861.00/6–2146: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State9
priority
[Received June 21—3:24 p.m.]
1964. London please pouch immediately to Paris for Secretary.
Columbia Broadcasting correspondent Hottelet interviewed Litvinov June 18 in latter’s office. As Litvinov was very outspoken, Hottelet has not used material from interview. He has reported it to us for Dept’s and our information and requests that its substance be conveyed to Murrow of CBS for his background information only. Report follows and should obviously be handled with great discretion.10
Discussing international situation, Litvinov said outlook was bad and it seemed to him differences between East and West have gone too far to be reconciled. Asked cause of this he said that as far as he was concerned root cause was ideological conception prevailing here of inevitability of conflict between Communist and capitalist worlds. It seemed to him that there had once been chance that two worlds would be able to exist side by side but that was obvious no longer case. There has now been return in USSR to outmoded concept of geographical security.11
In discussing principles being explored now to find basis of cooperation, Litvinov said basis of cooperation must be agreement among [Page 764] great powers. Obviously Haiti or Denmark could not threaten world peace and it is not unreasonable for USSR to be suspicious of any forum in which she would constantly be outvoted. Hottelet asked how this present chasm could be bridged. Litvinov answered, I won’t say until they call on me and they certainly will not call on me.12 Hottelet asked him if he was sure he would not be called upon and he replied, I am positive. He said I am an observer and I am glad to be out of it. His whole attitude in this part of conversation was one of passive resignation. Hottelet asked what chances would be of postponing any conflict between East and West long enough to allow new and younger men to grow up and take over. His answer was, what difference does it make if the young men are educated intensively in precise spirit of the old.
Hottelet asked if he had heard of Baruch’s suggestion13 to turn atomic secrets over to International Control Board and said that this seemed to him to be a most dramatic crystallization of world’s current dilemma, and asked what would USSR do—whether she would accept international control or refuse it. Litvinov reflected for a moment and said there was a vast difference between subscribing to principle of international control and actually subjecting oneself to rigid inspection. Hottelet asked him specifically whether USSR was likely to go whole way. He said he thought USSR was unlikely to submit to inspection. Hottelet asked him if suspicion which seems to be large motivating force in Soviet policy would be mitigated if West were suddenly to give in and grant all Russian demands, like Trieste, Italian colonies, et cetera—whether that would lead to easing of situation. He said it would lead to West being faced after period of time with next series of demands.
Discussing question of mutual suspicion, topic of genuine security versus imperialist aggression was dwelt on. Litvinov said Hitler probably genuinely felt that his demands were justified, that he wanted Lebensraum. Hitler was probably genuinely convinced that his actions were preventive and forced on him by external circumstance. Advantages that accrue to any totalitarian govt through its possibility of ignoring its public opinion were discussed. Litvinov volunteered that there was nothing one could do inside a totalitarian state to change it. He said that Italian and German people did not revolt even in face of most dreadful punishment. In 1792 French [Page 765] people could storm arsenals, grab muskets and make revolution, but today people would need artillery, tanks, radio stations, printing presses, all of which are held tightly in the hands of any totalitarian state. That is why it would be terribly difficult, for instance, to dislodge Franco. Even for a palace revolution one would need support of army and police.
Switching back to atomic bomb, Hottelet asked whether since gas was outlawed and not used during World War II, what he thought chances were, of atomic bomb not being used in event of another war. Litvinov said that depends on attitude of people who have an atomic bomb. If one side thinks it can bring about quick victory by use of atomic bombs then temptation will be great. If evenly matched and if one side feels that its immense area and manpower, resources and dispersed industry safeguard it to large extent, it will not be too loath to use it. This would be especially true where public opinion has no weight, where state leadership has completely conditioned public mind. Hottelet asked why present leaders who are after all astute and capable men cling to a patently outworn idea that a river or mountain range or 1,000 kilometers of ground would provide security. Litvinov answered, because they are conservative in their thinking and still follow old lines.
Germany was discussed. It was Litvinov’s opinion that it would obviously be broken up into two parts. Since all Allies professed to want unified Germany Hottelet asked would it not somehow be possible to find single solution. Litvinov answered each side wants unified Germany under its control. It was his opinion that of all single problems in world today, Germany was greatest problem.
At end of conversation Litvinov underscored that he was a private citizen speaking his own individual ideas.
Extent of this statement to a newly arrived correspondent is simply amazing to us.
Sent Dept 1964, repeated London 290 for Ambassador.
- The Secretary of State was in Paris attending the Second Session, Second Part, of the Council of Foreign Ministers. This telegram was sent to the Department as 1964 and repeated to London as 290. A copy was teletyped to Paris for the Secretary on June 21.↩
- This interview was not disclosed at the time. Litvinov died on December 31, 1951. Thereafter Richard C. Hottelet prepared five articles about this interview which were published in the Washington Post during January of 1952 as follows: January 21, p. 1; January 22, p. B–11; January 23, p. 13; January 24, p. 13; and January 25, p. 21.↩
- Ambassador Smith had already reported in telegram 1632, May 24, 2 p.m., from Moscow, that in a private conversation on the previous day Litvinov had remarked that “toward the end of the War and directly afterwards I had hoped for real international cooperation, but wrong decisions have been made and of the two paths which might have been taken, the wrong one has been chosen. I now feel that the best that can be hoped for is a prolonged armed truce”. (761.00/5–2446)↩
- Earlier in telegram 1024, April 2, 1946, from Moscow, the Ambassador had confirmed the belief that “as far as we are aware there has been no alteration iu his real position, which is one of semi-retirement.” (861.00/4–246)↩
- Bernard M. Baruch, the representative of the United States to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, at the opening session in New York on June 14, 1946, gave an address on “Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority.” For text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 23, 1946, p. 1057.↩