SWNCC Files: SWNCC 313 Series: Telegram
The Military Adviser on the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Lincoln) to the War Department
top secret
Paris, 1 July, 1946.
OCD 26. For COS for Norstad personal.
- 1.
- Given below is a suggested draft message in reply to Naf 1166 which is Byrnes view and which has been read and agreed by Bevin. I have inserted phraseology to make it a military directive if it is accepted by JCS and CCS. Bevin is sending this draft to Foreign Office and British chiefs as his political view with suggestion that instructions be sent to British Staff Mission. Lee is here and probably [Page 906] will ask for a copy of draft to take with him when he returns to Caserta tomorrow.
- 2.
- Reasons for suggested action in succeeding paragraph will be sent in separate message.
- 3.
- Follows the substance of suggested directive.
- (a).
- State Department and Foreign Office view is that withdrawals of troops from Pola, unless coincident with general Yugoslav attack, would create a gravely adverse political situation. Hence you should not withdraw except on direction of the CCS or upon development of what you estimate to be a general organized Yugoslav attack against our lines.
- (b).
- As to Yugoslavia in zone A, State Department and Foreign Office point out: Yugoslavia is an ally, and a member of United Nations and detachment is present on basis of Morgan-Jovanovic agreement. Hence a request for withdrawal is politically impracticable, at least until detachment has failed to obey orders of such substance as to be comprehensible to world public opinion. Even then it may not be politically desirable to open the matter since Yugoslavia would probably reject the request or might use it as an excuse to reopen whole Morgan–Jovanovic agreement.
- (c)
- As to move of RCT, political estimate is that gain therefrom is not commensurate with risk that Yugoslavs will maintain or even increase tension by countering with reinforcement of zone B for which Yugoslavs have a certain capability which we cannot match. Taking account the unlikely probability of a general Yugoslav attack the CCS have decided the RCT will not be moved at this time.
- (d).
- It is considered that a general organized Yugoslav attack is unlikely. It is a possibility however. Your plans and preparations for such a possibility should be on basis that all forces available in Italy, including Poles and such Italians as you estimate can be utilized, will be available for your operations in any area. Prior to development of such a general attack you are authorized to use Poles and Italians in any areas of Italy except zone A and the portion of Udine claimed by the Soviets for Yugoslavia; until development of such a possible general attack you should use Poles in forward areas as sparingly as possible, consulting frequently with your political advisers on the problem.
- (e).
- In the event of a general attack by the Yugoslav Army, while making every effort to hold in general the status quo, (reference Fan 65389), your course of action should be consistent with maintaining the Allied forces tactically intact.
- (f).
- On the basis of your previous directives and the foregoing, you should prepare plans for the initial operations in the unlikely possibility of a general Yugoslav attack coordinating with USFET, BTA and CINCMED, who will be furnished copies of this directive with appropriate instructions by their respective chiefs of staff.