Moscow Post Files: 121—Harriman
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page)
| Present: | V. M. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs |
| Mr. Pavlov, Soviet Interpreter | |
| W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador | |
| Edward Page, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy |
Subject: General Discussion Prior to the Ambassador’s Departure
The Ambassador stated that the President had requested him to proceed to the United States via the Far East, where he would see General Marshall17 and General MacArthur.18 He would in all probability also go to Korea and then continue on to the United States where he would report on his trip and on other matters of mutual interest. He wished to inform Mr. Molotov in confidence that he would submit his resignation upon his arrival in the United States and that he understood that his resignation would be accepted.
Mr. Molotov appeared somewhat chagrined at this news and inquired as to the reasons. He added that he deeply regretted the thinning of the Moscow diplomatic ranks by the Ambassador’s resignation.
The Ambassador explained that he had accepted the Ambassadorship as a wartime job. He had not had a vacation for five years and also he had been away from his country for about the same period. He wanted to get to know the United States again. He did not know what he would do in the future but that he might well obtain a government job. He did not feel he could entirely divorce himself from Soviet-American relations—he had them too much at heart.
Mr. Molotov stated that the Ambassador had had great experience in diplomacy and especially in that dealing with both the Soviet and the British. He therefore should not stand aloof from politics.
The Ambassador explained that he did not believe that he would do so. President Roosevelt had sent him to England before our entry into the war and that had thrown him intimately into the British war problems. He had worked closely with Churchill and Eden as well as Attlee and Bevin. Then the President had sent him to Moscow in 1941 with Lord Beaverbrook19 and later in 1942 with Prime Minister [Page 680] Churchill.20 Because of his past experience in Soviet-American relations it was quite likely that the President would call on him again in the future for work in this field. However, there was nothing definite at the present time. In any event he wished to go home and get to know America since American foreign policy must be based on public opinion.
Mr. Molotov stated that he wished the Ambassador all success in the future. He continued that the Ambassador had done a great deal in the cause of Soviet-American relations.
The Ambassador informed Mr. Molotov that Harry Hopkins was seriously ill and that it was unlikely that he would be able to play a part in American politics in the future.
Mr. Molotov remarked that Mr. Hopkins was a tenacious man and had great internal strength. The Soviet Government always thought well of him.
The Ambassador stated that he was anxious to have the privilege of saying goodbye to Generalissimus Stalin.
Mr. Molotov stated that the Generalissimus had asked him to explain to the Ambassador that he would be unable to see him since he was very busy in connection with the election campaign.
The Ambassador requested Mr. Molotov to convey his respects to the Generalissimus. He explained that he was leaving on Wednesday morning21 and if it were possible would like to have a few minutes with the Generalissimus.
Mr. Molotov stated that he would inform the Generalissimus accordingly.
The Ambassador inquired as to how things were working out in the Far East.
Mr. Molotov replied that it appeared that common ground had been found with respect to the Far Eastern matters and that now it was only necessary to work out the details.
The Ambassador inquired whether anything had transpired in the talks with Chiang’s son.22
Mr. Molotov stated that the talks were merely an exchange of information. Generalissimus Stalin had said that he had no detailed information as to the situation in China, other than that which he had read in the press and had received from the Soviet Embassy. [Page 681] Chiang had informed the Generalissimus as to what was happening there. With respect to General Marshall’s mission, the Soviet and Chinese Governments regarded it with favor. Mr. Molotov continued that the Soviet Government was abiding by its agreements with China. Its main purpose was to enable China to avoid civil war and to get China to set out on the road towards democracy and unification. He explained that the Chinese troops were coming into Manchuria quite slowly. He inquired whether the United States Government was satisfied with General Marshall’s reports. He added that it appeared that matters were going along satisfactorily.
The Ambassador replied that he had not received a great deal of information and that as far as he knew his Government was satisfied with General Marshall’s reports. He inquired as to when Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Manchuria.
Mr. Molotov replied that they would be withdrawn in conformity with the Communiqué.23 The Soviet Government would adhere to the date set forth in that Communiqué.
The Ambassador inquired as to the situation in Japan.
Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet representatives were leaving tomorrow for Tokyo. With respect to the Far Eastern Commission he understood that it was shortly proceeding to Washington. Ambassador Gromyko24 and Minister Novikov25 would be the Soviet representatives on it. He also explained that he was sending Mr. Golunski to Japan as the Soviet prosecutor.
The Ambassador asked whether Mr. Vyshinski had reported on the Rumanian talks.26
Mr. Molotov said that he had done so only by telephone. He explained that Mr. Vyshinski had been ill with a stomach ailment upon his return from Sofia—he had probably been eating too much Bulgarian pepper—and had only reported that evening to him. He explained that Mr. Vyshinski was leaving in the morning for London.
The Ambassador said that speaking perfectly frankly he was not pleased with the way the Control Commission was working out in Bucharest. However, he would recommend to MacArthur that he [Page 682] treat the Soviet representatives in Japan better than the Soviets treated us in Rumania. During the entire armistice period the American representative had only been consulted on one occasion.
Mr. Molotov asked whether the Ambassador knew how often the Soviet representatives had been consulted in Italy.
The Ambassador pointed out that there was an Allied Council in Italy. He remarked that it was not good business to treat the American representatives in Bucharest the way they had been treated.
Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government used the Italian example as a standard to go by in Europe. The Soviet representatives in Italy had never been consulted. However, he expressed the hope that the work of the Control Commission in Bucharest would improve.
The Ambassador remarked that the Soviet Government had asked for the Rumanian formula in Japan.
Mr. Molotov replied that in Rumania there were difficulties because of the divergencies in Russian and American policy. The Americans had opposed the Rumanian Government; the Soviets had supported it. It therefore had been difficult for the two nations to adjust their policies. However the situation was different now since both Governments supported the present Rumanian Government.
The Ambassador remarked that there were many petty annoyances which the American representatives were continually encountering in Rumania. As example he gave the difficulties they had with the entrance of planes, mail, the delays in issuing visas, etc. He expressed the hope that this condition would improve.
Mr. Molotov also said that he hoped there would be an improvement.
The Ambassador said that the Korean experience should be most interesting since it would be on a bilateral basis.
Mr. Molotov remarked that Korea would be a new sphere of American-Soviet cooperation. He believed that matters would proceed smoothly. Conferences had already started there.
The Ambassador continued that he did not wish to go over many of the details which entered into Soviet-American relations. He would leave that to the new Ambassador. However he would have liked to have left the new Ambassador with better housing conditions and not to have given him the annoying question of the Soviet wives. He asked Mr. Molotov whether he could not help in clearing up these matters.
Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet Government was bound to assist the American Embassy in finding proper housing accommodations. It was obliged to do this. With respect to the wives he pointed out that he had helped in some instances. He remarked that one [Page 683] Soviet wife had returned from London and had said she had had unfavorable experiences there.
The Ambassador said that if the Soviet Government would permit the wives married to American citizens to leave, the American Government would never put obstacles in their way if they wished to return.
Mr. Molotov stated that he would see what he could do to expedite action on these cases.
- General of the Army George C. Marshall, Special Representative of the President in China, with personal rank of Ambassador.↩
- General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.↩
- For documentation regarding the Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, pp. 825–851, passim.↩
- For reports concerning the Churchill-Stalin conversations in Moscow in August 1942, with Mr. Harriman in attendance, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 618–627, passim.↩
- January 23. Ambassador Harriman actually left on the following morning.↩
- Chiang Ching-kuo, Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs for Manchuria, son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China.↩
- Text of the communiqué of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Moscow on December 16–26, 1945, is printed in telegram 4284, December 27, 1945, from Moscow, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 815.↩
- Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States.↩
- Nikolay Vasilyevich Novikov, Minister Counselor of Embassy, who succeeded Gromyko as Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States on June 3, 1946.↩
- Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People’s Commissar (after March 15, Deputy Minister) for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador of the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union, constituted the Tripartite Commission for Rumania which had met at the beginning of January in Bucharest to discuss with Rumanian leaders the broadening of the government. For documentation, see pp. 555 ff.↩