861.24591/4–1146: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
us urgent niact
[Received April 12—5:19 a.m.]
510. At 7 tonight Jernegan saw Qavam and delivered carefully and fully substance of message contained your telegram 295, April 10.
Prime Minister who appeared dejected, said that he had seen Soviet Ambassador less than hour previously. Sadchikov had told him that Iranian insistence on continuance of case before Security Council was insult to USSR and would not be tolerated. After signature of agreements of April 4 there was no reason for keeping matter before SC. Iranian attitude indicated lack of confidence in Soviet word and would strain relations between two Governments.
Qavam had argued that present status of question before SC did no harm but eventually, under insistent pressure by Sadchikov, he had promised to telegraph Ala to withdraw case from Council.
Jernegan urged that he reverse that decision, pointing out danger that he would lose UNO support and find himself facing Soviets alone. In negotiations so far Iran had been able make reasonably satisfactory arrangements with USSR only because of SC support. Without that I bulwark she would be entirely in hands of Russians. Jernegan added that Soviet action in bringing pressure to have case withdrawn was itself highly suspicious. It would seem better for Qavam to continue to pin his faith in SC despite Russian threats, especially in view of fact he had successfully defied previous threats when he first appealed to Council.
Prime Minister admitted force these arguments but insisted he could not refuse Soviet demand that he change Ala’s instructions. He remarked that when dealing with lion you must cajole it and feed it, not attempt to match your claws against his. He felt position was extremely difficult. If he antagonized Soviets now he might lose all he had gained. Among other things Russians might break off economic negotiations at present in progress and also make impossible his contemplated negotiations with Azerbaijanis.
At end of hour of discussion he made following request: That Embassy should report circumstances to you, explaining dilemma in which he found himself, and ask if United States could not so arrange matters in SC that favorable attitude toward Iran could be maintained even if she acquiesced in withdrawal of case now. Being in full position [possession?] of facts, he hoped you would understand and be prepared again to come to Iran’s aid if necessary. Meanwhile, he would withhold despatch of new instructions to Ala until we had had reply from you, putting Sadchikov off with some excuse or other. When Jernegan suggested that US delegation to SC might continue [Page 418] to be sympathetic but could not guarantee attitude of other members, Qavam said he thought US and Britain between them should be able manage it.
Jernegan expressed regret that Prime Minister found himself unable definitely to refuse Soviet demand and promised to convey his request to you immediately.
Request urgent reply.