891.00/10–846
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Ambassador Ala, when he calls on you this afternoon, will probably bring to your attention what he considers to be the very critical situation in Iran and request American assistance at this time. The Ambassador will probably also request that this Government reopen the Iranian case before the Security Council.
Ambassador Ala yesterday informed us of the very serious view taken by him, and shared by the Iranian Ambassador in London, concerning conditions in Iran. The Ambassador feels that Iran has arrived at a crossroad where it must choose between exclusive orientation toward Russia and a more balanced policy within the spirit of the Charter of UN. He believes that the Russians are now exerting the strongest kind of pressure on Qavam to cause elections to be held, even while Azerbaijan is still outside the authority of the central Government and while the tribes in the South are rebelling against strong Russian infiltration throughout Iran. The Ambassador believes that if elections are now held the Russians will consolidate [Page 524] their position in Northern Iran and eventually gain control of the entire country.
Ambassador Allen shares Mr. Ala’s concern. We feel that the situation is critical and that we should do everything within our power to prevent Iran from slipping into the Soviet orbit. I need not elaborate on the consequences for this country of Iran’s falling under Soviet domination. In addition to our political interests in preserving the sovereignty of all small states and in holding the line against Russia in this area, we have discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the matter of US strategic interest in Iran. The JCS is strongly of the opinion that our strategic interest would be greatly harmed by division of Iran into spheres of influence or by Iran’s falling completely under Soviet domination. They hold the view that the oil fields in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq are absolutely vital to the security of this country.
We do not believe that the present Iranian case before the Security Council should be reopened at this time, since it may be contended that Qavam is following a sovereign and voluntary course of action. However, we do feel that some action on the part of this Government is required if Iran’s sovereignty is to be protected and the country prevented from taking immediate action leading to loss of the country’s sovereignty. We feel Qavam is following a pro-Soviet course of action, not because he desires to do so or because he believes it is in the interest of his country. We feel that Qavam is making concession after concession to the Russians of a nature which will eventually undermine the sovereignty of Iran and that one reason for his course of action is our inability to take concrete steps to assist Iran economically or politically. We have had on too many occasions to meet Iran’s requests for assistance in a half-hearted or negative fashion. Unless we can consistently show Qavam by action that he can count on the support of this country, in and out of the United Nations, Iran will, in our opinion, inevitably give way to Russian pressure, with all that such yielding entails for the interest of this country. Specifically, it seems to us that Qavam should be urged to hold fast in the protection of Iran’s sovereignty. He should be encouraged to hope for American assistance in implementing his announced program of reform. He should be encouraged to hope for an American loan for internal development. He should be encouraged to hope for the supply by this country to Iran of combat supplies necessary to maintain internal security. Furthermore, he should be specifically informed at once that the holding of elections before the central Government has resumed its authority over Azerbaijan would represent a step extremely dangerous to the continued independence and sovereignty of Iran.
[Page 525]It is hoped that in your conversation with Ambassador Ala you will be able to give him, for transmission to Qavam, an indication of this country’s real interest in Iran and our resolve to implement fully the declared US policy toward that country. A show of our interest in Iran would be emphasized by sending an official of the State Department to Iran at this time to discuss the whole Iranian problem with Ambassador Allen and to carry a formal message from the President or the Secretary to the Iranian Prime Minister. A good occasion is afforded by the departure of a special plane being sent by the President to Baghdad on October 19 for a period of a week.