761.00/9–2546: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received 6:14 p.m.]
3572. Stalin’s answers to questions posed by Alec Werth represent in our opinion tactical maneuver rather than pronouncement of strategic policy.
Stalin’s statements seem to have two immediate tactical aims:
- (1)
- To strengthen elements in USA advocating appeasement of USSR. Stalin’s release of his exchange with Werth is timed to capitalize on Wallace affair.
- (2)
- To tempt British Government elements with prospect of collaboration with USSR in hope that this might develop rift between USA and British which according to Stalinist doctrine must culminate in conflict between two last strongholds of capitalism. This move is a follow up on overtures made to Labor Party representatives who visited USSR some weeks ago.
At the same time Stalin’s comments may have wider connotations. We say this because several of Stalin’s statements, conspiciously his denial of capitalist encirclement, seem to contradict ideological line vigorously plugged since February. We shall not know for some time to come whether Stalin’s replies to Werth signify a broad departure to a new tactical line. We would suggest however possibility of following parallel:
Early this year Soviet policy in Iran utilized tactics of open military intervention and intimidation. Kremlin apparently counted on [Page 787] post-war demoralization of Western democracies to render UNO ineffective. Early in March it became evident that policy of saber rattling and bluff in Iran was not going to work against aroused conscience and determination of Western Powers. Stalin’s reply to questions posed by AP correspondent Gilmore regarding Soviet attitude towards UNO was one of symptoms of Soviet change of tactics in Iran from overt intimidation to covert political machination.
During past several months USSR has been talking and acting tough to Western democracies. These tactics have failed to intimidate USA and Britain. Rather they have resulted in increased firmness in American and British policy. Final demonstration of resolute American policy was showdown on Wallace. Stalin may now estimate that he had best change his truculent tune. He may feel that his bluff had been called and from now on he would do well to follow a somewhat more circumspect policy. If this is so his replies to Werth are probably indicative of the new line.
There are valid domestic reasons, as well as foreign ones, for possible revision of foreign policy pursued heretofore. Overall reason may be that Stalin is not able to back up, excepting in most immediate terms and only in certain areas, truculent foreign policy. Soviet industry is in comparatively bad shape. Rate of reconstruction and new construction is by American standards unbelievably slow. Difficulties have grown up in collective farm system which is now being radically overhauled. There are symptoms of uneasiness and discontent in armed forces. Intelligentsia, which should be a source of enthusiasm and spiritual vitality, has been considerably demoralized as result of dragooning by Communist Party. This unhealthy situation has been aggravated by anxiety of Soviet public over constant hammering by Soviet propaganda of possibility of new world war. This anxiety, as we have pointed out, has not contributed to Soviet morale.
Whether foregoing foreign and domestic reasons for tactical change in line will be acted upon remains, as stated above, to be seen. Stalin may choose to allow apparent contradiction between his replies to Werth and recent published party line to remain unresolved. Or he may feel that Soviet propaganda should adopt somewhat more conciliatory tone. There are precedents in past Soviet policy for either course.
Whatever tactical course he follows there is no reason to believe that it involves any change in basic long term strategy.
Dept please repeat to Tokyo and Nanking. Also to Paris as Moscow’s 377.