501.BC/4–1646: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State
80. The Soviet demand for removal of the Iranian question from the agenda again occupied the attention of the Security Council at a [Page 428] 2-hour meeting Tuesday morning, April 16.92 No decision was reached. The Council will meet again Wednesday afternoon, April 17, at 3:00 o’clock.
Chairman Quo opened the 33rd meeting at 11:11 a.m. All delegates were present. The provisional agenda was adopted without observation.
Dr. Quo announced that he had received letters from the French delegate93 and Secretary General Trygve Lie since the close of Monday’s session. The French letter, proposing the adoption of a resolution on the Iranian case, follows:
“Having again considered at its meetings of the 15 and 16 April, the question which it had placed on its agenda on 26 March 1946 at the request of the Government of Iran and which formed the subject of its resolution of 4 April;
“Takes note of the letter dated 14 [15] April addressed to it by the representative of the Government of Iran in which the latter informs the Security Council of the withdrawal of its complaint;
“Notes that an agreement has been reached between the two Governments concerned;
“Requests the Secretary General to collect the necessary information in order to complete the Security Council’s report to the Assembly, in accordance with article 24 of the Charter on the manner in which it dealt with the case placed on its agenda on 26 March last at the request, now withdrawn, of the Government of Iran.”
Lie’s lengthy letter commented on legal aspects of the Iranian case. Dr. Quo suggested after both letters had been read that Lie’s communication be referred to the Committee of Experts for study and report to the Security Council. He pointed out that the Secretary General’s letter was given to him but a short time before the meeting opened, and inasmuch as it contained a number of legal points the delegates would probably want to study them as well as the Committee of Experts.
Lie’s letter said that it was arguable that, following withdrawal by the Iranian representative, the Iranian question would be automatically removed from the agenda unless the Security Council voted:
- 1.
- An investigation under article 34;
- 2.
- A member brought it up as a situation or dispute under article 35;
- 3.
- The Council proceeded under article 36, paragraph 1, which would appear to require a preliminary finding that a dispute existed under article 33, or that there was “a situation of like nature.”
The Secretary General added:
“An argument which may be made against the view of automatic removal from the agenda is that once a matter is brought to the attention [Page 429] of the Council, it is no longer a matter solely between the original parties, but one in which the Council collectively has an interest, as representing the whole of the United Nations. This may well be true; but it would appear that the only way in which, under the Charter, the Council can exercise that interest is under article 34, or under article 36, paragraph 1. Since the Council has not chosen to invoke Article 34, in the only way in which it can be invoked, i.e.: through voting an investigation, and has not chosen to invoke article 36, paragraph 1, by deciding that a dispute exists under article 33, or that there is a situation of like nature, it may well be that there is no way in which it can remain seized of the matter.”94
The suggestion of the Soviet delegate that the Committee of Experts be given a time limit of 2 days in which to report their findings on the Secretary General’s letter was agreeable to Chairman Quo and other delegates. The Chairman announced that the suggestion that the Committee of Experts report to the Council by Thursday was adopted.
Mr. Stettinius was the first delegate called on at a continuation of the discussion on the Soviet demand to remove the Iranian questions from the agenda.
The U. S. delegate stated he was sorry the Soviet delegate had seen fit Monday, April 15, to question the U.S. motives in the Iranian case. He thought all delegates should avoid indulging in accusations against the motives of any of the United Nations. He pointed out that the only motive of the U.S. was fulfilling the objectives of the UN Charter.
Mr. Stettinius recalled the Soviet position that the entire Security Council action, including the April 4 resolution to defer the issue until May 6, was illegal and not in conformity with the Charter. Mr. Stettinius stated he did not believe that the subsequent Iranian request for withdrawal of the complaint should divert the Council’s attention from this “unjustifiable” Soviet charge. He thought it was within the power of the Council to continue the Iranian question on the agenda, even though Iran had withdrawn its complaint.
The U. S. delegate did not think circumstances justified a reversal of Council’s resolution of April 4. He was of the opinion that it would be unwise for the Council to drop the Iranian matter from its agenda, even though the parties concerned had requested such action. He pointed out that the principal factor in the case was the presence of [Page 430] Soviet troops in Iran after the expiration of the Tripartite Treaty and against the protests of the Iranian Government.
“The Council cannot ignore the fact that the sudden reversal by the Iranian Government of the position which it has steadfastly maintained until yesterday occurred while Soviet troops were still physically in Iran,” the U. S. representative declared.
Retention of the matter on the agenda did not infringe on the sovereign rights or independence of Iran, nor interfere with the agreements already reached between the two parties. On the contrary, it afforded them the opportunity of demonstrating to the Council and to the world that the confidence reposed by the Council in the assurances received in this matter was fully justified, Mr. Stettinius said. He concluded by pointing out that the April 4 resolution would make it possible on May 6 or before if the withdrawal is completed before that date, for the Council to dispose of the Iranian case in conformity with its responsibilities under the Charter.
Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet delegate, said that it was impossible to desire a quick and calm and peaceful settlement of the difference between the Soviet Union and Iran, and at the same time to insist on keeping this question on the agenda. He added that this was the case because it was known to all delegates that the Soviet and Iranian Governments had reached an understanding on all questions at issue between them.
Gromyko described the position taken by the U.S. delegate as “quite illogical”. He acknowledged that he called “things by their names” in the previous day’s discussion and said that he did not expect Mr. Stettinius to agree with him.
Gromyko said that the U.S. argued earlier that the Iranian question should not be deleted from the agenda because Iran did not agree to it. He said that argument was put forth repeatedly by Mr. Byrnes. Now, he asserted the Iranian question did not exist and the only logical conclusion was that it be removed from the agenda.
“However, I observe that the delegate of the U.S. sacrifices logic in order to prolong and inflate the so-called Iranian question,” Gromyko concluded.
The Netherlands delegate believed the issue was the question, “who is master of the Council’s agenda: the Council or States who are parties to a dispute or situation”. He thought it could only be the Council who determined what was and what was not on the agenda. He pointed out that the Council alone admitted a question to its agenda. He thought that it was incontrovertible that the Council alone should decide whether the application of the party to strike a matter off the agenda should be granted. This, he said, was borne out and reenforced by the Charter which clearly gives several organs [Page 431] of UN duties and powers independent of the will of the parties to a dispute.
The Netherlands delegate said that he was afraid that if the Charter were interpreted to give the parties sole power to judge, the door would be wide open for abuses. He added that it would be an incentive to bring displomatic pressure to bear in order that the question placed before the Council be withdrawn from the agenda by the parties who requested it to be placed there.
Speaking for a second time, the U.S. delegate pointed out that the U.S. resolution of April 4 set forth many other reasons than those mentioned by the Soviet delegate.
Chairman Quo advanced China’s views on the question, stating that the Council had an obligation to interest itself in questions coming within the scope of the Charter. He said that the Council had the right to determine the time and manner in which to examine a problem placed before it and that he would stand by the April 4 resolution.
Chairman Quo proposed to put the Soviet demand to delete the Iranian question from the agenda to a vote. The Polish and French delegates suggested that a vote on that question would be out of order, as report from the Committee of Experts on the Secretary General’s letter should come first. The French delegate also said that he would ask for a vote on his resolution, which was submitted by letter at the opening of the meeting, before the Soviet motion when the Committee of Experts had reported.
The Chairman was agreeable to delaying the vote until the Committee of Experts reported. After the question had been discussed by several delegates there was no objection to that procedure.
[Here follow last two paragraphs dealing with matters other than the Iranian question.]
- For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on April 16, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 142–152.↩
- Henri Bonnet.↩
-
For full text of the Secretary-General’s letter of April 16, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 143, or Department of State Bulletin, April 28, 1946, p. 707.
In telegram 81, April 16, 1946, 10:15 p.m., Mr. Stettinius stated: “The United States delegation feels that the communication submitted to the Security Council on April 16, 1946, was drafted with other than purely legal considerations in mind. It is considered extremely dubious practice for the Secretary General to put in an unsolicited interpretation concerning a matter which should be decided by the Council alone. This is particularly true in view of the fact that eight members of the Council had already put forth contrary opinions to those expressed by Mr. Lie.” (501.BC/4–1646)
↩