871.00/11–2946: Telegram

The Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

secret
urgent

1111. Re final paragraph mytel 1101, Nov 23. King Michael asked me to come and see him late yesterday afternoon. Present were King, Queen Mother and myself. In course of long and frank talk, in which events following coup d’état were reviewed in detail, King inquired:

“Do you want me to explode a bomb now like I did on Aug 20 last year? If I do that, I will be a hero to Mr. Maniu and those around him, but that means little to me as I have learned that my popularity with politicians is high only when I do exactly what they want me to do. What truly matters to me, will I be helping the Rumanian peasant and will my action help towards an international solution of our problem? It is peasant I think about first. My mother tells me that wherever she goes, in clinics, dispensaries, work rooms, the little people, sensing something is up, whisper ‘whatever you do, don’t let the King leave’. Now, I ask you, will I be helping these people by taking some action that will make my position untenable?

My friends tell me there is no place for kings in the Soviet system, and this is the last clear-cut issue upon which I can make a stand. They may be right about no place for a person of my profession in the Soviet system, but I think there will be other issues upon which I can provoke a crisis. As I told you, I am not concerned with my popularity but only with my desire to do the right thing by the Rumanian people. You well know my whole inclination is towards the Anglo-American point of view.”

The King then reviewed events illustrating that circumstances have made Anglo-American efforts for Rumania ineffectual. He continued “If you can tell me now that your Govt will give me more than moral [Page 667] support if I go out on a limb again I will think very seriously about doing so.”

At this point I asked the King if he had seen Mr. Acheson’s statement to the press about the Rumanian elections and he replied that he had read it carefully. I then read him the pertinent sections of Deptel 745, Nov. 26. He asked me to expand a bit on these statements but I said in reading the telegram I had given him all the information that I had, and therefore any interpretation he wanted to put upon it should be his rather than mine. He then continued:

“It should not come as a suggestion from me, but when your Govt asks the British and the Soviets to review the Rumanian situation, why don’t you three agree to have the opening of Parliament postponed until your talks are held?

“Under the constitution, I am not a judge of the validity of elections. I can postpone the opening of an elected parliament for 30 days, and then it opens automatically. I must appear in Parliament on the opening day and read a message from the throne. I can dissolve Parliament after it is assembled. I can’t constitutionally do more.

“Tomniceanu (Liberal Minister of State) has suggested that I take an injection to provoke fever so that I cannot be present at the opening of Parliament and hence cannot be accused of sponsoring it. I am not going to do this as it seems to me a cheap evasion. If your Govt delivers a note to the Rumanian Govt before Parliament opens, I shall ask Tatarescu (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to inquire of you and the British and Soviets if you are satisfied with the Groza implementation of the Moscow agreement. If the Soviets say ‘yes’ and you and the British ‘no’, I shall insist upon Susaikov telling me so himself. If Susaikov acts as Vyshinski did in 1944, it seems to me, under the circumstances in which we in Rumania live today, I have no choice but to stay by my people and that means opening the Parliament in person. I repeat, however, that if you can say on behalf of your Govt that you are in a position to give me more than moral support, I may very well act differently.”

Berry