861.00/10–3146: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State
urgent
4017. Since despatch Embtel 3354 of August 30 evaluating situation home front, considerable more evidence has come to hand from official and unofficial sources and travellers tending to confirm general discontent, production below prewar level, and patent desire of people for easier life. Drastic decrees on collective farming, attacking intelligentsia, and Party activity coupled with all-out Party campaign to increase production and canalize public thinking back into well-worn Leninist-Stalinist groove, are further evidence of seriousness with which authorities are attacking internal situation. These developments have been subject of separate reports.
Situation may be summed up as follows: people are tired, disillusioned, they do not resist tightening up of Marxist straight jacket when they had expected peace to bring better life and continuance of wartime relaxation of ideological pressures.
Soviet economic and political system although 29 years old still required complex and drastic control machinery. Party and Govt endeavoring to use all methods to tighten these controls, although in so doing they tend to unsettle already low morale. While authorities still using “imperialist” war scare to spur people to further efforts, [Page 797] this spectre was apparently pushed too far, necessitating Stalin’s fleeting assurance in letter to Werth that war not imminent.
While considerable number of arrests and some publicly announced executions on criminal charges have taken place, they are so far primarily of “horrible example” type rather than anything resembling a purge similar to that of 1936–38. These difficulties in their present magnitude do not, however, constitute threat to stability of regime or serious obstacle to carrying out of its chartered policies which authorities will endeavor to carry out on internal and external front notwithstanding internal hardships or conciliatory tone of Stalin’s replies to Baillie. Unless this is understood, aggressive foreign policy pursued by Soviet authorities, particularly during the year, might at first glance appear to be inconsistent with home front difficulties. Following reasons may further explain this apparent contradiction.
- 1.
- While authorities realize Western World will make determined effort to prevent further Soviet expansion, they apparently are also convinced that West will not, at least for time being, go to war to force Soviet withdrawal from any area already under their control.
- 2.
- Having learned on basis of experience after first World War that they could not count on spontaneous revolutions, Soviet leaders seek at this time to accomplish what they were unable to do then, namely, extend their control and introduce their type of Marxian political and economic system as far as possible while Soviet Army is in control in these areas. They hope that by continuing pressure all along line they can at least consolidate these gains now (Eastern Europe, Balkans) by obtaining reluctant acquiescence of other powers to their position in these areas. In event of another world war, which according to their continually emphasized Marxian theory is inevitable, they hope to be strong enough to extend their system yet further.
- 3.
- Their continuing diplomatic offensive coupled with seemingly conciliatory attitude in Werth and Baillie replies are designed to confuse and disrupt West, prevent rest of world forming solid front which would oppose consolidation of their present gains and future Soviet expansion. They apparently expect that by continuing diplomatic offensive eventually people of other countries will tire and lose interest in situation in Soviet periphery. Furthermore, they hope that economic crisis in capitalist world, which they believe to be inevitable and will do all possible to expedite, will do [so?] distract attention and weaken other powers that Soviets can further consolidate their position and gain time in which to strengthen their war potential. Emphasis given in Soviet press to inevitable economic difficulties in US and elsewhere given [give] credence to this belief, and it is probable that through their influence in trade union groups outside Soviet Union they are actively fostering economic difficulties abroad.
- 4.
- Since new Soviet postwar prestige is at stake in all peace settlements which are not favorable to them or their clients, it is natural for Soviet authorities to “throw their weight around” in order to maintain that prestige.
- Printed from corrected copy received October 31, 8 p.m.↩