Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

860C.5034/12–2246: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Warsaw, December 22, 1946—1 p.m.
[Received 6:40 p.m.]

1972. For the Secretary. Re mytel 1953, December 19, repeated London 253.⁹⁵ While I do not consider it probable that Minc will carry out commitment to export large share of Polish coal to ECO countries (as reported in London’s 10150⁹⁶) because of commitments to Soviet Union (and because of our estimates indicating Polish Govt has over committed itself re coal) which obviously will have priority over commitments to US, I feel for reasons given below that we should give sympathetic attention to any proposals which Polish Govt may make to us. My reasons do not in any way indicate change of viewpoint since my talks with Dept officials last month. I still concur with Dept that we should not give financial assistance to those govts which assume unfriendly attitude towards US and which do not live up to their obligations to US. There is however, a possibility that Polish Govt may at long last have realized shortsightedness of its anti-American policy in light of its need for our financial and economic assistance and may be willing to agree to conditions which should be essential prerequisite to our making any commitments to Minc. I have noted from my talks with Modzelewski and Osóbka as I did from my talks with Rzymowski and Lange in New York an evident present softening of previous attitude of obstruction towards our requests (because of tremendous bargaining power which is ours due to Polish critical need for foreign exchange) we should not slam the door in face of Polish requests for credit. I would recommend that no commitments be made re possibility of extending financial assistance until we receive satisfaction and by this I mean definitive action on part of Polish Govt and not mere promises as have been given in the past on the following points: Access to arrested claimants to American citizenship, adequate compensation to American owners of nationalized property and conclusion of bilateral aviation agreement. I have not included Polish promise to hold free and unfettered elections because of my opinion that in view of thousands of arrests of members of political parties opposing Communist controlled minority and repressive measures recently taken to prevent Polish Peasant Party from filing lists of candidates with election committees, elections cannot now [be] considered to be free regardless of possible absence of intimidation on election day and of possible absence of fraud in counting of ballots. I am in a later telegram recommending that we make a vigorous protest re irregularities and injustices and while I doubt that such a protest will be efficacious it may at least serve to alleviate political situation given Polish need for our financial aid.

Reasons follow:

1. Due to Polish admission that no foreign exchange exists with which to give compensation for American nationalized property and as compensation in zlotys or in zloty bonds would be unacceptable ultimate extension of credit which would permit Poland to increase coal export and thus obtain foreign exchange should be welcome to American interests whose property nationalized.

2. Unless we take advantage of leverage which we now have I seriously doubt whether we will otherwise be able to induce Polish Govt to adopt more cooperative attitude on treatment of US citizens and property or on aviation agreement.

3. While I assume Soviet Govt will continue to control Polish economy including coal exports increase in coal output could benefit western nations and thus credit for coal machinery could be justified on that basis provided always that our conditions had been fulfilled.

4. If as now seems probable Polish Peasant Party will virtually cease to have influence in Polish Govt after forthcoming elections, it is highly advisable that we have friendly relations with Polish Socialist Party and endeavor maintain our influence [apparent omission] through this [apparent omission] Communist element for even though Osóbka and other Socialists may be dominated by Communists and in time may be forced out of Govt there is still some divergence in fundamental policies of PPR and PPS the latter still striving for national independence and for freedom from police terrorism which is still our basic policy with respect to Poland. Our indication therefore that we are prepared sympathetically to consider Osóbka in⁹⁷ proposal should do much to improve the good relations which I have endeavored to cultivate with Premier. We have reason from past performances to doubt sincerity of Osóbka, Szwalbe⁹⁸ et al., but I believe we should not subject ourselves to accusation that we are only interested in success of Mikolajczyk and his party. In recommending therefore that Dept continue conversations with Minc regardless of whether or not Polish Govt is a good banking risk with a view to obtaining definitive favorable action on our requests but without giving any commitment for time being re financial assistance, I would appreciate Dept’s authorization to continue discussion with Osóbka Morawski along lines indicated above.

Please telegraph.

Sent to Dept as 1972, repeated London as 254.

Lane

[The discussions between the Polish Minister of Industry Minc and his advisers on the one hand and representatives of the Department of State on the other hand on the question of the procedure for compensation of United States owners of enterprises which had been nationalized by the Polish Government began on December 13 and concluded on December 26, 1946. Plenary meetings were held on December 13, 16, 19, 20, 23 and 26. The negotiators reached agreement on the text of an “Outline of U.S.–Polish Understanding Concerning Nationalization Problems”, not printed. For text of the statement issued to the press by the Department of State on December 27 regarding the agreement and the decision of the United States Government to release Polish assets in the United States, see Department of State Bulletin, January 5, 1947, page 28. A subcommittee of the negotiators considered the question of commercial policy, but that subject was presumably not discussed at any of the plenary sessions. The question of Polish coal was discussed at the plenary meeting on December 16 and apparently was not raised subsequently. Telegram 16, January 6, 1947, to Warsaw summarized the results of the efforts by the Polish delegation to secure assurances regarding additional credits: “For your information Minister Minc in course of conversations on nationalization problems sought to obtain assurances concerning Eximbank cotton and tobacco credits. Was informed first that credits could not be associated with undertakings regarding compensation for nationalized properties, and secondly that Department could not anticipate consideration of credits until after lapse of sufficient time following elections to give assurance of internal stability essential for credit worthiness. February 1 mentioned as earliest such date. Minister orally informed of this Government’s interest in European cotton market and advised of favorable consideration of cotton application at technical levels.” (860C.51/1–647)]

95. Not printed; it reported on Ambassador Lane’s conversation with Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski, December 17. Ambassador Lane stressed to the Polish Prime Minister that the attitude of the Polish press and the attacks made on the United States by responsible members of the Polish Government created circumstances under which it would be difficult for Poland to obtain credits from the United States. Osóbka-Morawski stated that “his policy is to have much closer relations with the West and especially with the US and that his party (PPS) supports this policy. He said that as this is a coalition govt there are divergent views. He admitted that one faction of govt (obviously PPR) takes position that Poland has only one friend (Soviet Union) and that it is to Poland’s interest to cultivate relations with this friend. Osóbka said that if he could obtain from US some tangible sign of our friendship such as a credit for coal mining machinery he would be able to rebut charge that Poland has only one friend. Osóbka added ‘monopoly is an evil thing’. He said further that Poland desires to maintain western form of civilization and for this reason wished to draw closer to western powers.” (860C.5034/12–1946)
96. Dated December 18, not printed.
97. This sentence is apparently garbled.
98. Stanislaw Szwalbe, President of the Presidium of the Chief Council of the Polish Socialist Party.