Caserta Mission Files: Lot 52 F 17: 711.9 VG 1946: Telegram
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Morgan)
top secret
[Washington,] 5 July, 1946.
W 93570. This is message Fan 678. Naf 115690 and Naf 1166 refer.
- 1.
- Political estimate is that gain from movement at this time of a Regimental Combat Team from US Forces, European Theater would not be commensurate with risk that Yugoslavs will maintain or even increase tension by countermoves which we can not match. With [Page 908] consideration of the unlikely probability of a general Jugoslav attack, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that the RCT will not be moved at this time.
- 2.
- As to the Jugoslav detachment, it is desired to point out that, since Jugoslavia is an ally, a member of the United Nations, and the detachment is in Zone “A” as a result of the Morgan-Jovanovic Agreement, any request for withdrawal is considered politically impracticable at this time. Meanwhile, you should forward a report of constant breaches of orders, interference, et cetera, reported in paragraph 4 B of Naf 1166.
- 3.
- Accommodation. We agree that if we are forced to remain in Venezia Giulia throughout the winter it will be necessary to provide hutted camps. We feel, however, that a decision on this should be deferred until we can gauge from the results of current Paris Conference whether the requirement is likely to arise.
- 4.
- Withdrawal from Pola. There are the following strong objections to
permitting withdrawal from Pola at your discretion:
- (a)
- Withdrawal from Pola would be regarded as prejudging any decision on the future of Venezia Giulia.
- (b)
- It would be regarded by Italians as a sign that we were giving way to the Jugoslav demands.
- (c)
- It would be contrary to your own statement that it is firm intention of British and Americans to maintain present position in Venezia Giulia until agreed settlement has been reached.
- (d)
- It would strengthen military position of the Jugoslavs and give them free use of the port of Pola.
- (e)
- In general, it would greatly encourage Jugoslavs to intensify intransigent attitude.
- 5.
- Whereas we agree that Pola is militarily untenable once hostilities have broken out, we consider that on all grounds our garrison should remain there as long as possible. You should therefore make such arrangements now as you consider necessary for evacuation of Pola but should not carry out evacuation without our prior approval unless hostilities break out, in which case you may withdraw garrison without our prior approval if you consider it militarily necessary to do so.