Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

Lot M–88: Yugoslavia–Folder III

Memorandum of Transatlantic Teletype Conference, August 31, 1946, 2:20 p.m.

August 31, 1946, 2:20 p.m.

secret

Paris Conferees:	Mr. Byrnes
	Mr. Cohen51
	Col. Bonesteel
Washington Conferees:	Mr. Dean Acheson
	Mr. John D. Hickerson52

Mr. Byrnes Speaking: As to Yugoslavia, we have sent a telegram to Patterson to be presented by him to the Yugoslav Government advising that Government of the contents of the messages Patterson had sent us stating in the last paragraph that if he does not receive from Tito a statement denying the accuracy of his statements he will regard that as confirmation of his messages to our Government. A copy has been forwarded you.⁵³

I am anxious to find a way to accept Tito’s regrets and promises and not be in the position of quarrelling merely about it not being in writing.

I am more troubled by the statement you made yesterday as to the indemnities⁵⁴ though we should have anticipated that in view of our message to Tito some correspondent would ask what course our Government would now take. In view of our former statement to Tito you could make no other answer. But my fear is that if we ask for indemnities, Tito having refused to confirm in writing his statements to our representatives, will not hesitate to refuse to pay indemnities. It will be our move then and it will be a difficult decision. Matthews has wired to ascertain whether we have any funds of Yugoslavia frozen. If so, we could announce that we would hold until indemnity was paid. I would like to know in case we have no funds what course you suggest we take when Tito refuses to pay.

I have given consideration your message as to my desire to stop giving aid to Yugoslavia. I agree the only course would be economic sanctions. I have wondered whether in case you had no concrete suggestion as to the enforcement of our demand for indemnities we could use economic sanctions until amount of indemnity was paid.

Mr. Acheson Speaking: The question and answer yesterday regarding indemnities were against the background of a question by Elmer Davis last week whether our note of August 21 meant that we were interested only in the living and were ready to forget about the dead.

Yugo Government has 46 million dollars gold frozen in U.S. We have offered to unfreeze enough to pay Jugo quotas International Bank and Fund, totaling about one million.

We could continue to hold the remainder or any desired portion thereof as security for indemnities.

In this situation we might hold the Yugo funds until the indemnities were paid or the claim was taken by both parties to the World Court and decided by it.

Mr. Byrnes: We want you to release the statement answering Tito’s charges about violations of Yugo territory by our planes. Colonel Bonesteel has sent all information to General Lincoln and asked him to contact you.

I assume you will not issue any statement until you hear from Patterson as to the conversation he was to have with Tito at eleven this morning.

Mr. Acheson: We are not clear whether your reference to Tito’s charges means those of August 20 or whether you have also received the Yugo note delivered here yesterday and cabled you last night. This charges further numerous violations of Yugo territory on August 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27. Have you received it with our comment?

Mr. Byrnes: We have just been handed the note to which you refer. It does not have any of your comments. The military statement prepared by General Lincoln should answer the charges made in this recent note as well as those made in the former statements by the Yugoslavs.

Mr. Acheson: The Yugo note yesterday was a stinker. Does your note through Patterson and the proposed statement refuting charges answer Yugo note adequately?

This note takes an aggressive attitude and seems to imply that Tito will withdraw his instructions not to fire on planes unless all violations cease.

Mr. Byrnes: Your message NR 4520 has just been handed us in the Embassy.

Bonesteel says that Lincoln now in possession of all the facts we have here. Arrangements are made for Air Headquarters Weisbaden to stand by today for possible telecon from Lincoln if he needs any further clarification or information. Bonesteel will continue to report immediately to Lincoln and we will take no action here of any kind without communication with you.

When I previously referred to the Military statement to be prepared by General Lincoln I had reference to the statement of facts he would prepare for inclusion in your newspaper release.

In replying I suggest that you reiterate the precautions we are taking to prevent our planes from flying over Yugoslav territory assuming that Patterson’s conversation with Tito today does not change situation and you do issue a statement, you might refer to Tito’s expressed willingness to confer with us as to distress signals and state that our Military representatives are authorized to meet, at such time and place as he may designate, the Military representatives of Yugoslavia in order to work out agreed distress signals to be used in case any planes because of weather, loss of direction or mechanical difficulty are forced over Yugoslav territory.

Your message just handed me as to censorship of our radio bulletin causes me to believe that information as to our demand message is just reaching Tito’s people and he wishes to divert attention by this indictment as to continued violations. In the light of the positive instructions issued I am satisfied American planes have not been flying over Yugoslav territory.

Mr. Acheson: May I review your instructions to be clear about them.

We are to await a message from Patterson and then release statement based on information received from Lincoln. We are also to reply to Yugo note as you have instructed. Are we to release Yugo note and our reply? Are we also to release Patterson note if his conversation is satisfactory? Or should we describe these messages in our press statement?

Mr. Byrnes: Await message from Patterson and if his statement satisfactory then issue a statement as to Patterson’s conversation and also including the information furnished by Lincoln answering Tito’s charges. It seems to me that it would be better to issue a statement describing these messages rather than to issue the message of Patterson and to Tito.

I leave entirely to your discretion the decision whether you issue one statement for the press describing the messages of Patterson and Tito or whether you give to the press the several messages. Our thought is that it may be advisable to publish Tito’s messages but paraphrase Patterson’s report.

Reading the message from Tito (Your 798⁵⁵) he charges that on 23rd there were flight by three bombers, three fighters and one transport, and similar charges as to the 24th. You will recall that we stopped all flights over that route on the 20th and did not authorize resumption of traffic until 25th when one bomber was supposed to go but because of bad weather turned back. It is entirely possible that British planes or Russian planes flew over their territory.

Mr. Acheson: Do we also send to Yugoslav Embassy here a note replying to its latest along lines your instructions this morning? And do we also release these messages or describe them in our discretion?

Mr. Byrnes: My thought is that you make no reply to Yugo until we get Patterson’s statement, then our reply should be one complete statement, reviewing the facts as to the planes and stating our position as to indemnities and everything else.

Let me try once more to state my views as to publications. I think there should be prepared a complete statement setting forth our whole case. The statement should include in full the statements of Tito but should paraphrase the reports of Patterson. This statement should be sent to Tito and at the same time should be given to the press.⁵⁶

Mr. Acheson: We understand and have only one question. Do you wish us to send the document to you for approval before delivery and release? It may take several days to prepare it depending on what we get from Patterson and Army.

Mr. Byrnes: In view of information War Department has it should not take more than a day. If you could have someone put it on the teletype as I would like to see it. If the teletype is not working it would be too much delay to send it to me. I want you to know that I still expect you to go on that holiday.

Mr. Acheson: Thank you very much. We shall do as you instruct and will finish it today if Patterson comes through. If not Will Clayton and the boys will carry on.

Mr. Byrnes: I am leaving now but we are sending a draft release prepared several days ago by Col. Bonesteel which might be of some service.

51. Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State.
52. Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.
53. See last paragraph of telegram printed supra.
54. Regarding the Acting Secretary’s statements on indemnities at a press conference on August 27, see telegram 4520, August 30, to Paris, p. 936.
55. Telegram 4521, Secdel 798, August 30, to Paris, not printed, transmitted the text of the Yugoslav Chargé’s note of August 30, p. 934.
56. For text of the note of September 3, 1946 from the Acting Secretary of State to the Yugoslav Chargé, released to the press on the same day, see Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1946, p. 501.