767.68119/9–946: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
secret
Ankara, September
9, 1946—6 p.m.
[Received 10:15 p.m.]
[Received 10:15 p.m.]
965. I asked Foreign Minister today if he had any info to indicate line Soviets may now take concerning Straits question. Saka said he had no info whatsoever. In his view Soviets have three courses open to them:
- 1.
- To attack Turkey. This he regards most unlikely as USSR, in his judgment, unready for war at present and undesirous run risk general conflict.
- 2.
- Take steps convoke international conference revision Montreux Convention. Soviets, while realizing their points 4 and 5 would be ruled out, might conceivably consider it advantageous have conference revise Convention sense note last November which would give them preferred position at Straits. However, by accepting such convention Soviets would be estopped from raising claims such as their points 4 and 5. For this reason Saka believes unlikely USSR will take initiative convoke conference.
- 3.
- Allow question remain in status quo until more favorable time for pressing essential Soviet claim against Turkey. Foreign Minister believes this most likely course USSR will follow.
Sent Department; repeated London 140, Paris as 76, Department relay to Moscow as Ankara’s 106.
Wilson