Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

891.00/10–846

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs (Minor)

[Washington,], October 8, 1946.

Participants:	Mr. Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador
	Mr. Acheson
	Mr. Minor, MEI

The Iranian Ambassador called today at his request. He said that he wished to emphasize to the Department the seriousness of the situation in Iran. He said that the Province of Azerbaijan is now entirely under the control of the Democrats, who are under Russian influence, so that the central Government has virtually lost control of this important state. In addition to this grave difficulty, the southern part of Iran is now torn by civil strife. Whatever the degree of British complicity in the southern rebellion, the Ambassador gave his opinion that the movement is a normal and natural reaction of the tribes against Russian infiltration into Southern Iran and domination over the central government. It all, in his opinion, goes back to the original “sin” of Russian aggression in northern Iran. Ambassador Ala declared that Iran now stands at a cross road, and the next moves may well determine Iran’s destiny. He stated frankly that, while he has up to this point been sure that Qavam is following a patriotic course designed to protect Iran’s independence, he is not now so sure of this. His general impression is still that Qavam has followed his present course because of necessity, since the Russians are on top of Iran and since little hope of assistance from any other power is evident. Iran, the Ambassador said, continues to pin its hope on the United States. He sincerely believes that Qavam has followed this course by default and that he will alter his course if encouragement is given by the United States.

The situation in Iran is made critical by the fact that Qavam has now agreed to hold elections. The Ambassador said he was at a loss to understand how Qavam could agree to hold elections for the Majlis at a time when Azerbaijan and part of the South are [not?] under the control of the central Government. The elections will certainly have the effect of returning to the Majlis a solid bloc of Soviet dominated deputies from Azerbaijan and possibly from other northern areas. The result of this Soviet bloc will be to give the Russians virtual control of the central Government and all that that entails. If this course of action is carried through, Iran will have lost a major degree of sovereignty.

With this background in mind, Ambassador Ala suggested that the United States should now help Iran in the following three ways:

1. The Iranian case should be reopened before the Security Council by the United States. The Ambassador said that conditions in Iran are much worse than in May when the case was postponed temporarily. With Russian aggression still effective in the North and rebellion in the South, a full inquiry should now be made and a commission sent to Iran to investigate.

2. The United States should express to Iranian officials, through its Ambassador at Tehran, the serious view this Government takes of the trend of events and recommend that the impending elections in Iran should be postponed.

3. In addition to bringing American views to the attention of Soviet officials through our Ambassador, it would be very helpful if this Government could send an official of the State Department to Iran with a more personal message from this Government, to express the American Government’s viewpoint more fully and carefully than could be done by telegraph.

Mr. Acheson assured the Ambassador of the very close interest this Government has in the course of events in Iran. As to the possibility of reopening the Iranian case before the Security Council, Mr. Acheson did not wish to express an off-hand opinion without full consultation on the subject. However, he told the Ambassador frankly that it would be very difficult for this Government to reopen the Iranian case when there is no indication that the Iranian Government has altered the stand it took before the Security Council in the spring when it requested that the Iranian case be dropped from the agenda. We are not at all sure of what the Iranian reaction to such a move might be, and we do not know that Qavam would approve of reopening the case or sending a commission of inquiry. This is a question which should be carefully considered before any action is taken. Concerning the second of the Ambassador’s points, Mr. Acheson said that this Government has on many occasions expressed a great interest in the Iranian affairs and only recently instructed Ambassador Allen⁹³ to express to Qavam the dangers which appear to be inherent in the proposed aviation agreement with Russia. We will continue to take a close interest in Iran and make every effort to implement our declared policy of economic assistance to that country. As to the specific point of recommending to Qavam that elections not be held, Mr. Acheson said he had some misgivings about such definite interferences in Iranian internal affairs. He thought that the appropriate course of action would be to give Qavam assurances of American interest and support so that he might feel strengthened to take whatever action he might feel suitable in the circumstances to protect Iran’s sovereignty. Replying to the third of the Ambassador’s points, Mr. Acheson said that the possibility of sending an official of the State Department to Iran on a special mission will be discussed with officials of the Department. In closing Mr. Acheson said he wished the Ambassador to take away the impression that the United States Government is sincerely interested in Iran and desires to be of assistance at this critical time.

93. The reference is presumably to telegram 844, October 8, to Tehran, infra, which was drafted the previous day.