Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

741.61/3–1446: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

secret
urgent

Moscow, March 14, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received 6:20 p.m.]

809. Significance of Stalin’s interview⁵³ on Churchill’s speech is naturally subject of most intense interest among foreign observers here today. Following points strike our attention.

(1) Interview is not an attempt to deal in any serious or objective way with Churchill’s statements, but a polemic, obviously drawn up for home consumption, in which Churchill’s remarks (which were basically defensive in character) are misinterpreted to Soviet public as evidence of strong sentiment in West for new “intervention” against Soviet Union.

(2) Taken together with Pravda editorial and Tarle’s article,⁵⁴ this interview represents most violent Soviet reaction I can recall to any foreign statement.

(3) Above would indicate that Kremlin had tactical reasons of high importance and urgency for seizing this speech and presenting it to Soviet public, not for what it was, but for what Kremlin wished it to appear.

(4) Churchill’s speech was made at moment when Soviet leaders have committed themselves to an aggressive course of action in Iran, character of which has been correctly spotted, analyzed and brought before world opinion by our Govermnent and British Government. In other words, their play has been called. Lightly as they may take possibilities for direct and immediate UNO sanctions against USSR in Iranian affair, they know that policy they are following in Iran must, if further pursued, have deep and unfortunate repercussions on great power relations and collaboration. These repercussions will be so great that they cannot be concealed from Soviet people. This will be source of concern and disappointment to large elements in this country, including possibly influential ones. If Soviet public got impression that such a turn of events had been provoked by arrogant and unnecessary policies of Soviet regime itself, this might lead to widespread and inconvenient discontent. To obviate this, Soviet public is now being taught, with help of Churchill’s speech, that important elements in England and America have serious aggressive plans against USSR. In light of such interpretation, subsequent Soviet actions in Iran can be portrayed, when time comes, as general measure of security on part of a Russia hemmed in by threatening aggressors, and any subsequent censure of Soviet Union in UNO can be held up to Soviet public as another step in that process of encirclement of USSR which, as Soviet public is being taught to believe, is heralded by Churchill’s speech.

(5) In summary, therefore, we are inclined to view Soviet reaction to Churchill’s speech as closely related to situation in Iran and to feel that Stalin has seized Churchill’s speech and exploited it, in a distorted interpretation, as an aid in preparing Soviet public psychologically for coming events.

Kennan

53. A translation of Stalin’s interview with a Pravda correspondent published on March 14 had been sent to the Department in telegram 808, March 14, 1946, from Moscow, not printed.
54. The editorial had appeared in Pravda on March 11, and a 3-column editorial article by the historian Evgeny (Eugene) Viktorovich Tarle was printed in Izvestiya for March 12, 1946.