening of friendly conversations with the USSR with the object of clarifying point 5. The principle of freedom of passage through the Straits is, according to principles universally recognized, limited by the right of the riverain state to guard the security and defense of its territory, and can not in any way diminish the right and duty that State has to see to its preservation. The right to defend itself against all aggression is, beyond denial, for an independent State which respects itself the most essential attribute of its sovereignty. The acceptance by Turkey of a joint defense of the Straits would mean no less than the sharing of her sovereignty with a foreign power. The Government of the Republic, in its note of August 22, has given to the Soviet Government all the necessary assurances with regard to its firm intention to defend, as in the past, Turkish territory against all aggression and had indicated to it its desire to see established between Turkey and the USSR cordial and confident relations. It is happy to repeat again the same assurances. It does not lose sight of the fact that the Soviet coasts on the Black Sea have a length of 2100 kilometers, but it also does not forget that the Turkish coasts of the Black Sea are almost as long. If the principle of the closing of the Straits to the Powers non-riverain of the Black Sea, a principle which, in itself, already constitutes a very important guarantee for the security of the USSR, is not sufficient to eliminate Soviet apprehensions completely, it is in order for that country to have recourse, in the event of an attack against the Black Sea, to the most perfect solution which mankind has yet found to repel aggression, that is the joint defense by national forces and the forces of the United Nations Organization charged with preventing all aggression, from wherever it comes.

Apart from these reflections, the Turkish Government cannot understand how the right of defense of the Soviet Union can be exercised in Turkey, in defiance of the rights of sovereignty of this country. The Turkish Government cannot resist recalling here the vehement terms in which Mr. Chicherin protested at the Lausanne Conference, against the proposal to take from Turkey the control of the passage of the Straits and opposed what he rightly called “a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and independence of Turkey”. It cannot conceive that the rejection by Turkey of this same demand for control now proposed by the Soviet Union, should be considered by that Power as incompatible with its dignity, since, in the opinion of the Government of the Republic, it is on the contrary to the honor, the dignity and the very existence of Turkey, as an independent nation, which are involved.

The Soviet note recalls, in support of its thesis, the passage of the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau through the Straits in 1914. This reference to two vessels purchased by the Ottoman Government has no relation either to the subject under discussion or to the enforcement of the Montreux Convention and seems rather a question of international law relating to the propriety of the acquisition by neutrals of belligerent vessels taking refuge in their territorial waters.

In the same way, the allusion made in the Soviet note to the subject of the adoption of supposed military measures in the Straits, by joint accord with certain Powers non-riverain of the Black Sea is not understood in Turkey, since it relates to facts lacking any foundation. In consequence it is outside this discussion.

In its note of August 22, the Turkish Government, after having emphasized that the most certain guarantee of the security of the USSR in the Black Sea rested not in the seeking of a privileged strategic position in the Straits, a position incompatible with the dignity and the sovereignty of an independent country, but in the restoration of relations of trust with a strong Turkey, ardently desirous of contributing to that healthy task, but whose activity in this respect has unfortunately been restricted by lack of efforts on a parallel plane, added that in addition to this first class guarantee furnished by Turkey, the USSR should, in the wholly improbable case of an attack in the Straits, also count upon the efficacy of the United Nations Organization of which she as well as Turkey are members.

After having recalled this reference the Soviet Government states in its note that its proposal No. 5 is entirely in conformity with the principles and objectives of the said Organization. In emphasizing the importance of the United Nations Organization in a question which is properly of the utmost interest to the USSR, the Turkish Government precisely wished to refer to the First Article of the Charter, relative to objectives and to principles, an article according to the terms of which the new international organization should, henceforth, answer for the security of everyone, placed under the guarantee of the international forces put at the service of the Organization. It also wished to allude to the undertaking solemnly assumed by the members of the Organization, by virtue of Article 2 of the said Charter relative to principles “to refrain in their international relations, from the threat or use of force, against either the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”.

Putting aside any considerations as to the necessity of allowing every country to defend itself in its own way against outside aggression, the Government of the Republic has difficulty in understanding how, in an age when all the peoples avid for tranquillity and peace, are in the position of having placed their hopes in the guarantees of security flowing from the work of San Francisco, a proposal disregarding the existence of the new Organization and the guarantees of collective security which it provides, can be compatible with the objectives and the principles thereof. It also asks itself how this same proposal which, to establish security at home, believes it possible to wipe out the security and sovereignty of a neighbor, can be reconciled with the obligation to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of others. The Government of the Republic is thus obliged to repeat again that point 5 of the Soviet note of August 7 is incompatible with the inalienable rights of sovereignty of Turkey and with her security which permits of no restriction.

Basing itself upon the long explanations furnished above, the Turkish Government is convinced that it has established tangible proof of its good will and of its spirit of conciliation in agreeing to participate in a conference for the revision of the Montreux Convention. It appeals to the Soviet Government to ask it to study, in its turn, the reflections which its proposals evoke, with the same objectivity and the same good will.

Finally, to reply briefly to the Soviet reproach to the Turkish Government that it confines itself to conditions of admissibility of the procedure for the revision of the Montreux Convention, without taking the Potsdam decisions into account, this Government must first of all state that the decisions in question, which by a free manifestation of its will it has consented to take into consideration, contemplated only the attempting by means of conversations of an endeavor at conciliation of the respective points of view of the three Powers represented at the said conference, within the framework of the rights of sovereignty of Turkey, in a manner to prepare the ground for the convocation of the conference for revision. They are symptomatic of the interest which these same Powers attach to the question of the Straits, but they cannot replace the Montreux Convention which, alone, binds the signatory states. Moreover, the Government of the Republic believes it useful to point out that, to its knowledge, the decision to which the Soviet note refers envisaged direct conversations between the Turkish Government, on the one hand, and each of the three Powers represented at Potsdam on the other hand, on the subject of the eventual revision of the Montreux Convention. Now, in the opinion of the Turkish Government the preliminary preparatory work desired by the Potsdam conference is now virtually completed, thanks, in the first place, to the communications made by the Governments of the United States of America and of Great Britain to Ankara and, then, to the exchanges of notes which have taken place concerning the same subject between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Government of the Republic consequently believes that the contacts thus accomplished have definitely and sufficiently clarified the respective positions of Turkey and of the three Powers concerned with respect to the question of the Straits. Under these circumstances, the Turkish Government cannot avoid expressing its doubts as to the usefulness and the advisability of continuing to follow, in the future, the same procedure of exchange of views by means of correspondence. It considers the ground sufficiently prepared in order that the procedure of revision can be usefully begun (déclenches). The Turkish Government, insofar as it is concerned, while maintaining its attitude defined in the present note as well as in that of August 22, concerning points 4 and 5 of the Soviet demands, declares itself ready to attend a conference at which are assembled the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France as well as the other states signatories of the Montreux Convention, except Japan, in order to proceed with negotiations for the revision of the above mentioned convention.

This note would certainly be incomplete if it closed without a fervent homage rendered to the organism which crystallizes all the hopes of peoples towards a future of peace. The Government of the Republic wishes, once more, to express its profound faith in the future of the United Nations Organization, the support of universal order based on concord, equity and mutual respect, framework of efficacious institutions in the service of living cooperation. It bases the greatest hopes on this constellation which has assumed the task of inculcating in everyone the necessity of collaboration between the peoples and of a law which governs them, and of orienting the community of nations towards a rich development of solidarity and interdependence, thus creating a work of high civilization, regenerator of stability and general prosperity. The Government of the Republic firmly hopes to find itself with its great neighbor of the North in this field of serenity, in the effulgence and radiance of international collaboration, dispenser of benefits for all the peoples of good will.

A copy of the Soviet note of September 24 has been transmitted by the Turkish Government to the Governments of Great Britain and of the United States of America.

A copy of the present note has been sent to the signatories of the Montreux Convention—except Japan—and to the Government of the United States of America.

Ankara, October 18, 1946.

7. Not printed; it transmitted the text of the Turkish reply of October 18 to the Soviet Union which was somewhat garbled in transmission.
8. The note, dated October 18, was published on October 21.
9. See footnote 76, p. 852.
9. Omission indicated in the original text.