[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)
top secret
Washington, 23 August
1946.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the military implications
in the existing international situation concerning the Turkish
Straits, and request that these views be furnished the Secretary of
State.
The methods and weapons of modern war are such that possession by the
Soviets of military base rights in the Dardanelles would not provide
for the effective defense of traffic through these Straits unless
such rights were extended to include military dominance of the area
for several hundred miles in all directions. Furthermore, traffic
clearing the Dardanelles must still pass through the island-studded
Aegean which is flanked by Greece and Turkey and controlled by
Crete. The same logic which would justify Soviet participation in
the defense of the Dardanelles would also tend to justify further
Soviet military peneration through the Aegean.
Soviet participation in defense of the Turkish Straits would project
Soviet military power into an area vital to the Turks. Even though
Soviet military privileges and forces within Turkey were nominal,
the Soviets have a tremendous capability to reinforce in days or
hours a bridgehead within the country. This situation, involving
Soviet immediate military dominance of Turkey, would be obvious to
all Turks. It is believed this situation would so soften the Turkish
attitude toward Russia as to soon result in reducing Turkey to a
satellite Soviet State.
Strategically Turkey is the most important military factor in the
Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. She is one of the few
national entities and the only nation now possessing, according to
best available information, a firm resolution to oppose the apparent
Soviet policy of expansion in the area. While lacking an effective
navy and air force, Turkey possesses a rugged and considerable
ground army which, particularly if properly equipped and supported,
is capable of offering material resistance, even to the Soviets, if
the nation is attacked.
If Russia attains military dominance of Turkey by political
concessions, her military threat is projected so that there is grave
doubt that, in case of a major world crisis, the Middle East and
Eastern
[Page 858]
Mediterranean
could be considered militarily tenable for the non-Soviet powers.
Furthermore, the faith and political reliance in the major
non-Soviet powers of the Middle Eastern peoples and nations on the
periphery of the “iron curtain” is a considerable although
intangible factor in U.S. security. This faith and reliance will be
gravely affected if not dissipated by success of the Soviets in
their present political venture in the direction of the Turkish
Straits. The logical result is a further weakening of the present
stand of those nations, including Great Britain, peripheral to the
“iron curtain”, against Soviet pressure and expansionist policy.
From the military standpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff view with
concern the present world situation. In spite of the written word of
the United Nations’ Charter, many and major indications point to a
calculated Soviet policy of expanding Soviet de
facto geographical and political control. Such a Soviet
policy has the most serious impact on the vital interests of the
United States.
It is recognized that under present circumstances:
-
a.
- Successful opposition of Soviet efforts against Turkey
rests primarily on the continuation of the will of the
Turkish government and people to take a firm stand against
Russian demands.
-
b.
- The U.S. people are not well informed concerning the
situation which is the subject of this paper and that any
useful action, in the interests of U.S. security, is in the
end dependent upon their comprehension and support.
-
c.
- Britain’s immediate security interest in the situation is
even more acute than that of the United States.
In light of the foregoing it is suggested that the military situation
of Turkey would be greatly improved if the United States would give:
-
a.
- Encouragement to the Turkish purchase from the United
States of such nonmilitary materials and supplies as will
enable a strengthening of Turkey’s economic and military
position.
-
b.
- Permission to Turkey to purchase from the United States
arms, military aircraft and other military equipment in
order to strengthen the defensive ability of her armed
forces as outlined in SWNCC 202/2/
-
c.
- Consideration to the advisability of supplying selected
U.S. technicians, including officers, for the purpose of
assisting the Turks.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
William D. Leahy
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Staff to
the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
(JCS 1704—Approved as amended 23
August 1946)80
