767.68119/8–746
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)
Subject: Comments on Soviet Proposals of August 7, 1946 for a Revised Régime of the Straits.
1. While the Soviet proposals incorporated the American traffic regulations for the Straits, they depart as widely as possible from the American idea that the Montreux Convention should be revised under the aegis of the United Nations. The Soviet proposals ignore the existence of the United Nations and do not admit the interest of any except Black Sea Powers in the régime of the Straits. Thus France, Great Britain, Greece and Yugoslavia—Montreux signatories—as well as the US (not a signatory), would, by the Russian standard, be excluded from any interest in the Straits.
2. The position taken in the American note of November 2, 1945 was
largely influenced by State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee Paper
No. 169 of July 30, 1945, which states:
In view of the above and aside from our support of the United Nations system, a change in the regime of the Straits along the lines of the Russian proposal would cause grave concern in the War and Navy Departments.
3. The Soviet Government cites certain instances to establish the fact that the Montreux Convention of 1936 “does not meet the interests of the safety of the Black Sea Powers and does not insure conditions under which the use of these Straits for purposes inimical to the Black Sea Powers would be prevented.” The instances cited (July 9, 1941, August 1941, November 4, 1942, and June 1944) did in fact take place but now that the smoke of war has cleared away there is a great deal to be said on the side of the Turks regarding them. The vessels referred to were, so far as the outcome of the war is concerned, inconsequential, a number of them were borderline cases so far as the Montreux definition of war vessels is concerned, and all were disguised as merchant vessels. (In this connection, the Montreux Convention does not recognize as a warship any surface vessel of under 100 tons. The Ems class boats to which the Soviet note refers were 40 to 50 tons. The Kriegstransport or Mannheim class boats were about 800 tons but according to Ambassador Steinhardt’s telegram no. 1083, June 15, 1944,54 “neither type of vessel was specifically covered by the Montreux Convention”. The wartime test of the Montreux Convention showed that it is out of date in respect to war vessel definitions: in 1936 there were no landing barges, LST’s, floating piers, etc.)
In 1941 and 1942 the Turks were in an extremely difficult position, and Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu, a famous international lawyer, insisted on a strict juridical interpretation of questions arising under the Montreux Convention. One of the Turkish defenses against the German threat in 1941 was “correctness”, and Numan was careful during this period to favor neither side. The Soviet, British and American governments protested to Numan in regard to specific Axis vessels when there was evidence or a presumption that they were War vessels disguised as merchantmen in order to keep Axis traffic at a minimum. Numan examined each protest in the light of the terms of the Montreux Convention and acted in accordance with these terms. In 1941 he halted certain Italian vessels; in 1942 he prevented passage of Vichy French vessels.
[Page 832]The utility of the Numan policy to the Allies had diminished by June 1944, when an instance arose in which it was proved that the Turkish authorities had been lax in their first inspection of certain German “merchant” vessels. A second inspection of the vessels at Allied request revealed guns secreted below decks. Allied protests on this occasion caused the Turkish Government to remove Numan from office. Even in this case, however, Allied protests had to rest largely on the “spirit” and not the letter of the Montreux Convention.
In general the Turks in the period of Axis ascendency were stiffly correct, favoring neither side; as Allied fortunes mounted the Turks interpreted the Montreux Convention more and more to favor the Allies. When German troops were cleared from the Greek islands, thus making possible the use of the Straits as a supply route to the Soviet Union, the Turkish Government greeted the first Allied ships with an enthusiastic communiqué welcoming their use of the Straits in the Allied cause.
4. Ankara’s 844 of August 8 indicates that the Turks are not particularly alarmed by the Russian note of August 7 and that they expect to reply in about ten days “after receiving the views of the US and Britain.” The following thoughts appear relevant:
- a)
- The Potsdam agreement stated that each of the three Powers would communicate its views on the Straits question, separately, to the Turkish Government. It did not provide for the reconciliation of these views if they were at variance. Consequently, the Turks in their reply may defend themselves against Soviet allegations regarding their poor custodianship of the Montreux Convention and state their own views regarding what the regime of the Straits should be in the future.
- b)
- Taking into account our interest in the United Nations system, and the probable views of the War and Navy departments, the US should stand upon the position it took on November 2, 1945.
- c)
- The British position will probably be the same as that of the US, because one of the larger issues is whether the United Nations should allow the Soviet Union to force upon Turkey a strictly regional regime of the Straits including joint Soviet-Turkish defense, thus removing from the UN system the Black Sea and its littoral. In this connection, our defense arrangements for the Pacific will have a bearing and may tend to weaken our position of November 2, 1945.
Recommendations: It is suggested that the US should reply to a Turkish request for our views by stating simply that we stand by our November 2, 1945 note. Informally the Turks might be told that the US would not favor any régime of the Straits not fully consonant with the principles of UN, and that the US has noted that Points 4 and 5 of the Soviet proposals omit any reference to the United Nations, and propose the organization of “joint means of defense” [Page 833] (i.e. bilateral arrangements) “to prevent the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea powers.”
If the Turks seek our advice regarding their next step, we can hardly withhold it in the light of the Potsdam conversations and our November 2, 1945 note. Our informal advice might be that the Turks in a friendly manner should inform the USSR of Turkish views regarding the future regimé of the Straits. This might gain time and allow some of the Paris smoke to clear away.55 With more time, the UN defense pattern may emerge more clearly, thus drawing some of the foundation from under the Soviet demand for bilateral defense of the Straits.
The possibility exists that the Turks may consider the Soviet note as a demand for revision within the terms of Article 29 of the Montreux Convention which provides an opportunity to revise the Convention every five years (i.e. in 1946). If the Turks decide on this course it is likely to cause a strong Soviet reaction and to increase the tension between the Soviet Union and the Western powers in a confusing side arena. Turkish motivation might be that they have lived in suspense long enough and that Soviet-Turkish relations should be cleared up before the world without delay. On the other hand, there is a grave question whether the United States and Great Britain would gain in Paris and in UN by taking on the Soviet Union and its Black Sea satellites at a conference in the next few months to revise the Montreux Convention.
- Not printed.↩
- The Paris Peace Conference was in session between July 27 and October 17. For documentation, see volumes iii and iv .↩