501.BC/4–1246: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:03 p.m.]
69. To Secretary of State from Stettinius. Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, called upon me at my apartment this morning at 11:15 at his request.
He commenced the interview by saying that he was not feeling at all well, that the strain of recent events was beginning to show on his nerves. He then stated that he thought it would be very helpful for him to have a frank exchange of views with me this morning relative to the Iranian situation, with particular emphasis upon the procedure to be followed at Monday’s83 meeting.
Ala stated that prior to Gromyko submitting his letter to Lie requesting the Iranian matter be taken off the agenda that he had exchanged messages with Qavam in which it was agreed that it was vitally important that the matter be continued on the agenda until May 6. After Gromyko’s letter to Lie was received, Ala communicated with Qavam stating that based upon the understanding that he had had several days previous, he had submitted his letter to Lie stating that Iran was desirous that the matter be continued. Ala said that inasmuch as he did not receive disapproval of this action he has assumed it was in accordance with Qavam’s desires.
Ala then referred to the fact that after the press releases from Tehran in which Qavam was quoted as having said that now that satisfactory arrangements have been made with the Soviet Union the whole question could be dropped by the Security Council, that he had communicated with Qavam, asking whether this was a correct interpretation of his statement. Qavam immediately replied saying that this was not accurate and that he was desirous of the matter remaining on the agenda. Ala then stated that he had heard through reliable [Page 419] sources in the last 48 hours that great pressure was being brought on Qavam to instruct him, Ala, to state before the Security Council that, it would be satisfactory to Iran that the matter be dropped.
Ala said that last night he had sent a very strong message to Qavam stating that in the event of such instructions, if he tcok such a position, he would lose the sympathy of the nation’s position, he would lose the sympathy of the nations who had rallied to Iran’s support in the last 2 weeks, that it would show weakness and indecision, and that he would have great difficulty in ever getting the Iranian question before the Security Council again if it were taken off the agenda. Ala then added to me personally that if Qavam sent him instructions to take the Iranian matter off the agenda of the Security Council, he would not execute those instructions and would resign.
Ala then inquired as to what I felt the procedure would be on Monday afternoon and whether it was likely that he would be called to the table. I replied saying that I thought it was unlikely that he would be called to the table and it would be best from the Iranian standpoint that he not be. That I felt the normal procedure would be for the chairman to ask the Soviet representative if he desired to supplement his written statement with an oral statement; that after the Soviet statement was made undoubtedly several countries would immediately make statements defending the Byrnes resolution; and that I had every reason to believe that the Council would decline to alter that resolution and would insist on the Iranian matter remaining on the agenda until May 6. Ala stated that this would be an ideal solution from his standpoint.
[Here follows Mr. Ala’s analysis of various matters and his statement concerning a remark attributed to Mr. Gromyko that he might not be present at the Security Council meeting if he, Ala, were called to the table and participated in the deliberations.]
- April 15.↩