Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

740.00119 Council/7–3146: Telegram

The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State⁴³

secret
urgent

Sofia, July 31, 1946—11 a.m.
[Received 8:40 p.m.]

595. For Delsec personal for Matthews⁴⁴ I realize how overburdened Secretary and all of you must be but same time feel that following points should receive attention on high level.

1. In my telegram 67, June 21 (personal to Secretary in Paris and to Department as 469) I said that for some time Opposition leaders had accepted force of contention that benefits of treaty providing for withdrawal of Russian troops would in end exceed any momentary advantage for Opposition of United States carrying policy of non-recognition to extreme of refusing to sign satisfactory treaty with Bulgarian Government. There followed in same telegram statement of material reasons why circumstances required renewed effort to implement Moscow decision.

2. My telegram 138, July 29, (for Delsec and repeated to Department as 588)⁴⁵ recommended that we and British tell official Bulgarian delegation to Peace Conference that when Government reorganized on basis sufficiently broad to assume obligation in name of whole Bulgarian people to carry out treaty, United States prepared to sign Bulgarian peace.

3. To reconcile any discrepancy that may at first glance appear to exist between these two telegrams, I must point out that:

(a) Telegram 138 sent after learning that in conversations in Paris several weeks ago Molotov and Vyshinski took position that efforts to implement Moscow decision impossible until after elections for Grand National Assembly;

(b) In meantime Bulgarian Government enacted legislation to assure that Communists shall dictate country’s political future for long time to come unless reorganization government can be forced before peace signature (my telegram 587, July 29, repeated Paris 137);⁴⁶

(c) Since return General Biryusov June 21 (my telegram 471, June 22, repeated for Delsec as 68)⁴⁷ intensified terror, more brutal and repressive measures against Opposition and army and civil administration purge have greatly worsened political conditions throughout country. At risk of being tiresome I call attention to following brief list intervening telegrams reporting this state of affairs: 473, June 22 (70 for Delsec), 480, June 25 (74 for Delsec) 487, June 26 (80 for Delsec) 494, June 28 (84 for Delsec), 531, July 12 (111 for Delsec), 541, July 16 (not repeated Delsec), 542, July 16 (114 for Delsec) 553 July 19 (120 for Delsec), 567, July 23 (128 for Delsec) 587, July 27 (137 for Delsec), 590, July 29 (140 for Delsec).⁴⁸ In this connection I feel that I should again draw attention to views of British representatives here reported final paragraph my telegram 572, July 24 (130 for Delsec),⁴⁹

4. Department’s telegram 238, July 25 [26] just received telling me of Secretary’s reply several weeks ago to Molotov that non-recognition of Bulgaria should not delay agreement on Bulgarian treaty; that United States prepared to proceed with Bulgarian treaty at Paris Conference and to have final text drawn and signed by Council of Foreign Ministers, but that there might be some difficulty in connection with ratification if Moscow Agreement not carried out. Of course this reply was made before Secretary had knowledge of certain of developments reported telegrams listed above.

5. I believe that review these telegrams will lead you and Secretary to same conclusion I have reached. This is that if Secretary still of opinion expressed to Molotov, notwithstanding what has transpired here in meantime, especially enactment two laws reported my telegram 587, July 27 (137 for Delsec), then in justice to opposition its leaders should be informed of United States position well in advance of actual signature.

6. Should we allow opposition to prepare participate in elections for GNA without this knowledge, I am sure strong body of opinion in Bulgaria would feel we had “let down” democratic elements of country. I say this because it would appear to all, government parties, opposition parties, public in general, and Russians as well, that in signing peace with government that since return of Biryusov has thrown to winds all restraints in sense of Yalta Agreement, we would in fact be whitewashing (see views my British colleague and General Oxley reported my telegram 572, 130 for Delsec) regime already on several occasions “publicly condemned as repressive of most elementary democratic freedoms” (Department’s telegram 202, July 5 to Sofia)⁵⁰ by ourselves and United Kingdom. I feel under these circumstances that opposition would conclude only one possible course of resistance left, namely, abstention from GNA elections in hope imposing incubus of illegality on regime to be set up by new constitution. I should add that at present time opposition planning to participate, but this plan based on their own estimate (hope at any rate) that United States and United Kingdom will not sign peace with government they have already publicly condemned.

For urgent personal reasons I propose to take brief leave Paris shortly after August 10 if Department and you perceive no overriding objection. (Matthews and Department please reply by telegram on this point.) I do not wish to intrude either on Secretary’s time or your time, but if opportunity were to present itself while I am in Paris to discuss subject matter this telegram, I should be deeply gratified.⁵¹

Sent Paris; repeated Department 595.

Barnes

43. This telegram was relayed by the Department as telegram 3799, Secdel 574, August 2, 1946, to Paris, for the Secretary who was serving as United States Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
44. H. Freeman Matthews, Director, Office of European Affairs; Political Adviser, United States delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.
45. Not printed.
46. Not printed; it reported that the National Assembly has passed legislation for a referendum on September 8 on the question of the establishment of a republic and for the convening of a Grand National Assembly on October 27 which would prepare a new constitution. According to Barnes: “Formula of transition to Republic and for the drafting and adoption of the new Constitution as embodied in the projects that have now been enacted as law will preclude effective participation of opposition in formation of the new Bulgarian regime unless between now and outset of the electoral compaign for Grand National Assembly way is found to reorganize present government to include opposition.” (874.00/7–2746)
47. Not printed, but see footnote 20, p. 108.
48. Of the telegrams cited here, only Nos. 531, July 12, and 542, July 16, are printed; see pp. 116 and 118, respectively.
49. The final paragraph of telegram 572, July 24, 1946, from Sofia, reads as follows: “Houstoun-Boswall and General Oxley are strongly of view that if considerations of high policy permit UK should not sign peace with present Bulgarian Government or in any way deal with it in manner that might be interpreted in Balkans, or by anyone who knows facts about present-day Bulgaria, process of ‘whitewashing’ Moscow-created Bulgarian police Government. They stated this view 2 days ago in reply to direct query from Mr. Bevin, adding that if considerations of overall policy dictates conclusion of peace with present non-representative and Communist dominated Government then necessity for such course be publicly explained to effect that UK has not abandoned its moral principles, that it continues to condemn present state of affairs in Bulgaria, but has bowed to superior requirements of moment for formal peace.” (740.00119 E.W./7–2446)
50. Not printed.
51. In telegram 3784, August 2, 1946, from Paris, Matthews expressed delight at the opportunity of seeing Barnes in Paris after August 10. Barnes left Sofia for Paris on August 11.